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Abstract 
 Infants with life-terminating conditions (ILTCs) are those whose conditions prevent them 
from living more than two years.  When these infants have difficulty assimilating food and fluids 
orally, doctors can provide nutrition and hydration through artificial means.  While artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) can provide benefits, it can also result in complications leading to 
pain and/or distress in addition to that which an ILTC may already be experiencing from one or 
more underlying conditions.   
 Many medical experts maintain that withholding or withdrawing ANH can help a 
patient’s body produce its own analgesics.  I consider four categories of ILTCs: 1) infants who 
receive prognoses of two weeks or less; 2) infants who will live longer than two weeks but no 
more than two years and who are not suffering or in distress; 3) infants who are not dying, but 
are in distress from the use of ANH; and 4) infants who are not dying, but are in distress from 
their conditions and/or ANH.  I argue that in addition to providing natural analgesics, 
withholding or withdrawing ANH is a form of comfort care that prevents the occurrence of 
further complications requiring additional medical treatments and keeps ILTCs content.  Under 
certain circumstances, the withholding or withdrawing of ANH should be obligatory. 
 As it stands, the whole of Catholic teaching on ANH is inconsistent.  Operating from the 
sanctity-of-life ethic, the Church teaches that ANH is an ordinary, therefore obligatory, form of 
care.  But this position contradicts the view that any form of care presenting a grave burden to a 
patient and/or his family is extraordinary and therefore optional.  In addition, by making ANH 
obligatory, the Catholic Church causes families to undergo heroic suffering (i.e., enduring more 
than what can be expected or asked of anyone), which the Church says is not required of 
everyone.  I argue that rethinking the Catholic position on ANH will enable the Church to offer 
vii 
practical moral guidance for families to comfort ILTCs, help ILTCs and their families avoid 
heroic suffering, and provide spiritual care families of ILTCs need, all while still respecting the 
sanctity of life of every person.  
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Preface 
1  Considering the Use of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
 Should we use artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) to feed and hydrate infants with 
life-terminating conditions (ILTCs)?  ANH is normally provided as a temporary or “bridge” 
treatment for patients who cannot orally assimilate food and fluids.  It is intended to be used until 
a patient is well enough to eat foods and drink liquids orally.   
 ANH is not peculiar to the twentieth century.  Ancient Egyptians tried to feed patients 
using reeds and animal bladders.  In the late eighteenth century, attempts to feed patients utilized 
“hollow whale bone covered with eel skin” (Greene).  Attempts even occurred rectally (e.g., 
ancient Egyptians and the doctors treating President James Garfield after he was shot in 1881) 
(Greene).   
 Today, ANH can be provided in a number of different ways.  Doctors can thread a 
nasogastric (NG) tube through the nose, down the esophagus, and into the stomach or duodenum.  
They can surgically insert a gastrostomy tube into the stomach, the duodenum, or further into the 
gastrointestinal tract.  If necessary, doctors can feed and hydrate patients through a peripheral 
vein or a central vein near the heart.  Each form of ANH has both its advantages and 
disadvantages.  I shall provide a more detailed account of the various forms of ANH in chapter 1.  
 Sometimes, though, when an infant is not expected to live more than a year or two and 
has lost either his appetite or his ability to eat, families and doctors at least consider, if not follow 
through with, providing him with ANH.  Providing ANH, however, does not always benefit the 
infant and/or the family caring for him.  In fact, ANH can cause distress for the infant and 
suffering for the family.  Sometimes it is best to withhold or withdraw ANH, but only under 
certain conditions.   
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2  Offering Help to Families of ILTCs 
 In 2010, Marie T. Hilliard,1 the director of bioethics and public policy for The National 
Catholic Bioethics Center, published a pamphlet entitled Caring for Each Other, Even Unto 
Death.  This pamphlet draws its information from the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops’ (USCCB’s) Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
(ERDs), Wojtyla’s The Gospel of Life and 2004 address, and the Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith’s (CDF’s) “Responses to Certain Questions of the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and Hydration.”  Since Hilliard’s pamphlet is a 
USCCB-approved resource designed to help Catholic families make moral choices about the end 
of life for their loved ones, it is worth considering its discussion of ANH for dying patients. 
 The front panel of Caring for Each Other, Even Unto Death depicts a smiling religious 
sister helping a dying elderly woman drink from a cup.  Inside the pamphlet is a picture of what 
appears to be an elderly husband at his dying wife’s bedside.  Like most Catholic resources on 
death and dying, this pamphlet focuses primarily on the care of dying elderly patients and of 
patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS); it does not address caring for sick or dying 
infants.  So Catholic families with ILTCs may find themselves without practical choices in their 
particular situations.  We can probably assume that lessons learned in caring for the dying elderly 
can be applied to caring for dying ILTCs. 
 Looking at the pamphlet’s front panel, we may be led to believe that the religious sister is 
helping the elderly woman drink all the water from her cup.  Giving drink to the thirsty is an act 
of charity that the Church encourages all of her members to perform whenever the situation 
arises.  But as we shall learn in chapter 1, a dying patient may only need a sip of water to keep 
                                                          
1
 Hilliard is a canon lawyer and a nurse. 
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his mouth moist, and nothing more.  From a religious point of view, we may get the impression 
that we are supposed to help a dying patient finish whatever is in his cup or on his plate.  From a 
medical point of view, however, by forcing (either intentionally or unintentionally) food and 
fluids, we may be delivering more harms than benefits to a dying patient. 
 Suppose, however, that the picture on the front panel depicted the religious sister feeding 
the elderly woman through an NG tube or a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube.  
The scene may be disturbing to some people, especially if they are unfamiliar with ANH.  The 
scene may also cause many people to say, “If that is the way I am going to be fed, I would rather 
die.”  The risks and burdens of ANH are real, especially in conjunction with underlying 
conditions.  While ANH is something that few, if any, people relish the thought of, it is 
important for everyone to learn that this has become a widely practiced, successful method of 
providing nutrition and hydration to patients who cannot assimilate food and fluids orally.  And 
it may become just one of many treatments that families have to consider in caring for their 
ILTCs.  
 The fact that the elderly dying woman is sipping from a cup implies a number of things 
worth considering.  As the sister is helping her with the cup, we notice the woman’s hand also 
holding it.  From this picture we can infer 1) the woman is conscious, and has somehow 
indicated that she would like some water; 2) the woman can still perform certain functions such 
as drinking from a cup, although she needs help holding it steady; and 3) the woman probably 
has some kind of interpersonal connection with the sister (as indicated by the smile on the 
sister’s face). 
 While an ILTC may be similar to the elderly woman in virtue of the fact that both may be 
dying, there are a number of differences we need to keep in mind.  First, while an ILTC may be 
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aware of stimuli, he is incapable of expressing himself in the same way the elderly woman may 
be able to.  If she cannot ask for water verbally, she may be able to make gestures such as 
pointing to a pitcher of water or holding an imaginary cup to her lips.  She can push a button to 
signal the nursing station that she needs assistance.  An ILTC cannot do any of these things.  It 
may be some time before someone notices his crying or other cues of distress (e.g., thrashing, 
etc.) during hospital rounds.  If the elderly woman is conscious of her situation, she can indicate 
in some form or other that she wants something provided or withdrawn.  If she is unable to do 
this for herself, other family members can give doctors and nurses permission to perform various 
treatments based on their knowledge of her preferences or prior wishes.  But an ILTC is 
completely at others’ mercy.  In some instances, it is only when complications develop that 
doctors and parents realize that the infant is in pain and/or distress.  And sometimes, the best 
interests of the family override the best interests of the ILTC.  Sometimes it is in an ILTC’s best 
interests to be allowed to die sooner rather than later.  While it may not seem to be the case at the 
time, an ILTC’s death may actually help relieve the family’s suffering and allow them to move 
forward with their own lives and be a source of help and comfort for other families in similar 
circumstances.   
3  Motivation and Purpose of This Dissertation 
 My dissertation will examine the debate over ANH for ILTCs from within the Roman 
Catholic tradition.  Why am I taking this approach?  I am a Catholic, and consequently, I think 
from within the Roman Catholic tradition.  In 2002, my wife gave birth to our second son 
Zachary, who was born with trisomy 13, a fatal genetic condition.  We learned of his condition a 
little more than two months before he was born.  Because we wanted to remain in good standing 
with the Catholic Church (so as to be able to receive the sacraments), it was extremely important 
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for us to do only those things the Church permitted.  Since Zachary lived for only six hours, 
feeding him was not an issue we needed to pursue.  Had he lived longer, though, it would have 
been, and because of severe facial deformities, some form of ANH would have been necessary.  
In my research of the Catholic position on ANH, I have discovered that very little attention is 
given to infants within the debate over ANH.   
 Within the Catholic tradition, infants deserve as much protection as any other vulnerable 
persons such as the elderly, disabled, sick, or dying.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I shall 
consider the question of providing ANH to ILTCs whose conditions will cause them to die 
before the age of two.  ILTCs who die before the age of two will never be able to speak on their 
own behalf.  Nor will they experience life as do healthy infants who live to later stages of 
childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.  Since the Catholic Church considers ANH an obligatory 
form of care but clinical evidence suggests that it may be best to withhold or withdraw ANH 
from dying patients, Catholic families often find themselves facing a very difficult ethical 
dilemma in deciding what forms of care to provide to their infants.  My goals are to resolve 
tensions within the Catholic tradition regarding ANH—especially in regard to ILTCs—and to 
offer suggestions as to how the Church can provide both spiritual care and practical moral 
guidance for her members. 
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Chapter 1: ANH Not Always Beneficial for ILTCs 
 Some infants are born healthy and can assimilate food and fluids orally either by 
breastfeeding or bottle feeding.  As they mature, they can eat solid foods as well.  But some 
infants are born with conditions preventing them from assimilating food and fluids orally (e.g., 
duodenal atresia).  Doctors can correct duodenal atresia with a relatively quick and simple 
surgical procedure to remove the blockage, after which an infant can begin to assimilate food and 
fluids orally.  Still other infants who cannot assimilate food and fluids orally have more severe 
conditions that simple surgery cannot correct.  While doctors are capable of more invasive forms 
of surgery, infants with life-terminating conditions (ILTCs) may be unsuitable candidates for 
these more invasive forms.  Artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) then becomes the only 
means of feeding and hydrating them.   
 Since my focus is on ILTCs who are not expected to live more than two years, we must 
ask some extremely difficult questions.  First, if ILTCs are given prognoses of two weeks or less, 
must we feed and hydrate them through ANH?  Second, if ILTCs are given prognoses of more 
than two weeks but less than two years, what should our position be on providing ANH to them?  
There are three groups of ILTCs we must consider in regard to the second question.  Most ILTCs 
will eventually enter the dying process due to underlying conditions.  But there are also some 
ILTCs who are not dying from underlying conditions but suffer distress from complications of 
the use of ANH.  There are still other ILTCs who are not dying from their underlying conditions 
but suffer distress from complications of their conditions and/or ANH.  Sometimes it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to tell the difference.  Some of these complications can be life-threatening in 
and of themselves.  I contend that if ILTCs are given prognoses of less than two weeks, it is in 
their best interests for us to withhold ANH from them completely.  I also contend that if ILTCs 
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are given prognoses of more than two weeks but less than two years, it is in their best interests to 
withhold ANH from them once we can determine that they have entered the dying process.  In 
cases where ILTCs are not dying but are in distress from the use of ANH, it is in their best 
interests to withdraw ANH and provide palliative care only.  In cases where ILTCs are not dying 
but are in distress from their conditions and/or the use of ANH, I recommend that doctors first 
pinpoint the cause of the distress and then alleviate it.  If either the underlying condition or 
complications from the use of ANH cause an ILTC to enter the dying process, doctors should 
withdraw ANH.  
 My position may seem to go against our instincts to provide food and fluids to our loved 
ones, especially infants.  But many medical experts argue that withholding or withdrawing food 
and fluids, including ANH, may actually be in a dying patient’s best interests.  What I aim to 
show is that there are inconsistencies within the whole of Catholic teaching on ANH for sick 
and/or dying persons.  While my position may not be consistent with the whole of Catholic 
teaching on this issue, it is consistent with at least part of it. 
1.1  ANH: What It Is, Its Benefits, and Its Burdens 
 ANH becomes an option when an infant—or any person, for that matter—is incapable of 
assimilating food and fluids orally.  Without proper nutrition and hydration, any infant will die.  
But an infant may refuse to eat altogether, spit out whatever is placed in his mouth, vomit what 
he has already ingested, or show other signs of distress such as choking, constipation, diarrhea, 
etc.    It is important to consider the various forms in which ANH can be supplied, for each 
involves different risks and burdens. 
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1.1.1  Enteral Forms of ANH 
 The first type of ANH is referred to as enteral, or that which uses the digestive tract.  
ANH can be accomplished enterally by various methods: nasogastric tube, gastrostomy tube, or 
jejunostomy tube.  I will briefly describe each of these devices, procedures for inserting them, 
benefits, and risks, as described by Myles N. Sheehan, S.J., in “Feeding Tubes: Sorting Out the 
Issues.” 
 Nasogastric (NG) tubes “are thin tubes inserted into the nostril, threaded into the 
nasopharynx, and then advanced down the esophagus into the stomach or, frequently, into the 
first portion of the duodenum” (18).  NG tubes are relatively easy to insert and deliver necessary 
alimentation without surgery.  As a means of feeding, however, they are not intended to be used 
longer than two weeks.  NG tubes  
can press against the delicate lining of the nostrils and pharynx and lead to 
ulceration.  They can also interfere with drainage from the sinuses and lead to 
blockage and infection.  Although they are sometimes used for a prolonged period 
of time, the risks of ulceration and infection make them a less-than-ideal choice.  
Some patients must be restrained so that, in a moment of confusion, they do not 
pull on the tube and dislodge it.  (19) 
 A gastrostomy tube is “inserted directly into the stomach, either surgically or, more 
commonly, by placing an endoscope through the skin” (18).  If an endoscope is used, the tube is 
referred to as a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube.  After insertion of the 
endoscope, doctors can see the lighted end of it through the skin.  Once the endoscope is in the 
proper location, doctors can insert the PEG tube into the stomach or the duodenum.  If necessary, 
doctors can place the tube further into the gastrointestinal tract in the same manner as a PEG 
4 
tube.  When this is done, the tube is referred to as a jejunostomy (JPEG) tube (18).  Gastrostomy 
tubes are an option if ANH is required for more than two weeks.  “Surgically placed gastrostomy 
tubes are inserted when a person has had previous abdominal surgeries or when placing the tube 
endoscopically would be dangerous” (19).   
 PEG tube placement requires sedation, and an extremely ill patient or one with “serious 
breathing difficulties” can suffer rare “complications from drops in blood pressure or respiratory 
arrest during placement” (19).  Other possible nonserious complications include “perforation of 
the gastrointestinal tract, infection of the abdominal cavity (. . . peritonitis), bleeding, and local 
infection at the site of the tube placement” (19).  If a patient routinely suffers from “aspiration of 
stomach material into the lungs,” a jejunostomy tube is usually recommended (19).  One 
drawback of jejunostomy tubes is that they require formulas that are different from and more 
expensive than PEG tubes.  In addition, patients with jejunostomy tubes are more likely to suffer 
from diarrhea than patients with PEG tubes (19). 
 How a patient is fed with feeding tubes can also vary.  “Tube feedings can be ordered as 
bolus feedings (where a relatively large amount is given over a short period of time several times 
a day) or through a continuous drip in which the solution is administered at a precise rate for 
eighteen or more hours a day” (19-20).  The use of feeding tubes is not a trouble-free solution, 
however.  “Bolus feedings can allow a person to be mobile when not being fed, but they do have 
a higher risk of aspiration.  Drip feedings carry a lesser risk of massive aspiration but limit 
mobility and independence” (20).  Newborn infants are not mobile, but family members must be 
careful not to interfere with drip-feed tubes when holding or providing other forms of care for 
their infants.  In addition, “[d]iarrhea, transient pneumonia, restraints that keep a confused 
patient from pulling a tube out, severely restricted mobility, and occasional clogging by pill 
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fragments are day-to-day occurrences with feeding tubes.  Feeding tubes are burdens, but the 
degree of burden varies from patient to patient” (20).    
1.1.2  Parenteral Forms of ANH 
 Parenteral or intravenous feeding is the second type of ANH.  Like enteral feeding, 
parenteral feeding can provide alimentation to a patient using different methods.  The National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops’ (NCCB’s)2 Committee for Pro-Life Activities describes various 
forms of parenteral feeding in “Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections.”  The 
first type of parenteral feeding is peripheral intravenous feeding, in which “a needle [is] inserted 
into a peripheral vein” (131).  Benefits of peripheral intravenous feeding include the ability to 
“provide fluids and electrolytes as well as some nutrients; they can maintain fluid balance and 
prevent dehydration . . .” (131).  One disadvantage of this method is that it “cannot provide 
adequate nutrition in the long term” (131).   
 The second type of parenteral feeding is central intravenous feeding, also referred to as 
“total parenteral feeding or hyperalimentation” (131).  This method of alimentation involves 
“using a larger needle inserted into a central vein near the heart” (131).  One benefit of total 
parenteral feeding is that it “can provide a more adequate nutritional balance” (131).  At the 
same time, however, it can [pose] significant risks to the patient and may involve costs an order 
magnitude higher than other methods of tube feeding” (131).  Total parenteral feeding “has 
become ‘a mainstay for helping critically ill patients to survive acute illnesses where the 
prognosis had previously been nearly hopeless,’ but its feasibility for life-long maintenance of 
patients without a functioning gastrointestinal tract has been questioned” (131). 
                                                          
2
 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) is now known as the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).  While it may be found in print form, the reader may 
access “Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections” here. 
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1.1.3  A Review of the Burdens of Each Form of ANH 
 The ultimate benefit of any form of ANH is that it delivers nutrition and hydration that an 
ILTC needs to survive.  But since the decision to withhold or withdraw ANH is dependent on the 
burdens, it may be helpful to summarize the burdens associated with each form of ANH. 
 I.  Enteral: 
  A.  Nasogastric (NG) tube:  
   1.  Burdens:    
    a.  Not intended to be used for more than two weeks 
    b.  Easy to dislodge and may require patient restraint 
    c.  Ulceration 
    d.  Sinus blockage and infection 
    e.  Restraint is source of distress for patient 
  B.  Percutaneous Enteral Gastrostomy (PEG) tube/Jejunostomy (JPEG) tube: 
   1.  Burdens: 
    a.  Requires sedation 
    b.  Possibility of perforation of gastrointestinal tract 
    c.  Infection of abdominal cavity 
    d.  Bleeding 
    e.  Local infection at tube placement site 
    f.  JPEG is more expensive 
    g.  JPEG more likely to cause diarrhea 
    h.  Higher risk of aspiration with bolus feeding 
    i.  Limited mobility and independence with drip feeding   
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 II.  Parenteral: 
  A.  Peripheral intravenous feeding:  
   1.  Burdens:    
    a.  Cannot provide adequate nutrition in long term 
  B.  Total parenteral feeding (hyperalimentation) 
   1.  Burdens: 
    a.  Significant risks to patient3 
     (1) Cholestasis with possible resulting sepsis 
     (2) Liver disease and hepatic failure 
     (3) Irreversible liver failure after several months of use 
     (4) Complications from use of line 
      (a) Thrombosis 
      (b) Vascular perforation 
      (c) Infection 
       ((1)) Staphylococcus epidermidis (bacterial) 
       ((2)) Staphylococcus aureus (bacterial) 
       ((3)) Candida albicans (fungal) 
       ((4)) Malassezia furfur (fungal) 
    b.  Much more expensive than other methods 
    c.  Long-term use questionable 
                                                          
3
 The NCCB (now the USCCB) does not provide a list of what these significant risks may be.  
These risks may be found in Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine: Diseases of the Fetus and Infant 608-
609. 
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These are only some of the burdens associated with ANH.  Parents of ILTCs must also consider 
the burdens associated with their infants’ underlying conditions, the burdens associated with 
treatments for those conditions, the burdens associated with complications resulting from 
treatments, etc.  Likewise, parents must also consider the burdens associated with complications 
resulting from ANH.  As we can see, families may be overwhelmed by all the decisions they 
must make about providing care for their ILTCs.  Families need the expertise of doctors and 
nurses to help them make these decisions.   
1.2  Diminishing Importance of Food and Fluids in the Dying Process 
 Because our society has, for the most part, become unfamiliar with the dying process, it 
may surprise many people to learn that when a patient begins the dying process, he no longer 
needs food and fluids as do people who are not dying.  In our attempt to understand what 
happens to a patient’s body during the dying process, we need to speak in clinical—not religious 
or moral—terms.  Describing the dying process in clinical terms, the vast majority of medical 
experts concur that once the dying process begins, the patient’s body no longer needs food and 
fluids.  Administering food and fluids may in fact interfere with and prolong the dying process, 
and as a result, it does nothing more than create greater discomfort for the patient.  
 Complications can arise as a result of employing even the simplest form of ANH, an NG 
tube.  According to Joyce Brennfleck Shannon, editor of the Death and Dying Sourcebook, an 
NG tube is the easiest of the various feeding tubes to insert, but it can cause a patient “pain and 
discomfort related to the forceful introduction of physical devices in the esophagus, needed 
sedation, and infections often resulting from the procedure” (135). 
 According to Dr. Ladislav Volicer, clinical director of the Geriatric Research, Education 
and Clinical Center (GRECC) at the E.N.R.M. Veterans Hospital in Bedford, Massachusetts, the 
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common practice at his facility is to “[convert Alzheimer] patients back to assisted feeding on 
arrival.  ‘They can always eat to some degree,’ he says, ‘except during the actual dying process.’  
Patients in the dying phase do not experience hunger and thirst. . .” (Shannon 135).  Volicer also 
says,  ‘What we are trying to do is switch the emphasis of care from high tech to high touch. . .’ ” 
(135).   
 Some ILTCs require ANH at the very beginning of their lives because they have 
conditions that prevent them from assimilating food and fluids orally.  In this regard they are 
different from Alzheimer patients who eventually forget how to eat.  But worth noting is the 
notion of “switching the emphasis of care from high tech to high touch.”  ILTCs—as well as 
other patients—may benefit from the use of advanced technology in a hospital setting.  But it is 
human presence—especially the sense of touch—that can help comfort an infant.  In the neonatal 
intensive care unit (NICU) where Zachary would have been treated, there was a room with 
several rocking chairs in it, precisely so that families and/or nursing staff could rock these infants 
to comfort them.  Rocking by itself will not cure an infant’s life-terminating condition(s), but the 
simple, gentle, steady act of rocking delivers benefits not only to the infant, but anyone caring 
for him.  
 What would prompt us to even consider withholding or withdrawing food and fluids from 
a person, especially in the dying process?  Providing food and fluids is a basic form of care 
showing people that we love them.  The body can produce its own painkillers.  This phenomenon 
occurs, however, only when food and fluids are withheld during the dying process.  In Handbook 
for Mortals: Guidance for People Facing Serious Illness, Drs. Joanne Lynn and Joan Harrold list 
a number of potential benefits of not using ANH when a patient is close to death.  First, “less 
fluid in the lungs” makes it easier for a patient to breathe (131).  Second, a patient needs less 
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suctioning—an unpleasant procedure—if there is “less fluid in the throat” (131).  Third, a 
decrease in fluids results in “less pressure on tumors,” and this in itself will relieve some pain 
(131).  Fourth, patients suffer “less risk of skin breakdown and bed sores” through “less frequent 
urination” (131).  Fifth and finally, an “increase in the body’s natural pain-relieving hormones” 
results in “increased comfort and less pain” for the patient (131).     
 Since we ourselves are unfamiliar with the body’s ability to create its own painkillers in 
the dying process, we seek pharmaceutical remedies for others when it is really unnecessary.  We 
need to educate ourselves more about what actually happens when people die.  Darby Morhardt, 
a social worker from Northwestern University Alzheimer’s Disease Center, says, 
Our modern culture tends to treat dying as unnatural.  Our technology allows us to 
forestall death, yet cannot prevent it.  Family members need to be informed—with 
great compassion, sensitivity, and patience—about the dying process and how 
natural and inevitable it truly is.  The body is shutting down.  The natural process 
of dying means that the body no longer wants or needs food or fluids.  This is 
often viewed as unnatural by caregivers and even some health care professionals.  
However, we need to explore our own feelings and attitudes toward death and 
dying before we can help families through this transitional process, this time of 
loss and change.  (Shannon 135) 
Dying patients’ bodies are no longer functioning as a healthy person’s does.  Often a person 
loses strength and the ability to fight infection.  In many instances, pneumonia or a urinary tract 
infection (UTI)—conditions otherwise healthy people recover from with antibiotics4—ends up 
                                                          
4
 While not the primary focus of my dissertation, it is worth noting that the Church considers 
antibiotics to be an ordinary form of medical care.  Like ANH, the use of antibiotics can prolong 
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being the direct cause of a dying patient’s death.  Lynn and Harrold write, “Until this generation, 
everyone who died a natural death died without artificially supplied fluids.  The stopping of 
eating and drinking has always been part of the last phase of a terminal condition.  Only recently 
have people been afraid that not providing food and fluid through a tube would cause someone to 
‘starve to death’ ” (133).  The patient’s body is telling him in its own terms that the end is near.  
Since dying infants cannot express themselves in words, it is even more important for us to be 
able to read the signs of dying in their case so as to allow them to die in comfort. 
 Consider how Mary K. Kazanowski, a registered nurse and professor at Saint Anselm 
College in Manchester, New Hampshire, describes in “Symptom Management in Palliative 
Care” the benefits of withholding fluids: 
. . . [D]ehydration in individuals at the end of life is considered a normal 
physiologic process that occurs to prepare the body for death.  Reduced desire and 
intake of food and fluids is also a normal physiologic process near death.  
Although decrease (sic) intake and consequent dehydration may be associated 
with weakness, fatigue and thirst, it is not considered an uncomfortable condition 
for the patient that merits reversal.  Furthermore, dehydration may actually have 
some beneficial effects in terms of symptom palliation (Zerwekh, 1983; 
Musgrave, 1990).  Zerwekh (1983) contended that intake cessation leads to a 
reduced fluid load which serves to reduce urinary output, nausea and vomiting, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a dying patient’s life to the point where he recovers from an infection, only to contract it again or 
bear the pain of some other condition(s) or complication(s).  Coupled with ANH, antibiotics can 
begin a vicious cycle of being fed, suffering complications (e.g., pneumonia from fluid in the 
lungs or a UTI), being treated with antibiotics, and possibly suffering further complications 
(either from antibiotics, underlying condition[s] or both).  I believe no patient should be placed 
in such a predicament.  
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pulmonary congestion, and edema.  Printz (1992) described a possible 
endogenous benefit of intake cessation citing the effects of ketosis and increased 
levels of endorphins on the central nervous system in rats.  Increased endorphins 
in humans may lead to a heightened state of well-being.  (351-352) 
When we think of dehydration as a negative condition only, we deny ourselves the possibility of 
viewing it as a benefit for a dying patient.  Likewise, if we view hydration as a positive condition 
only, we may be providing more harms than benefits to a dying patient.  Kazanowski describes 
the following negative side-effects of providing ANH: 
Forcing fluids or food on a person who has no or little appetite risks causing 
nausea, vomiting, and aspiration.  Insertion and maintenance of intravenous 
catheters or nasogastric/feeding tubes is often painful for patients.  Fluids from 
intravenous infusions or nasogastric tube feedings can increase respiratory 
secretions, which in turn increases pulmonary congestion, cough, and sensations 
of dyspnea.  Administration of intravenous fluids will also increase urinary 
output, increasing the occurrence of incontinence or need for Foley catheters.  
Intravenous fluids will also increase total body water, which could result in an 
increase in fluid retention in the form of edema, ascites, or pleural effusions.  
Intravenous and nasogastric fluids would also increase gastric secretions, which 
could contribute to nausea and vomiting.  (352)  
 Marianne LaPorte Matzo, a registered nurse, professor of nursing at New Hampshire 
Community Technical College in Manchester, New Hampshire, and editor of Palliative Care 
Nursing: Quality Care to the End of Life, recommends the following actions when caring for 
dying patients: 
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The person may have a decrease in appetite and thirst, wanting little to no food or 
fluid.  The body will naturally begin to conserve energy that would be expended 
on these tasks.  Do not try to force food or drink into the person.  To use guilt or 
manipulation only makes the person more uncomfortable.  Small chips of ice, 
frozen Gatorade or juice may be refreshing inside the mouth.  If the person is able 
to swallow, fluids may be given in small amounts by syringe. . . .  Glycerin swabs 
may help keep the mouth and lips moist and comfortable.  A cool, moist 
washcloth on the forehead may also increase physical comfort.  (497) 
Sometimes, medical personnel who are determined to save the lives of terminally ill infants use 
guilt or manipulation to get parents to consent to ANH when it may be unnecessary.  
Kazanowski urges nurses to discuss advantages and disadvantages of terminal dehydration with 
families, “and allow families time to absorb the information” (352).  If family members cannot 
bring themselves to consent to withholding or withdrawing food and fluids but insist on 
continuing with ANH, nurses should ensure that over-hydration does not occur (352-353). 
1.3  Comforting ILTCs with Forms of Care other than ANH 
 It may help to narrow our focus within the debate over ANH for ILTCs by beginning 
with forms of care that 1) everyone agrees we should provide to ILTCs until they die; 2) do not 
present complications that cause distress; and 3) do not make decisions about their moral nature 
(i.e., ordinary or extraordinary) difficult.   
 As the human body shuts down, it needs less of the things we consider necessary for 
good health: food, fluids, exercise, etc.  Since we are talking about infants, most of the things 
that matter to adults and older children (e.g., work, school, sports, hobbies, friends, etc.) have no 
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relevance for ILTCs.  But there are three things that every person benefits from, regardless of his 
age or condition: warmth, cleanliness, and human presence. 
 As the body begins to shut down, it is unable to regulate its own temperature.  An 
obvious sign of discomfort from cold is shivering.  An infant will, if able, cry to alert us that he 
is in distress.  Keeping any patient warm can be as simple as turning up the thermostat, adding 
additional layers of clothing, or placing additional blankets over the patient.  Keeping a terminal 
infant warm will not prolong the dying process.  So the simple act of providing warmth can help 
not only the infant, but also family members (to include young children) and friends by making 
them feel as though they are doing something useful, even when the infant is dying. 
 Another need that every single person has—but terminal infants especially—is 
cleanliness.  While soiled diapers are not in themselves a life-threatening condition, they make 
an infant uncomfortable, and, left untreated, lead to other discomforts such as diaper rash.  
Cleanliness is especially important for infants because their immune systems are not fully 
developed, and it is easier for them to pick up infections of one sort or another.  If an infant has 
undergone surgery—to include placement of a feeding tube—medical personnel and family 
members must routinely check to ensure complications (e.g., bleeding, infection, etc.) have not 
arisen.  Like providing warmth, cleaning can help anyone involved feel useful. 
 Satisfying an infant’s physical needs such as warmth and cleanliness also satisfies 
another need: human presence.  Providing cleanliness requires human presence.  But there is 
more to human presence than just placing blankets over the infant or changing his linens.  
Moreover, human presence entails more than checking an infant’s charts and vital signs, 
administering feedings, and inspecting medical devices such as tubes, monitors, etc. 
15 
 An ILTC cannot communicate in the same manner as an older patient who still has the 
ability to speak or give nonverbal cues to caregivers.  Crying, thrashing, or some other indication 
of distress may be all ILTCs are capable of in terms of communicating their need for something.  
But unlike an older person who can tell his caregivers that he does not want any more food or 
fluids, an ILTC being fed by ANH cannot tell his caregivers that he does not want any more food 
or fluids.  Caregivers must be extremely vigilant of indications that the ILTC is receiving more 
food or fluids than his body needs: edema, aspiration, infection, etc.  Some of these 
complications can be life-threatening in and of themselves. 
 Another difference between dying elderly patients and dying ILTCs is that some dying 
elderly patients can enjoy interpersonal relationships on different levels with family, friends, 
doctors, and other caregivers.  We do not expect these things of dying ILTCs, but they may 
somehow know that the presence of their mothers, fathers, and/or other family members means 
comfort.  Family, friends, doctors, and caregivers can provide human presence by providing the 
sound of a human voice as they share their own memories and stories, as well as by holding, 
rocking, caressing, singing to him, etc.  Though an ILTC cannot articulate his gratitude the way 
older children or adults can, caregivers should feel reassured that if the ILTC is comfortable, 
they must be doing something right, that is, providing loving care that the ILTC needs right here 
and now.  Warmth, cleanliness, and human presence are all, I maintain, morally ordinary (i.e., 
obligatory) forms of care for an ILTC.  Attempts to provide more aggressive treatments may 
actually interfere with these forms of care which are always morally required. 
1.4  Conditions Making Decisions about ANH Difficult 
 We consider infants—especially ILTCs—to be some of the most vulnerable persons 
among us.  The vulnerable deserve our care and protection.  Infants also represent our future.  
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They give us hope and reasons to look forward to the future.  But in the case of ILTCs, their 
future may end just minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, or a couple of years from now.  As a 
hospital chaplain told my wife and me just a few weeks before Zachary was born, Zachary’s 
birth was going to be bittersweet: just as soon as we would be welcoming him into the world, we 
would have to begin planning for the moment he would be leaving it.  Especially for first-time 
parents, there is also the frightening question of how they are going to care for their infant once 
they bring him home from the hospital.  For the parents of ILTCs, the terrifying question is how 
they are going to care for their infants and keep them comfortable until the time they die. 
 Keeping in mind that death for anyone deprived of all food and fluids occurs within 
approximately fifteen days, I wish to consider four groups of ILTCs when it comes to 
withholding or withdrawing ANH as a means of providing comfort care.  In chapter 4, I present 
my recommendations and arguments for doing so.  
1.4.1  Infants Who Receive Prognoses of Two Weeks or Less 
 The first group consists of those ILTCs who receive prognoses of two weeks or less.  
Conditions that often result in death within two weeks after birth are trisomy 18, trisomy 13, and 
trisomy 9.  About trisomy 18, Kenneth Lyon Jones, professor of pediatrics, chief of the Division 
of Dysmorphology and Teratology, and author of Smith’s Recognizable Patterns of Human 
Malformation, writes, “Fifty percent die within the first week and many of the remaining die in 
the next 12 months.  Median survival time is 14.5 days. . . .  Once the diagnosis has been 
established, limitation of extraordinary medical means for prolongation of life should be 
seriously considered” (14). 
 About trisomy 13, Jones writes, 
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 The median survival for children with this disorder is 7 days.  Ninety-one 
percent died within the first year. . . .  Because of the high infant mortality, 
surgical or orthopedic corrective procedures should be withheld in early infancy 
to await the outcome of the first few months.  Furthermore, because of the severe 
brain defect, limitation of extraordinary medical means to prolong the life of 
individuals with this syndrome should be seriously considered.  (19)      
Infants with trisomy 13 often also have several abnormalities including those affecting the 
central nervous system, heart, and kidneys.  Like his comments about infants with trisomy 18, 
Jones says, “. . . [I]t is important to emphasize that each case must be taken on an individual 
basis. The individual circumstances of each child as well as the personal feelings of the parents 
must be acknowledged” (19).   
 The majority of infants with trisomy 9 “die during the early postnatal period” (26).  There 
are “[c]ongenital heart defects in approximately two thirds of cases” (26).  In addition, infants 
with trisomy 9 may have abnormalities affecting the gastrointestinal system, kidneys, and 
bladder (26).   
 For our purposes, we may consider these infants already in the dying process from the 
moment they are born.  Of course, there will be infants who live longer than expected.  In very 
rare cases, infants with trisomy 18 live much longer than one year.  “There are at least ten reports 
of affected children older than 10 years of age” (14).  “Only one adult [with trisomy 13], 33 
years of age, has been reported” (19).  But obviously only a few children defy the odds; the vast 
majority of children with trisomy 18, trisomy 13, or trisomy 9 will die well before their first 
birthday. 
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1.4.2  Infants Who Will Live Longer than Two Weeks but No More than Two Years but Who Are 
Not Suffering or in Distress5    
 The second group consists of those ILTCs who will live longer than two weeks but no 
more than two years but who are not suffering from the condition that will eventually cause their 
death.  There are a number of conditions that may cause infants to die before they reach their 
second birthday: triploidy syndrome, duplication 3q syndrome, deletion 4q syndrome, 
duplication 10q syndrome, and Wiedemann-Rautenstrauch syndrome. 
 Describing triploidy syndrome, Jones writes, “All cases of full triploidy either have been 
stillborn or have died in the early neonatal period, with 5 months being the longest recorded 
survival” (28).  Infants with triploidy syndrome often have congenital heart defects, brain 
anomalies, and renal anomalies (28).  
 Over one third of infants with duplication 3q syndrome die before the twelfth month.  A 
majority of these infants have cardiac defects, and/or renal or urinary tract anomalies (34). 
 For infants with deletion 4q syndrome, “[f]ifty percent of patients with a terminal 
deletion . . . died before 15 months of age of cardiopulmonary difficulties including asphyxia, 
apnea, and congestive heart failure” (38).  At least one fifth of these infants have gastrointestinal 
defects (38). 
                                                          
5
 ILTCs raising some of the most difficult ethical problems regarding treatment are those born 
with anencephaly, a condition which leaves them permanently unconscious and unable to feel 
pain (due to the absence of the forebrain and the cerebrum).  Anencephaly is occasional in 
certain syndromes such as acrocallosal syndrome, hydroethalus syndrome, and Meckel-Dieker 
syndrome (Jones 868).  The majority of anencephalic infants die within the first year, but there 
are reported cases of anencephalic infants living for many years.  Since my focus is on ILTCs 
who can and do experience pain and/or distress, I exclude anencephalic infants from my 
discussion.  
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 Almost one half of infants with duplication 10q syndrome “died within the first year of 
life, usually from congenital heart defects and other malformations” (49).  Renal malformations 
are another abnormality associated with duplication 10q syndrome (49). 
 For infants with Wiedemann-Rautenstrauch syndrome, “the life expectancy of affected 
patients is approximately 7 months” (150).  Infants may have congenital heart defects.  “Feeding 
difficulties and respiratory infections occur frequently” (150). 
1.4.3  Infants Who Are Not Dying, but Are in Distress from the Use of ANH 
 The third group consists of those ILTCs who have not yet entered the dying process, but 
are in distress from complications resulting from the use of ANH.  For example, infants with 
deletion 3p syndrome often have cardiac defects and renal anomalies.  Because these infants 
cannot suck well, feeding often requires an NG tube.  “Persistent central and obstructive apnea is 
common with frequent pneumonia.  Gastroesophageal reflux and profound failure to thrive often 
occur” (32).  Reported cases include one infant who died of cardiac arrest after 3 days and 
another who died of aspiration pneumonia at 3 months (32). 
1.4.4  Infants Who Are Not Dying, but Are in Distress from Their Conditions and/or ANH 
 The fourth and final group consists of those ILTCs who have not yet entered the dying 
process, but are in distress from complications resulting from their conditions, and possibly also 
the use of ANH.  It may be difficult in some instances to determine whether an ILTC in this 
fourth group is in distress from complications resulting from an underlying condition and/or 
from the use of ANH.  Examples of conditions include Smith-Lemli-Opitz syndrome, Noonan 
syndrome, Costello syndrome, Opitz G/BBB syndrome, and Marshall-Smith syndrome. 
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 Half of infants with Smith-Lemli-Opitz syndrome have cardiac defects.  In addition, these 
infants may have renal abnormalities.  Occasional abnormalities include diaphragmatic hernia.  
Consider the problems associated with trying to feed these infants: 
Feeding difficulty and vomiting have been frequent problems in early infancy.  
Oral tactile defensiveness and failure to progress to textured food is common 
resulting in the need for nasogastric tube feeding in 50%.  Gastroesophageal 
reflux is common because of small stomach, intestinal dysmotililty, and milk or 
soy protein allergy.  Of those who survive, 20% die during the first year.  Death 
appeared to be related to pneumonia in most of them, one of whom had a 
hemorrhagic necrotizing pneumonia with varicella, suggesting an impaired 
immune response.  (114-115) 
 Infants born with Noonan syndrome have a number of abnormalities of the heart, 
including hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (124).  Jones notes, “Poor feeding and symptoms of 
gastrointestinal dysfunction (vomiting, constipation, abdominal pain, and distention) often lead 
to failure to thrive and require nasogastric tube feeding. . . .  Twenty percent with 
cardiomyopathy die in the first 2 years of life.  Onset of the myelomonocytic leukemia has been 
in the first 2 months of life” (124).      
 More than half of infants with Costello syndrome have hypertrophic cardiomyopathy 
(128).  “Polyhydramnios occurs and swallowing difficulties leading to failure to thrive frequently 
necessitate gavage feedings in the neonatal period. . . .  The cardiomyopathy can be associated 
with dysrhythmias and sudden death” (128). 
 Opitz G/BBB syndrome leads to problems of the larynx, trachea, and esophagus.  
“Swallowing problems with recurrent aspiration, stridulous respirations, intermittent pulmonary 
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difficulty, wheezing, and a weak, hoarse cry should raise concern about a potentially lethal 
laryngoesophageal defect.  In those individuals, mortality is high unless vigorous efforts are 
made to repair the defect and protect the lungs with gastrostomy or jejunostomy” (140). 
 A majority of infants with Marshall-Smith syndrome “die by 20 months with pneumonia, 
atelectasis, aspiration, or pulmonary hypertension. . . .  Aggressive management of respiratory 
difficulties is extremely important with respect to ultimate prognosis” (172).  
 Remember that I consider an ILTC to be an infant who will die before the age of two.  
That would make the twenty percent of infants with Noonan, more than half of infants with 
Costello syndrome, and a majority of infants with Marshall-Smith syndrome who die within their 
first two years ILTCs.  Of all the infants with any of these syndromes, not knowing for certain 
which of these infants are ILTCs according to my criteria is what makes prognoses and treatment 
decisions—especially the decision to withhold or withdraw ANH—so difficult. 
 The conditions I have described in this section are by no means the only congenital 
conditions that infants may have.  My aim here is to show that any number of conditions can 
present serious challenges to parents providing care for their infants.  Many of these infants have 
both severe internal and external anomalies.   
 It is easy to see why caring for these infants poses a tremendous challenge to doctors and 
families.   
 Withholding or withdrawing ANH provides a number of benefits for ILTCs, regardless of 
the category to which they may belong.  First, an ILTC’s body is able to produce its own 
analgesics once all food and fluids are withheld or withdrawn.  Second, the complete suspension 
of food and fluids eliminates the possibility of complications that could result from providing 
ANH.  Third, without ANH, an ILTC’s body can begin the process of naturally shutting itself 
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down without interference.  Fourth, while death may occur sooner rather than later when ANH is 
withheld or withdrawn, it is in the ILTC’s best interests to be released from all pain and/or 
distress that his condition(s) and/or ANH may cause, especially since he derives no benefit from 
suffering (something I shall address in chapter 3).  I provide a much more detailed account of the 
benefits and the conditions under which ANH should be withheld or withdrawn for ILTCs in all 
four categories in chapter 4.     
1.5  An Objection to My Proposal 
 From a strictly medical point of view, an objective weighing of benefits and burdens 
associated with conditions and treatments may make the decision to withhold or withdraw ANH 
somewhat easier.  But even from a medical point of view, doctors do not categorically advocate 
withholding or withdrawing ANH from ILTCs simply because they have birth defects or because 
the provision of ANH may pose risks.  For instance, most medical professionals do not agree 
with the decision to withhold food and fluids from a trisomy 21 infant since doctors can now 
rather easily and quickly correct duodenal atresia.  And some infants need ANH only as a bridge 
treatment, after which they can assimilate food and fluids orally.  Short-term use of ANH does 
not prevent many of these infants from maturing to lead healthy, fulfilling lives. 
 From a religious point of view (specifically that of the Roman Catholic Church), 
decisions based on such calculations are not always morally permitted.  Karol Wojtyla (more 
famously known as Pope John Paul II) was adamant in his defense of all human life.  I shall 
address his position in detail in chapter 2, but for now, I present the claim he makes in his 2004 
address, “Care for Patients in a ‘Permanent’ Vegetative State”: “. . . [T]he administration of 
water and food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means of 
preserving life, not a medical act.  Its use, furthermore, should be considered, in principle, 
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ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally obligatory. . .” (205).  This statement follows 
the command he gives in his 1995 encyclical, The Gospel of Life: “[R]espect, protect, love and 
serve life, every human life” (11 [5]).6  “Every human life” includes all ILTCs, many of whom I 
have just described. 
 Wojtyla would object to my proposal claiming that it is my intention to eliminate weak 
and vulnerable persons.  My proposal to eliminate such persons, he would argue, promotes the 
culture of death, which he is attempting to defeat.  My response to this objection is that I respect 
ILTCs as persons and am very much concerned about their welfare (hence my call for 
comforting them).  At the same time, I acknowledge that their health is compromised to the point 
where even the most aggressive treatments will not save them from death before the age of two.   
 Let us review the four groups of ILTCs I have addressed in my proposal: 
1.  Infants who receive prognoses of two weeks or less 
2.  Infants who will live longer than two weeks but no more than two years but 
who are not suffering or in distress     
3.  Infants who are not dying, but are in distress from the use of ANH 
  4.  Infants who are not dying, but are in distress from their conditions and/or ANH 
Regardless of the category, Wojtyla would say that unless an ILTC is imminently dying, (i.e., in 
his final hours), doctors must administer ANH, unless it proves useless and/or produces more 
burdens than benefits.  So he would call my recommendations a promotion of euthanasia on the 
grounds that it is my intention to hasten an ILTC’s death, possibly out of convenience for the 
family. 
                                                          
6
 When citing The Gospel of Life, I shall use both page numbers and section numbers (in 
brackets) for greater clarity.  Should the reader wish to examine The Gospel of Life on the 
Internet, section numbers will prove to be more helpful. 
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 As I shall argue in the next chapter, we must weigh the benefits and burdens of ANH as 
they affect not only the ILTC, but also his family and the community at large.  As we begin to 
compare Wojtyla’s statements about ANH within the Catholic tradition, we shall see that he may 
have made too broad a statement regarding the obligation to provide ANH, without the 
possibility of withholding or withdrawing under certain circumstances.  In addition, there are 
inconsistencies between his position and the position of Catholic Church on the whole issue of 
providing care for the sick and/or dying.  Such inconsistencies make it impossible to abide by 
Catholic teaching as a whole in this regard.  In the next two chapters, I shall argue for why I 
believe Wojtyla’s position is inconsistent with part of the Church’s teaching on providing care 
for the sick and/or dying.  In doing so, I shall pave the way for why I believe that my proposal is 
more consistent with what I believe to be the correct position on providing care for the sick 
and/or dying.  
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Chapter 2: Introducing The Gospel of Life and “The Prolongation of Life” 
     This chapter introduces the ethical pronouncements made by two recent Popes, Pius XII 
and John Paul II (whom I shall refer to as “Pacelli” and “Wojtyla,” respectively).7  Why am I 
focusing on these two individuals’ positions?  Obviously, papal pronouncements carry great 
weight within the Church.  Also, as we shall see, the central issue regarding artificial nutrition 
and hydration (ANH) is whether it is an ordinary (and therefore obligatory) or extraordinary (and 
therefore optional) means of care.  Pacelli attempts to explain under what circumstances various 
forms of artificial life support may become extraordinary, while Wojtyla explicitly states that 
ANH is an ordinary means of care.  Pacelli’s and Wojtyla’s positions have framed the 
contemporary debate within the Catholic tradition.  I shall address the contemporary debate in 
greater detail in chapter 4. 
  Commentators since the sixteenth century have debated whether certain forms of 
medical care, including food and fluids taken orally, are to be considered ordinary or 
extraordinary.  Even something as simple and natural as water can become extraordinary under 
certain circumstances.   Throughout the twentieth century, significant breakthroughs in medicine 
and science, including artificial respiration, allowed doctors to save people who would have died 
without medical intervention.  The debate over whether ANH constitutes an ordinary form of 
care or a medical treatment has played a significant role in blurring even further the distinction 
between ordinary and extraordinary means.  In light of what medical and technological 
breakthroughs mean for patients, families, and the community at large, we need to reconsider 
what we mean by “ordinary” and “extraordinary,” which I do at the end of this chapter.   
                                                          
7
 Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli became Pope Pius XII upon his election to the papacy in 1939.  His 
pontificate lasted until 1958.  Karol Cardinal Wojtyla became Pope John Paul II upon his 
election to the papacy in 1978.  His pontificate lasted until 2005. 
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 Prolonging life by artificial means was (and continues to be) not without its troubles, 
however.  Doctors continue to encounter families who oppose their professional opinions and 
decisions over whether or not to save patients from death using artificial means.  Upon request, 
Pacelli offered guidance to a group of anesthesiologists and other doctors asking questions about 
artificial respiration in a 1957 speech entitled “The Prolongation of Life.”  Since Pacelli died in 
1958 but it was not until 1979 that the first successful instance of ANH8 as we know it today 
occurred, it is impossible to know what he would have said specifically about ANH (Fritz).  
Since then, most commentators discussing end-of-life issues involving artificial life support refer 
to Pacelli in the hope of drawing parallels to artificial respiration.  Wojtyla is no exception.  In 
his 1995 encyclical The Gospel of Life, Wojtyla challenges the world to transform itself from 
being a “culture of death” to a “culture of life.”  Aware that some people resort to ending 
patients’ lives by withholding or withdrawing food and fluids, Wojtyla states in a 2004 speech 
entitled “Care for Patients in a ‘Permanent’ Vegetative State” that “the administration of water 
and food, even when provided by artificial means,” is an ordinary, thus obligatory form of care, 
and not an extraordinary medical act (205).  This statement, when compared with Pacelli’s 
statements, fuels the ANH debate.  
2.1  Wojtyla’s The Gospel of Life 
 My starting point for the debate over ANH for infants with life-terminating conditions 
(ILTCs) is Wojtyla’s encyclical, Evangelium Vitae [The Gospel of Life], in which he challenges 
us to become the “culture of life.”  But what does he mean by this phrase?  He does not explicitly 
                                                          
8
 The first successful occurrence of modern ANH occurred on 12 June 1979 at University 
Hospitals of Cleveland, when Dr. Michael Gauderer, a pediatrician, and Dr. Jeffery Ponsky, an 
endoscopist, saved a ten-week-old infant’s life by inserting a percutaneous endoscopic 
gastrostomy (PEG) tube. 
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define it, but we can surmise that it is the antithesis of what he labels the “culture of death.”  In 
developing what he means by that phrase, Wojtyla lists threats that have existed and caused 
suffering since ancient times, such as “poverty, hunger, endemic diseases, violence and war” (6 
[3]).  Quoting the Vatican II9 document Gaudium et Spes to express his alarm at the current 
situation of the world, Wojtyla lists numerous human actions which cause human suffering: 
 Whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, 
abortion, euthanasia, or wilful (sic) self-destruction, whatever violates the 
integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or 
mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as 
subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, 
prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working 
conditions, where people are treated as mere instruments of gain rather than as 
free and responsible persons; all these things and others like them are infamies 
indeed.  They poison human society, and they do more harm to those who practice 
them than to those who suffer from the injury.  (7 [3])  
Restricting our discussion to ILTCs, there are many ways in which they can suffer harm.  They 
can be abandoned or neglected.  Even though they cannot comprehend abusive words, they can 
acknowledge resentment and go into distress from it if their parents or siblings harbor grudges 
against them (e.g., “How come you were born this way?”  “Do you realize what I must do for 
                                                          
9
 Pope John XXIII convened the ecumenical council known as Vatican II in 1962 but died the 
following year.  His successor, Pope Paul VI, allowed Vatican II to continue until it reached its 
conclusion in December of 1965.  Bishops attending the council (including Wojtyla himself) 
produced several documents, including those discussing the role of the Catholic Church in the 
modern world, liturgical reform, etc.  The reader may access the documents of Vatican II on the 
Internet here. 
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you now?”  “You have ruined my life.”).  We cannot hold infants responsible for the conditions 
they have at birth.  But we can hold family members responsible for neglecting or abusing these 
infants in any way.  Especially for Catholics who believe in Jesus’ statement that whatever they  
do or fail to do to others, they do or fail to do to Jesus (New American Bible, Matt. 25.40, 45), 
the care they provide or fail to provide affects their standing with the Church and society at large, 
and, to some extent, their eternal salvation.  This is what Wojtyla may be implying in the 
comment that these violations “do more harm to those who practice them.”   
 But even if a good family provides loving care for their infant, they may still worry that 
they have not done enough, or have done something that causes unintentional harm (e.g., 
allowing doctors to perform a procedure that delivers more harm than benefit to the infant).  
Even if they only feel guilt but are not actually guilty of sin, they can suffer indefinitely and 
unnecessarily.  That is why the debate over ANH for ILTCs is so important: the Church needs to 
provide not only spiritual care for her members, but also practical moral guidance10 when 
families of ILTCs find themselves having to make end-of-life choices without a clear 
understanding of what is and is not morally permissible.   
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 By “spiritual guidance” I mean prayer, counseling, or anything else that provides spiritual 
benefits for a person’s soul.  By “practical moral guidance” I mean providing a person with 
practical alternatives that the Church considers morally permissible.  For example, suppose a 
couple asks their pastor about what the Church teaches on withholding or withdrawing ANH.  If 
the priest merely responds, “You cannot do either, but I will pray for you,” he has not provided 
practical moral guidance.  The priest offers practical moral guidance by helping the couple 
understand the Church’s teaching on end-of-life issues (e.g., palliative care), contacting on their 
behalf support groups or parishioners who work in the medical profession, etc.  The purpose of 
this dissertation is to demonstrate how my proposal to withhold or withdraw ANH when an 
ILTC has entered the dying process can actually become a practical alternative to offer Catholic 
families.  
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 Regarding the harmful actions listed above, Wojtyla laments the fact that some of these 
practices seem to be expanding, not diminishing, in the modern world: 
At the same time a new cultural climate is developing and taking hold, which 
gives crimes against life a new and—if possible—even more sinister character, 
giving rise to further grave concern: broad sectors of public opinion justify certain 
crimes against life in the name of the rights of individual freedom, and on this 
basis they claim not only exemption from punishment but even authorization by 
the State, so that these things can be done with total freedom and indeed with the 
free assistance of health-care systems.  (7-8 [4]) 
Wojtyla then gives his account of how the culture of death emerges: 
In fact, while the climate of widespread moral uncertainty can in some way be 
explained by the multiplicity and gravity of today’s social problems, and these 
can sometimes mitigate the subjective responsibility of individuals, it is no less 
true that we are confronted by an even larger reality, which can be described as a 
veritable structure of sin.  This reality is characterized by the emergence of a 
culture which denies solidarity and in many cases takes the form of a veritable 
“culture of death”.  This culture is actively fostered by powerful cultural, 
economic and political currents which encourage an idea of society excessively 
concerned with efficiency.  Looking at the situation from this point of view, it is 
possible to speak in a certain sense of a war of the powerful against the weak: a 
life which would require greater acceptance, love and care is considered useless, 
or held to be an intolerable burden, and is therefore rejected in one way or 
another.  A person who, because of illness, handicap or, more simply, just by 
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existing, compromises the well-being or life-style (sic) of those who are more 
favoured tends to be looked upon as an enemy to be resisted or eliminated.  In this 
way a kind of “conspiracy against life” is unleashed.  (22 [12]) 
So the culture of death appears to be marked by various attitudes and actions of denial, 
intolerance, and rejection.  To combat these problems requires acceptance, love, and care.  And 
this is Wojtyla’s challenge to us to become a culture of life: “respect, protect, love and serve life, 
every human life!” (11 [5]).  He further states where we must stand in this conflict between the 
culture of life and the culture of death: 
 This situation, with its lights and shadows, ought to make us all fully aware 
that we are facing an enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death 
and life, the “culture of death” and the “culture of life”.  We find ourselves not 
only “faced with” but necessarily “in the midst of” this conflict: we are all 
involved and we all share in it, with the inescapable responsibility of choosing to 
be unconditionally pro-life.  (50 [28]) 
 But as we shall see, being “unconditionally pro-life” does not mean—at least, within the 
Catholic tradition—prolonging it by whatever means possible until the body is completely 
unable to survive despite assistance from various forms of artificial life support.  To do 
absolutely everything possible to avoid death—no matter the cost—is a type of idolatry that 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., in “To Save or Let Die,” calls “medical vitalism” (30).  When we 
talk about being pro-life, we must not only be able to accept the fact that dying and death are 
parts of the cycle of life, but also be able to allow individuals to die—as difficult as it may be—
when it is in their best interests to do so.  One of the things that makes the deaths of ILTCs 
difficult is that just as soon as they enter the world, their parents must plan for them to leave it. 
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 So how do we apply Wojtyla’s command to respect, protect, love, and serve every infant 
with life-terminating conditions?  A very important question to consider is, can we respect, 
protect, love, and serve an ILTC by allowing him to die by withholding or withdrawing ANH 
once he has begun the dying process?  My dissertation will be a response to this question.   
 Within The Gospel of Life, Wojtyla makes several references to children who are at risk 
of being harmed: 
- . . . [T]he point has been reached where the most basic care, even nourishment, 
is denied to babies born with serious handicaps or illnesses.  (26 [14]) 
 - As well as for reasons of a misguided pity at the sight of the patient’s suffering, 
euthanasia is sometimes justified by the utilitarian motive of avoiding costs which 
bring no return and which weigh heavily on society.  Thus it is proposed to 
eliminate malformed babies. . . . (27 [15]) 
- In the materialistic perspective . . . interpersonal relations are seriously 
impoverished.  The first to be harmed are women, children, the sick or suffering, 
and the elderly.  (42 [33]) 
- Human life finds itself most vulnerable when it enters the world and when it 
leaves the realm of time to embark upon eternity.  The word of God frequently 
repeats the call to show care and respect, above all where life is undermined by 
sickness and old age.  (78 [44]) 
- “. . . [Y]ou shall not put a child to death by abortion nor kill it once it is  
born. . . .”  (97 [54]; Wojtyla quoting Didache; ellipses in orig.) 
- “Nothing and no one can in any way permit the killing of an innocent human 
being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult, an old person, or one 
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suffering from an incurable disease, or a person who is dying.”  (102 [57]; 
Wojtyla quoting Declaration on Euthanasia11)   
- The Second Vatican Council defines . . . infanticide . . . as an “unspeakable 
crime”.  (103 [58]; Wojtyla quoting Gaudium et Spes) 
From these quotations, it first appears that Wojtyla wants every infant to survive no matter the 
cost to that infant or to others.  It is possible, though, that when Wojtyla mentions “babies born 
with serious handicaps or illnesses”, he may not have conceived instances in which ILTCs have 
significantly compromised gastrointestinal systems, or how serious some complications become 
when certain ILTCs are fed.  But notice in the fourth quotation that Wojtyla acknowledges that 
there is a proper time for earthly life to come to an end.  Some infants’ conditions are such that 
no matter what is done for them, they will not survive.  Notice also that ILTCs can be labeled as 
“sick,” “disabled,” “terminally ill,” “dying,” or “weak.”  If we withhold food and fluids from a 
healthy infant or fail to treat a minor medical condition that turns into a life-terminating 
condition for him, we can be said to have killed him.  But in certain instances, we may withhold 
or withdraw medical treatments that seem to provide no benefit to an ILTC.  From the numerous 
examples of life-terminating conditions I presented in chapter 1, many infants have compromised 
gastrointestinal systems.    In these instances, we are said to have allowed an ILTC to die, which 
is morally permissible.  There seems to be a very fine line here, then, between killing and 
allowing to die.  This distinction seems to be even more blurred when we consider ANH for 
ILTCs. 
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 The reader may access the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s (CDF’s) Declaration 
on Euthanasia (1980) on the Internet here.  
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 Recall that Wojtyla says, “. . . [T]he most basic care, even nourishment is denied to 
babies born with serious handicaps or illnesses” (26 [14]).  What should we consider to be basic 
care?  Let us first begin by listing common things that most people have access to: water, food, 
clothing, and shelter.  Now obviously there will be instances where we must consider infants 
born into abject poverty all around the world.  When certain treatments are unavailable to them, 
these treatments become extraordinary and therefore optional.  I cover the notion of ordinary and 
extraordinary means in the next section.  But for the present, let us determine what it is about 
certain things that make them basic or ordinary.  Ordinary things such as food, water, clothing, 
and shelter are necessary for a person’s overall well-being and survival (provided, of course, that 
they are accessible).  Without them—especially food and water—life becomes miserable and/or 
unsustainable.  Newborns need to be swaddled, as their systems are not fully developed after 
birth.  Shelter is also especially important for infants.  Not only do infants need protection from 
the elements, but also from communicable diseases and infection. 
 So far I have mentioned only physical things that count as basic care for infants.  But 
there are nonphysical things that can also be considered basic care and should not be overlooked: 
human presence, love, compassion, etc.  Anyone can do the following things to an infant: hold, 
rock, speak, sing, read, play with, etc.  We usually want to do these things especially if the infant 
is healthy and beautiful.  But what if the baby is sick or deformed in some way?  People—
especially nonfamily members—tend to have an aversion to anyone or anything that is somehow 
sick and/or deformed.  But there may be another reason why an infant may not receive all the 
attention he needs: medical devices (e.g., incubators), tubes, wires, etc. may prevent people from 
being able to hold or even touch him.  The attempt to provide ANH may interfere with meeting 
the nonphysical needs of an infant. 
34 
 In The Gospel of Life, Wojtyla sets the stage for the dilemma by claiming normal care for 
sick persons should not be interrupted (117 [65]).12  But the fact that Wojtyla does not explicitly 
mention ANH may leave some wondering whether he views ANH as normal care.  In the 2004 
address given to participants in the International Congress on “Life-Sustaining Treatments and 
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas,” Wojtyla explicitly states his 
position on ANH: 
 The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or a natural end, still 
has the right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration, cleanliness, warmth, etc.), 
and to the prevention of complications related to his confinement to bed.  He also 
has the right to appropriate rehabilitative care and to be monitored for clinical 
signs of eventual recovery. 
 I should like particularly to underline how the administration of water and 
food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means 
of preserving life, not a medical act.  Its use, furthermore, should be considered, 
in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally obligatory, insofar 
as and until it is seen to have attained proper finality, which in the present case 
consists in providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of his suffering.  
(“Care” 205) 
In making these comments, Wojtyla recalls what he says in The Gospel of Life.  What he thought 
about ANH might have been clear in his own mind all along, but it probably occurred to him that 
others might not have held the same position.  Keep also in mind that Wojtyla made these 
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 Wojtyla here refers to the CDF’s Declaration on Euthanasia. 
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comments a year before Terri Schiavo13 died.  After her case reignited the ANH debate, the 
Vatican found itself having to reclarify its position and provide additional commentary in 2007 
(two years after Wojtyla’s death) as several bishops in the United States repeatedly found 
themselves facing these questions from their faithful.  I shall address these considerations in 
chapter 4.      
 Before concluding my discussion of Wojtyla’s position, I raise the question as to whether 
it is permissible to provide all forms of basic care to an infant except ANH once we can 
determine that he has entered the dying phase.  Although not all ILTCs are in the dying phase, 
the Church permits the withdrawal of ANH in a dying patient’s final hours.  Moreover, as we 
have seen in chapter 1, an infant may not need food and fluids once he enters the dying phase; 
continued nutrition and/or hydration may cause an infant distress by preventing the body from 
shutting itself down.  But a dying infant still needs warmth, cleanliness, and human presence.  
We can provide many forms of basic care.  But do we need to continue to provide all forms of 
basic care?  And which forms of basic care are most important if the provision of one form (e.g., 
ANH) interferes with another (e.g., human presence)?        
2.2  Pacelli’s “The Prolongation of Life” 
 I have briefly mentioned the notion of ordinary and extraordinary means of medical care.  
Most Catholic commentators who debate the use of advanced medical care invoke the difference 
between the two.  Like most contemporary commentators who address the Catholic Church’s 
position on the care of the sick and the dying, Wojtyla himself refers to Pacelli’s speech, “The 
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 Terri Schiavo was a patient in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) beginning in 1990 until her 
death in 2005.  A critical consideration in her case was the fact that although she was being cared 
for in a Florida hospice, she was not in fact dying.  Her death resulted from the court-ordered 
removal of her feeding tube, not an underlying condition.   
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Prolongation of Life,”14 so it is surprising to discover basic tensions between his position and 
Pacelli’s.   
 Pacelli delivered “The Prolongation of Life” in 1957 to a group of doctors regarding the 
topic of resuscitation, primarily as it pertains to anesthesiologists.  Pacelli did not invent the 
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of medical care; the distinction goes back 
several centuries.  I shall address this distinction in detail in the next few pages.  The current 
debate over ANH for dying patients appears to hinge on this distinction.  We shall see the 
conflict that arises if we claim—as Wojtyla does—that ANH is always to be considered an 
ordinary means of care.  For now, however, I merely wish to introduce Pacelli’s discussion of 
prolonging life by artificial means. 
 The twentieth century witnessed advances in medicine and science—both in scope and in 
number—unlike any other period in history.  But with many of these advances came ethical 
dilemmas never needing attention before.  Pacelli was entering his last year of life when he 
delivered his speech in 1957.  Had he lived longer, he might have addressed other ethical 
dilemmas regarding medicine and science as they arose.  But since he did not, other 
commentators have attempted to draw parallels with his discussion of artificial respiration.  But 
as I shall show, difficulties encountered with artificial respiration are not completely identical to 
difficulties encountered with ANH. 
 The fact that we can keep patients alive longer than we were able to in the past raises a 
very important question as to whether it is always in the best interests of a patient to keep him 
alive.  That is the problem Pacelli attempts to address.  Pacelli specifically addresses the notion 
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 “The Prolongation of Life” (published only in Spanish at the Vatican’s website) can also be 
found in Artificial Nutrition and Hydration and the Permanently Unconscious Patient: The 
Catholic Debate 91-97. 
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of resuscitation, which he describes as “. . . the technique which makes possible the remedying of 
certain occurrences which seriously threaten human life, especially asphyxia, which formerly, 
when modern anesthetizing equipment was not yet available, would stop the heartbeat and bring 
about death in a few minutes” (91).  He considers a variety of patients: “. . . persons who have 
suffered head wounds, . . . persons who have undergone brain surgery or . . . those who have 
suffered trauma of the brain through anoxia and remain in a state of deep unconsciousness. . .” 
(92).  While Pacelli does not specifically address ILTCs, from the types of patients he does 
consider, we can assume that at least some of these newborns would warrant his consideration.  
In the 1950s, little could be done for such infants, but doctors can do much more to save their 
lives today. 
 Consider Pacelli’s discussion of how an anesthesiologist artificially resuscitates a patient:  
 It happens at times—as in . . . cases of accidents and illnesses, the treatment of 
which offers reasonable hope of success—that the anesthesiologist can improve 
the general condition of patients who suffer from a serious lesion of the brain and 
whose situation at first might seem desperate.  He restores breathing either 
through manual intervention or with the help of special instruments, clears the 
breathing passages, and provides for the artificial feeding of the patient. 
 Thanks to this treatment, and especially through the administration of oxygen 
by means of artificial respiration, a failing blood circulation picks up again and 
the appearance of the patient improves, sometimes very quickly, to such an extent 
that the anesthesiologist himself, or any other doctor who, trusting his experience, 
would have given up all hope, maintains a slight hope that spontaneous breathing 
will be restored.  (92) 
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But not every attempt at resuscitation is successful.  Sometimes a patient’s condition is so serious 
that it is artificial life support (e.g., a respirator) that is keeping a patient “alive.”  Pacelli raises 
the following concern: 
In most cases this situation15 arises, not at the beginning of respiration attempts, 
but when the patient’s condition, after a slight improvement at first, remains 
stationary and it becomes clear that only automatic artificial respiration is keeping 
him alive.  The question then arises if one must, or if one can,16 continue the 
resuscitation process despite the fact that the soul may already have left the body. 
 The solution to this problem, already difficult in itself, becomes even more 
difficult when the family—themselves Catholic perhaps—insist that the doctor in 
charge, especially the anesthesiologist, remove the artificial respiration apparatus 
in order to allow the patient, who is already virtually dead, to pass away in peace.  
(92-93) 
A very important phrase to consider here is “the soul may already have left the body.”  No one—
not even the Pope himself—can determine the moment at which a soul leaves a body.  If a 
person has already died, we can say that his soul has left his body, but we cannot mark the 
moment of the soul’s departure from the body as we can the moment of death.  The problem in 
using modern medical equipment is that it may be machines, rather than the person himself, that 
give the appearances of life.  While monitors can track vital signs such as body temperature, 
respiration, and blood pressure, they cannot track the status of the person’s soul.  Why is this so 
important?  If we can determine that a person is already dead, we can remove everything from 
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 Pacelli refers to a brain lesion so serious that the patient will most likely die despite the use of 
artificial life support. 
16
 Pacelli uses “can” to mean “morally permissible,” not “actually capable.” 
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him that was keeping him alive, including whatever form of ANH was employed.17  If we cannot 
determine this fact, then, according to Church tradition, ordinary means of life support must 
remain in place.  If we consider ANH ordinary care as Wojtyla does, then it must remain in 
place.     
 Pacelli alludes to basic principles that will help him arrive at answers to various questions 
of using artificial life support: 
 Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is entrusted 
with the task of taking care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in case of 
serious illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life and 
health.  This duty that one has toward himself, toward God, toward the human 
community, and in most cases toward certain determined persons, derives from 
well ordered (sic) charity, from submission to the Creator, from social justice and 
even from strict justice, as well as from devotion toward one’s family.  (94) 
Granted, not everyone is Christian.  Especially for people who do not believe in God, 
“submission to the Creator” seems inapplicable.  But even if a person does not believe in God, he 
can still have a sense of duty towards his family, community, or any other individual or group 
based on the demands of love, devotion, and justice.  Pacelli does not specify what he means by 
“certain determined persons,” but I believe we can interpret this phrase to mean specific 
individuals in our midst, such as family members, friends, or someone we care enough about to 
take care of.  There may even be instances when we do not truly care for someone (e.g., a parent 
or grandparent with whom our relationship is strained for one reason or another), but have a 
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 In “The Artificial Prolongation of Life,” The Pontifical Academy of Sciences states, “Death 
occurs when: a) The spontaneous cardiac and respiratory functions have definitively ceased; or 
2) If an irreversible cessation of every brain function is verified” (107). 
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responsibility to take care of him nonetheless.  Or it may be the case where a person feels he 
cannot risk growing attached to an infant with a serious condition.   
 For example, years ago we had a next-door neighbor whose son was born prematurely.  
Since his son’s lungs were underdeveloped, he needed an extended stay in the neonatal intensive 
care unit (NICU).  A few days after his son’s birth, we asked our neighbor whether he had been 
to the hospital yet that day to see his son.  His reply was something to the effect of, “I do not 
want to get too close to him, in case something happens to him.”  The father was fulfilling 
certain duties toward his son by giving the doctors permission to treat him.  It might very well 
have been the case that he had difficulty in accepting the possibility that his son could have died 
and was guarding his emotions, but the matter-of-fact manner in which he expressed his 
emotional detachment shocked everyone who was part of the conversation.  As it so happened, 
his son survived and was unaffected by his condition. 
 Continuing his discussion of basic principles, Pacelli refers to what we often refer to as 
“ordinary” and “extraordinary means” of medical care: 
 But normally one is held to use only ordinary means—according to 
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture—that is to say, means that do 
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another.  A more strict obligation 
would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the 
higher, more important good too difficult.  Life, health, all temporal activities are 
in fact subordinated to spiritual ends.  On the other hand, one is not forbidden to 
take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life and health, as long as 
he does not fail in some more serious duty.  (94) 
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Most, if not all, contemporary Catholic commentators cite the above passage in their arguments, 
as the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of medical care occupies center 
stage in the Catholic debate over end-of-life issues.  This distinction can also be applied to issues 
not involving the end of life.18  There are many points to address, and I shall each one in turn.   
 The first point regards the definitions of ordinary and extraordinary means of medical 
care.  If Pacelli means by “ordinary” those “means that do not involve any grave burden for 
oneself or another,” we can assume that he would define “extraordinary means” as those means 
that do involve any grave burden for oneself or another.  The next logical question, then, is, what 
constitutes a grave burden?  Pacelli does not give specific examples, but provides a general list 
of factors to take into consideration: “circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture.”   
 In the Catholic tradition, “ordinary” refers to that which is morally obligatory, not 
necessarily technically simple.  Likewise, “extraordinary” refers to that which is morally 
optional, not necessarily technically elaborate.  For example, in “End-of-Life Care Revisited,” 
Daniel Sulmasy, O.F.M., a doctor and Franciscan friar, recounts the argument made by Cardinal 
John De Lugo in the seventeenth century regarding whether a person being burned at the stake 
was obliged to douse himself with water to prolong his life (190).  In the event that there was 
only enough water to douse oneself but not extinguish the fire, dousing oneself would do nothing 
more than prolong the agony of burning.  Therefore, according to Lugo, the victim was not 
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 Some conditions do not threaten an infant’s life but are incurable.  As an infant, Olivia Rusk, 
now a teenager, developed alopecia areata, a condition in which defective white blood cells 
attack hair follicles, thus causing baldness.  Other than completely losing her hair, Rusk does not 
seem to suffer any other symptoms.  In the attempt to make her look “normal,” her parents had 
her fitted for a wig to hide her baldness.  Years ago, Rusk decided to remove the wig because it 
was hot outside, and has not worn one since (Adams, “One Smooth Kid” 7).  Decisions based on 
considerations of benefits and burdens related to cost, comfort, etc. of something like a wig 
strictly for cosmetic purposes are still decisions about what people consider to be ordinary 
(obligatory) or extraordinary (optional).        
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obliged to pour water on himself.  Something as simple as water, then—at least in this case—
could be considered extraordinary, not ordinary.   
 On the other hand, returning to the example of our next-door neighbor’s son, the use of 
an incubator, monitors, etc. involved technically sophisticated equipment.  But there was 
reasonable hope of the son’s survival.  In addition, since the mother was in the military and gave 
birth at a U.S. Army hospital, the family did not have to cover the cost of their son’s treatment.  
So in this instance, technically elaborate equipment was ordinary.  From these two examples, 
then, we can say that it is impossible to label something as ordinary simply because it is simple 
or found in nature, or extraordinary simply because it is somehow more complex or manmade. 
 Like an artificial respirator that delivers air—something we consider natural—ANH 
presents a challenge in that it delivers something natural (e.g., food and fluids) to a patient 
through artificial means (e.g., a tube or an intravenous [IV] line) and requires medical 
competence for placement.  To appreciate all the considerations a family of an ILTC must make 
in this regard, it may be easiest to compare an ILTC born into a well-to-do family with one born 
into an underprivileged family. 
 Suppose these two ILTCs are in need of ANH; without it, both will die.  Is each family 
obliged to have their child undergo the procedure?  Since Pacelli says that any grave burden is 
enough to consider a form of treatment extraordinary, we need to find only one.  As we have 
seen in chapter 1, certain forms of ANH (e.g., a nasogastric [NG] tube, the easiest to insert) are 
not meant for long-term use due to foreseen complications and patient discomfort.  It is because 
of one or more underlying conditions that ANH is required in the first place.  So ANH may be 
just one of either a few or several treatments that doctors need to discuss with families.  Suppose 
that the procedure that gives the infants their only hope of survival is open heart surgery.  Let us 
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also suppose that the well-to-do infant is too weak to undergo surgery; it is highly likely that he 
will die either on the operating table and away from his family, or from a complication resulting 
from surgery.  At the same time, the underprivileged infant is strong enough to undergo surgery, 
but his family cannot afford the procedure.  Open heart surgery, then, would be extraordinary 
and therefore optional for the well-to-do infant based on the likelihood of his dying during 
surgery. The same judgment would apply to the case involving the underprivileged infant based 
on his family’s inability to pay for it.  Even though forgoing surgery would result in both infants’ 
deaths, their families would be able to continue providing ordinary forms of care, especially 
human presence, up to and including their infants’ final moments.  On the other hand, if either 
one of these infants is choking to death and the remedy is as simple as dislodging some object 
with a finger, then such a procedure is ordinary and therefore obligatory. 
 Second, the word “persons” is vague, so we must ask the question of whether Pacelli is 
taking into account the patient only, his family, and/or others beyond the family.  I believe that 
his focus not only includes but also extends beyond the patient.  As I mentioned in my example, 
we are dealing with both a well-to-do and an underprivileged family.  The well-to-do family may 
have excellent medical coverage on their insurance policy, perhaps even enough money to cover 
the financial costs that insurance does not.  The underprivileged family, we can assume, has 
minimal to no insurance, and not enough money to cover the cost of a doctor’s visit, let alone a 
procedure like open heart surgery.   
 Notice, I have just been discussing a family’s finances.  What if a family is unable from 
an emotional or psychological standpoint to watch their infant undergo invasive surgery?  The 
word “cost” typically refers to finances, but there are physical, intellectual, emotional, 
psychological, social, and/or spiritual costs associated with providing care for a loved one.  We 
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cannot assume that ILTCs are born into families where every other family member is perfectly 
healthy.  One or both parents may be physically debilitated.  Families of ILTCs can be 
overwhelmed by all kinds of worries and concerns, and, coupled with an incomplete 
understanding of their infants’ condition(s), families may not comprehend all that a doctor is 
explaining or suggesting to them.  They may find themselves unable to make even simple 
choices, let alone choices that mean the difference between life and death.  It may very well be 
the case that other incidents in the family’s life have left one or both of the parents emotionally 
or psychologically scarred, and taking care of an ILTC is too overwhelming.  Caring for anyone 
with a terminal condition often isolates a family from society.  Hobbies, activities, friends, and 
groups often become much less of a priority, even though these things or people may be what 
family members providing care to an ILTC need most of all for their own well-being.  We cannot 
overlook the importance of the ILTC’s or the family’s spiritual well-being, either, as this is a 
good that Pacelli (and the Church, for that matter) holds superior to any temporal good such as 
life or health.  I shall address the notion of spiritual goods in chapter 5. 
 Third, places can make medical means ordinary or extraordinary.  A family living in a 
metropolitan area may very well have access to an excellent healthcare facility, while a family 
living somewhere else may have to travel a considerable distance to arrive at a hospital that 
cannot provide cutting-edge procedures or state-of-the-art technology and equipment.  But even 
if a family lives in a metropolitan area, their infant may have a condition that requires the family 
to travel extensively to a hospital specializing in treatments for that particular condition.  And 
even if a family can afford to travel there, chances are more than likely that treatment for the 
condition will require the child to remain there.  Are the parents then obligated to relocate and 
find new employment, or live out of a hotel room while they wait for the child to recover?  
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Situations like these can make certain treatments extraordinary.  But the question remains, if a 
hospital can provide ANH but not the lifesaving procedure an ILTC needs to survive, must the 
hospital provide ANH?  As we have seen in chapter 1, the answer is not as obvious as we might 
think, especially when ANH creates complications in addition to the ones the ITLC may already 
have. 
 When we consider places as a determining factor, we often think only in terms of the 
distance between a patient’s home and the hospital.  But we must also consider factors such as 
weather, road construction, etc.  For example, recent tornados across the United States 
completely destroyed certain towns, and massive quantities of debris made many roads 
impassable.  In some areas, health facilities were completely destroyed, and in other areas, 
families could not find a good road to travel on (if they still had vehicles to travel in, that is).  A 
new health facility may replace one that was destroyed, and at some point in time, a once-
impassable road will once again become usable.  Perhaps a family’s vehicle is now inoperable 
(or even missing), but someone else may offer to drive the infant to the hospital in his vehicle.  
But for the time being, these setbacks are real and can be deciding factors affecting the outcome 
of whether an infant lives or dies.  As we can see, certain circumstances—even temporary 
ones—can change a factor’s status from being ordinary to extraordinary or vice versa.   
 The fourth point to consider in the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary 
is the notion of “time” or “times.”   Like “persons,” “times” is vague.  We can take “times” to 
mean the times we live in.  One hundred years ago, infants unable to assimilate food and fluids 
orally died.  It is impossible for doctors to provide treatments that do not exist.  In The Will to 
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Live: Clear Answers on End of Life Issues, Archbishop Jose H. Gomez of Los Angeles19 says,  
“. . . As science progresses, various methods that were previously considered medically 
extraordinary have become medically ordinary” (36).  But as we all know, impoverished areas 
throughout the world do not benefit from the latest advancements such as ANH; primitive 
medicine may be all that some families have access to. 
 We can also take “time” to mean the time it takes to produce a desired benefit.  A 
treatment’s status as ordinary or extraordinary depends on the fortuitous combination of 
interdependent variables such as location, the time needed for a treatment to take effect, etc.  For 
example, inserting a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube is a rather simple and 
quick procedure, but it may take a family a very long time to travel to a place where competent 
doctors can perform the operation.    For instance, a family may get their infant to the proper 
facility for emergency treatment of an underlying fatal condition, only to discover that the only 
doctor competent to perform the procedure is unavailable.  Certain procedures are so advanced 
now that doctors who are not qualified to perform them cannot simply take the place of a 
specialist. A change in any of these variables, then, can make a treatment normally considered 
ordinary extraordinary. 
 Fifth, a patient’s culture can make certain medical treatments extraordinary.  The 
example often given is the prohibition on blood transfusions for Jehovah’s Witnesses.  They 
believe that were they to receive transfused blood, they would suffer eternal punishment.  A 
person’s faith is only one aspect comprising his culture.  A patient’s culture is also made up of 
and influenced by his family, his friends, organizations to which he belongs, his ethnicity, etc.  
                                                          
19
 At the time his book was published in 2006, Gomez was the Archbishop of San Antonio, 
Texas. 
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Illness and dying are stressful enough, but creating added anxiety over cultural issues does 
nothing to comfort the patient or his family.  Infants may be oblivious to arguments over their 
care, but they can perceive stress when they are being held, which in turn causes them distress.  
While using cultural reasons to determine whether ANH is ordinary or extraordinary is more 
subjective than using objective reasons (e.g., financial costs), cultural circumstances are real, 
important, and worthy of consideration.            
 The sixth and final consideration concerns duties a family has towards not only the 
infant, but also themselves, other family members, and the community at large.  An infant 
obviously has no responsibilities or duties, regardless of his health.  But families have countless 
duties and responsibilities: parents must care for each other, their children, and other relatives.  
Family members need to maintain good relationships with friends, bosses, coworkers, etc.  When 
parents bring a healthy newborn infant home from the hospital, their roles and responsibilities 
increase, in addition to the ones they already have.  But caring for ILTCs requires even greater 
effort to meet all obligations imposed by family, work, etc.  Parents may find themselves making 
routine trips to the doctor and/or the hospital.  They may also find themselves feeling 
overwhelmed by trying to locate specialists, support groups, accurate information about such 
conditions, what care will involve, etc.   
 A primary duty for the breadwinner is to return to work so he or she can continue to 
support the family.  Especially for families with ILTCs, it is often impossible to fulfill all duties.  
What if both parents were working to support the family, but now one must stay home to provide 
round-the-clock care?  For the parent who continues to work, will his or her mind be focused on 
the job, or on the difficulties at home?  If job performance suffers, that parent may find himself 
or herself out of work.  Children who are already living in the home may also find themselves 
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having to sacrifice any number of things: extracurricular activities, jobs, or even college (if 
caring for the infant wipes out the family’s savings).  Parents would then have to deal with 
emotional issues such as resentment, disappointment, grief, etc.  And they must find a way to 
help each person deal with the circumstances. 
 What duties or responsibilities would those caring for ILTCs have towards the 
community at large?  It is easy to forget that when any family member is in medical distress, 
there are others in the community who are also suffering at the same time and may have a greater 
need for more medical attention.  It would be a disservice to the community if a family 
demanded their doctor to treat their infant every single time the infant developed some kind of 
symptom.  The time a doctor takes to see one infant is time that he cannot give to another patient.  
Likewise, there may be a shortage of medical supplies such as injections, units of blood, etc.  
There are also real limitations when it comes to transporting infants to hospitals, either by 
ambulance or, in some cases, helicopter.  A real dilemma arises when doctors use scarce 
resources on an infant who is not expected to live to the detriment of other infants who are.  It is 
unfortunate that not all infants can be saved from death.  As difficult as it may be, families need 
to recognize that at some point, care for their infant should include the very basics they 
themselves can provide (e.g., warmth, cleanliness, and human presence), thus freeing up medical 
personnel and resources for the benefit of others. 
 Having considered the ways in which something can become ordinary or extraordinary, I 
now turn my attention toward three specific questions that Pacelli aims to address in his speech.  
The first question is as follows: 
 1.  Does the anesthesiologist have the right, or is he bound, in all cases of deep 
unconsciousness, even in those that are considered to be completely hopeless in 
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the opinion of the competent doctor, to use modern artificial respiration apparatus 
even against the will of the family?  (95) 
Pacelli responds by saying, “In ordinary cases . . . the anesthesiologist has the right to act in this 
manner, but he is not bound to do so, unless this becomes the only way of fulfilling another 
certain moral duty” (95).  These “certain moral duties” refer to a person’s preparing his soul for 
eternity (e.g., receiving final sacraments such as Viaticum  [Holy Communion], Penance, or 
Anointing of the Sick [normally entailing both Penance and Holy Communion]).  Another moral 
duty may be ensuring one’s last will and testament is in proper order.  Last wills and testaments 
are normally considered legal matters, but there is also a moral dimension in ensuring one’s 
family is provided for after one’s death.  Yet another moral duty may entail making final 
goodbyes to family members and friends so that they (as well as the dying person, if able) can 
forgive past grievances and provide closure.  
 Pacelli maintains that a doctor cannot take any action without the patient’s consent, as the 
patient has primary rights when it comes to healthcare.  Again, Pacelli seems to be discussing 
adults who at one point in time were capable of making decisions about their own healthcare but 
because of accident, illness, etc. are not now.  In the case of newborns, the primary rights belong 
to them, but they are completely dependent upon their parents for healthcare decisions.  In the 
case of ILTCs, the chances of their surviving to an age where 1) they can understand what is 
happening to them; and 2) they are able to give informed consent are very small, if they exist at 
all.  So their families must make every decision regarding their care.  “Where the proper and 
independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually bound to the use of ordinary 
means” (Pacelli 96).  As we have seen from my discussion of circumstances, determining what is 
ordinary is more complex than many people imagine. 
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 Given many forms of medical treatment that may be used to save a person’s life, many 
people raise the question of whether withholding or withdrawing artificial life support constitutes 
killing a person.  For when a person is taken off artificial life support, death occurs shortly 
thereafter.  Pacelli says the following: 
 Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation constitutes in 
reality such a burden for the family that one cannot in all conscience impose it 
upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor should discontinue these 
attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply.  There is not involved here a case 
of direct disposal of the life of the patient, nor of euthanasia in any way: this 
would never be licit.  Even when it causes the arrest of circulation, the 
interruption of attempts at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of the 
cessation of life, and one must apply in this case the principle of double effect and 
of  “voluntarium in causa” [‘indirect cause’].  (96)         
When a patient is placed on artificial life support, it can be difficult to determine whether natural 
bodily functions or the apparatus is keeping the patient alive.  Before the advent of artificial life 
support, patients in these situations would have died because their bodies were no longer 
functioning properly.  It is precisely because their bodies are not functioning properly that 
patients are placed on life support in the first place.  The real question here is that of intention: 
what is the motive behind withholding or withdrawing life support?  If one determines that the 
patient cannot recover without creating additional burdens (e.g., financial hardship, prolonged 
pain and suffering, emotional toll on family, etc.), one can, according to Pacelli, in good 
conscience, decide to withdraw artificial life support.  It would be immoral, however, if one 
decides that it would be better to withdraw artificial life support to maximize one’s inheritance or 
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avoid providing simple care.  Once again, Pacelli does not address the nutrition and hydration of 
ILTCs, but we can assume that the considerations will be similar to those regarding resuscitation. 
 Let us now turn to the second question that Pacelli addresses: 
 2.  We have, therefore, already answered the second question in essence: “Can 
the doctor remove the artificial respiration apparatus before the blood circulation 
has come to a complete stop?  Can he do this, at least, when the patient has 
already received Extreme Unction?  Is this Extreme Unction valid when it is 
administered at the moment when circulation ceases, or even after?”  (96) 
Responding to the first and second parts of the question, Pacelli says that removing the means of 
artificial life support is morally permissible.  In order for the person to receive Extreme Unction, 
artificial life support should be continued until he has received the sacrament.  Afterwards, 
artificial life support may be removed.  Pacelli says that it is impossible to determine whether 
Extreme Unction is valid once circulation stops or shortly thereafter (96). 
 Responding to the third part of the question, Pacelli says that it is possible for doctors to 
keep particular organs alive even after circulation has completely ceased.  If doctors are of the 
opinion that the patient’s soul has left his body, Extreme Unction cannot be given, since only 
living persons can receive sacraments.  But if doctors are doubtful that this separation has 
occurred, the patient should receive Extreme Unction.  Pacelli says, “But applying her usual 
rules: ‘The sacraments are for men’ and  ‘In case of extreme necessity one tries extreme 
measures,’ the Church allows the sacrament to be administered conditionally in respect to the 
sacramental sign’ ” (96). 
 Determining when a person dies is important in the Catholic faith because there is an 
opportunity—only before death—for a dying Catholic to receive what is known as Extreme 
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Unction, Last Rites, or Viaticum.  In this situation, the dying Catholic can receive the sacraments 
of Penance (i.e., make a final confession), Anointing of the Sick (for healing),20 and Holy 
Communion in preparation for death (i.e., Viaticum).  But when it comes to infants, the only 
sacrament they truly need is Baptism in order to be absolved of Original Sin.21  Since an infant 
has not reached the age of reason (for the Church, typically around the age of seven), there is no 
further sin that needs to be confessed and forgiven.  And since Holy Communion is typically not 
administered until a child reaches the age of reason, the child’s salvation is not jeopardized if he 
has not yet received Holy Communion. 
 The validity of the sacraments is a major point of concern within Pacelli’s speech, but it 
is not a concern here.  What Pacelli’s answer highlights, though, is the question of what we must 
do when biological life continues in some manner, while the qualities that make an individual a 
person seem to have disappeared.  The sacraments, as they are instrumental in providing grace 
upon which a person’s salvation depends, are a form of spiritual care.  As Pacelli explains, as 
long as there is hope in receiving grace from the sacraments, the sacraments should be 
administered.  
                                                          
20
 In the Anointing of the Sick, the person prays for both physical and spiritual healing.  The 
primary emphasis is on spiritual healing, even if physical healing does not occur. “ This 
assistance from the Lord by the power of his Spirit is meant to lead the sick person to healing of 
the soul, but also of the body if such is God's will” (Catechism of the Catholic Church n. 1520). 
21
 Even today, there is a looming, agonizing question as to what happens to infants who die 
without Baptism.  The Catechism of the Catholic Church states: “As regards children who have 
died without Baptism, the Church can only entrust them to the mercy of God, as she does in her 
funeral rites for them.  Indeed, the great mercy of God who desires that all men should be saved, 
and Jesus’ tenderness toward children which caused him to say: ‘Let the children come to me, do 
not hinder them,’ allow us to hope that there is a way of salvation for children who have died 
without Baptism.  All the more urgent is the Church’s call not to prevent little children coming to 
Christ through the gift of holy Baptism” (n. 1261). 
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 There are a few key phrases in Pacelli’s response warranting further attention.  The 
first—“separation of the soul from the body, even if particular organs go on functioning”—raises 
concerns about what we must do with individuals whose bodies continue to show even minimal 
signs of biological life.  Probably the best example that is relevant here would be that of babies 
born with anencephaly,22 a condition which leaves them permanently unconscious and unable to 
feel pain (due to the absence of the forebrain and the cerebrum).  Most anencephalic babies die 
within the first year.  What may make these cases difficult is that the baby looks like a person, 
but will never act as a person.  Because nothing can be done to correct the condition, most, if not 
all, people would agree that aggressive medical treatments would not be necessary because they 
would not improve the baby’s condition.  In other words, the gains (or really, lack thereof) would 
be disproportionate to the level of effort required—not pain on the infant’s part—to keep him 
alive.   
 A key question regarding anencephalic infants would be whether they need to be fed and 
hydrated, or whether it is better for them not to receive alimentation so that their deaths will 
occur sooner rather than later.  (I mean “need to be fed and hydrated” in a moral sense, i.e., 
someone needs to feed and hydrate them.  From simply a biological standpoint, all living things 
need to be fed and hydrated, or else they will die.)  With the consideration of food and hydration 
also come considerations of other basic forms of care (e.g., blankets, vaccinations, etc.)  Perhaps 
it is because an anencephalic baby looks like a human person that we think we have the 
obligation to provide basic care for him.  Even though an anencephalic baby cannot feel pain, we 
                                                          
22
 I acknowledge that caring for of anencephalic infants raises ethical challenges for parents and 
doctors.   In chapter 1, I mentioned that infants with anencephaly would fall under the category 
of infants who are not yet dying but who are also not suffering.  See footnote 5 in section 1.4.2. 
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would probably be abhorred at the thought of dropping (either accidentally or intentionally) the 
baby on the ground.   
 The second phrase worth considering is “in extreme necessity one tries extreme 
measures.”  Again, Pacelli here is speaking about administering the sacraments very close to the 
moment of death.  If there is a chance at all for a dying patient to receive final grace for the 
benefit of salvation, Pacelli says it is best to administer the sacraments.  But we must be careful 
not to extend this rule to all instances of medical treatment where a person is on some type of 
artificial life support.  To do so would run counter to Pacelli’s earlier guidance about withholding 
or withdrawing extraordinary measures when they prove to be too burdensome. 
 The third and final question pertains to when a person is dead.  Pacelli presents the 
question as follows: 
 3.  “When the blood circulation and the life of a patient who is deeply 
unconscious because of a central paralysis are maintained only through artificial 
respiration, and no improvement is noted after a few days, at what time does the 
Catholic Church consider the patient ‘dead,’ or when must he be declared dead 
according to natural law (questions ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’)?”   
 (Has death already occurred after grave trauma of the brain, which has 
provoked deep unconsciousness and central breathing paralysis, the fatal 
consequences of which have nevertheless been retarded by artificial respiration?  
Or does it occur, according to the present opinion of doctors, only when there is 
complete arrest of circulation despite prolonged artificial respiration?)  (97) 
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Of the three questions, Pacelli provides the shortest response here.  He says that we cannot 
deduce an answer to this question from religious or moral principles (97).  He admits that many 
cases cause serious doubt: 
But considerations of a general nature allow us to believe that human life 
continues for as long as its vital functions—distinguished from the simple life of 
organs—manifest themselves spontaneously or even with the help of artificial 
processes.  A great number of these cases are the object of insoluble doubt, and 
must be dealt with according to the presumptions of law and of fact of which we 
have spoken.  (97) 
What constitutes human life—“vital functions” of the whole person or “the simple life of 
organs?”  In “The Artificial Prolongation of Life,” the Pontifical Academy of Sciences reports 
that “. . . it has been found that when the entire brain has suffered irreversible damage (cerebral 
death), all possibility of sensitive and cognitive life is definitively ruled out, while a brief 
vegetative survival can be maintained by artificial prolongation of respiration and circulation” 
(107).  The cases involving Karen Ann Quinlan and Terri Schiavo (both entering the permanent 
vegetative state [PVS] in their twenties) astounded the medical community.23  They both 
remained in a PVS for several years; sustaining the simple life of their organs was accomplished 
through ANH.  Before they became PVS patients, they were able to function as competent 
adults.   
                                                          
23
 Doctors used an artificial respirator to keep Karen Ann Quinlan alive for more than a year.  
Once they were allowed to remove it, she “lived” another ten years (Pence, Classic Cases in 
Medical Ethics 3-5, 7, 22).  Terri Schiavo remained in a PVS for fifteen years.  While she did 
receive various forms of therapy over the years, it was ANH—not other forms of artificial life 
support such as a respirator—that kept her “alive” (Echiavarria).  
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 Now consider cases involving ILTCs.  No infant is capable of the higher functions that 
older children or adults (in good health, that is) are capable of.  If these ILTCs die by the age of 
two, it may remain a mystery as to what level of functioning they would have possessed were 
they to live beyond the age of two.  If simple organs are not functioning in unison to help a 
person function as a human being, what moral obligations do we have toward them in terms of 
providing artificial life support?  If we cannot ascertain that the ILTC is already dead, then 
operating on the assumption he is still alive, we must—according to Church tradition—provide 
ordinary means of life support.  If we consider ANH ordinary means of life support as Wojtyla 
does, then we must provide this as well.  But as we have just seen, ANH is not always an 
ordinary means, at least not if Pacelli’s statements are accepted.  As we have seen in chapter 1, 
ANH is not trouble-free; it can create additional medical problems for a patient.  These new 
problems raise the question of whether we must treat these as well.  A vicious cycle of providing 
ANH and treating subsequent complications may then begin.  It is my aim to avoid this vicious 
cycle altogether. 
2.3  Status of ANH: Ordinary Care or Medical Act? 
 If Wojtyla had said that ANH constituted a medical act, we could regard certain cases 
involving ANH for ILTCs extraordinary and therefore optional under Pacelli’s considerations of 
the “circumstances of persons, places, time and culture.”  But Wojtyla did not; instead he said, “I 
should like particularly to underline how the administration of water and food, even when 
provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical 
act” (“Care” 205).  But I—as do others—question the status of ANH.  It appears to be more a 
medical act than an ordinary form of care.  It is because of these opposing positions that the 
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debate over ANH continues.  Reconsidering the status of ANH is one step toward resolving the 
debate over ANH for ILTCs.   
 Sulmasy provides a robust investigation of several issues within the debate over the status 
of ANH, especially the controversial claim: “The use of feeding tubes is an act of basic human 
caring, and is not a medical act” (195). 
 Sulmasy cites several examples of feeding as a basic form of care: a mother’s feeding her 
child and the miracles of the multiplication of the loaves and fishes as found in the Scriptures.  
“And it is clear that the emotional significance of feeding tubes, and their symbolism, make the 
decision to withhold or withdraw feeding tubes particularly stressful for family members, even 
compared with the stress of forgoing other treatments” (195). 
 Let us consider the following argument distilled from Sulmasy’s treatment of the subject: 
1.  An act that requires a qualified doctor to perform it is a medical act. 
2.  Insertion of a PEG tube24 requires a qualified doctor to perform it. 
3.  Therefore, insertion of a PEG tube is a medical act. 
4.  An act that does not require a qualified doctor to perform it is not a medical 
act, but “nonmedical, obligatory, ordinary care” (195). 
5.  Feeding a patient through a PEG tube requires training, but the person trained 
to feed a patient does not necessarily have to be a qualified doctor. 
6.  Therefore, feeding a patient through a PEG tube is nonmedical, obligatory, 
ordinary care. 
                                                          
24
 Although Sulmasy argues using a PEG tube as an example, any form of ANH requires 
qualified doctors to implant it to prevent life-threatening complications. 
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What we must resolve is the inconsistency between (3) and (6), that is, the insertion of a device 
such as a PEG tube and the subsequent use of it.  Sulmasy writes, 
 First, logically, this would imply that withholding a PEG tube would be 
morally permissible, since its insertion is a medical act, whereas discontinuing its 
use once it is in place would be prohibited, since its use is not a medical act.  This 
would be the first instance of a Catholic teaching that there is a morally relevant 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing care.  The tradition has always 
consistently held that the same criteria apply to withholding as apply to 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments.  (195)   
 A second problem with the argument as it stands occurs when we compare PVS patients 
(the individuals under discussion in Sulmasy’s article) to anyone else suffering from a chronic 
illness.  If we regard the discontinuation of ANH as morally impermissible based on respect for 
the PVS patient’s dignity,25 then discontinuing ANH for any other patient is morally 
impermissible as well.  Sulmasy writes, “This, of course, would have the absurd conclusion that 
no one dying of a chronic illness could have a feeding tube withdrawn” (196).  Notice that he 
says “dying of a chronic illness.”  This is distinguishable from dying from a lack of food and 
fluids.  Without this clear distinction, it is understandable how families can unintentionally cause 
their infants additional pain and/or distress by providing ANH, when their real intention is to 
comfort them.  There are ways to comfort dying infants other than providing food and fluids.  I 
elaborated on these other ways in section 1.3. 
                                                          
25
 The notion of dignity falls under the discussion of the sanctity of life, which I shall address in 
chapter 3. 
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 According to Sulmasy, resolving the argument requires drawing the “proper parallel” 
(197).  His examples involve a patient on an artificial respirator and a patient being fed by a 
feeding tube.  In both cases, artificial means are being used to replace functions the patients do 
not possess: breathing and swallowing,26 respectively (197).  It is not as if we are telling these 
patients, “I do not permit you to have air,” or “I do not permit you to have food and fluids.”  
What we are saying is that they cannot, without artificial assistance, breathe or eat on their own.  
Sulmasy writes, 
 Taking the oxygen out of the air that a dying person is breathing is killing and 
is always wrong.  Failing to provide food is allowing to die.  Doing so is 
sometimes wrong and sometimes morally permissible.  It is wrong not to feed a 
baby who can eat.  It is not wrong to refrain from force-feeding someone dying of 
cancer who has lost his appetite.  (197) 
We must be careful with terms and phrases such as “failing” and “allowing to die.”  As Sulmasy 
demonstrates, there are instances when we should provide food (e.g., the baby who can eat) and 
times when we should refrain from feeding a person (e.g., a patient dying of cancer).  There is, 
however, a world of difference in the meanings of these following statements: 
1.  The baby died because the parents failed to provide food to him. 
2.  The baby died because the parents tried to feed him but failed. 
3.  Though the baby needed medical attention, the parents allowed him to die. 
                                                          
26
 To be clear, we must note that some ILTCs are able to swallow.  It may be a condition such as 
duodenal atresia, esophageal atresia, or esophageal fistula that prevents ILTCs from assimilating 
food and fluids orally.  So for the sake of argument, let us take “swallow” to mean “unable to 
adequately process food and fluids when taken orally.”  This example clearly shows how, in 
certain regards, PVS patients are different from ILTCs.  This is why there needs to be more 
debate over ANH for ILTCs. 
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4.  Because medical intervention could not save the baby, the parents allowed him 
to die. 
So Sulmasy’s statement, “Failing to provide food is allowing to die,” can be construed as an act 
of omission, or passive euthanasia.  Without further clarification, someone taking Wojtyla’s 
position could misconstrue this statement and claim that Sulmasy is advocating a practice 
condemned by the Church. 
 To draw another distinction, cancer patients can differ from ILTCs insofar as some 
cancer patients may have the ability to tell us they are not hungry, eating makes them sick, etc.  
ILTCs, on the other hand, cannot verbally tell us that they do not want food.  Just as we would 
not want someone to feed us to the point where we have negative reactions (e.g., vomiting, 
reflux, bloating, diarrhea, etc.), we should not feed ILTCs to the point where they experience 
pain and/or distress. 
 Concluding his comparison between artificial respiration and ANH, Sulmasy writes, 
The analogous medico-moral issues concern the interventions aimed at assisting 
persons who have lost these functions [of breathing and swallowing].  If that is so, 
then just as there are reasonable limits to the obligation one has to replace the lost 
function of breathing via a ventilator machine or an Ambu27 bag, there are limits 
to the obligation one has to replace a lost ability to swallow with a pump machine 
or a syringe.  So there seems to be no principled way to define a medical act in 
such a way that feeding tubes are classified as “nonmedical” while other treatment 
modalities that are initiated and prescribed by physicians remain classified as 
“medical.”  (197)          
                                                          
27
 “Ambu is the trademarked name of a self-reinflating bag used in resuscitation” (Sulmasy 197). 
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Sulmasy is concerned about the Church’s becoming involved in the debate over what counts as 
medical or nonmedical.  He asks, “Is the answer to the medical/nonmedical question of such 
import that the church (sic) must define which acts are, when performed by medical personnel, in 
fact not medical?” (198).  In addition, he says that “[t]he tradition has never considered the 
question of whether something was ‘medical’ to be a criterion for distinguishing ordinary from 
extraordinary means of care” (198).  He refers to “commonplace acts, such as traveling to a 
healthier climate, eating certain kinds of foods, or even eating itself have all been considered, in 
the proper circumstances, ‘extraordinary means’ under traditional analysis” (198).  The Church’s 
becoming involved now as to the medical/nonmedical debate would seem, at least in Sulmasy’s 
opinion, a step towards “alter[ing] the tradition and mak[ing] this a decisive factor in 
distinguishing ordinary from extraordinary means of care” (198). 
 Why is Sulmasy’s analysis important in the ANH debate?  He states that questions 
regarding end-of-life care “require serious examination in advance of any formal dogmatic 
resolution of these hotly disputed questions” (198).  We see a marked distinction between 
Pacelli’s and Wojtyla’s remarks.  Pacelli gives credence to various circumstances and admits that 
some cases will be most difficult, if not impossible, to resolve without much anguish.  Wojtyla, 
on the other hand, tries singlehandedly to close the debate on ANH by proclaiming that it 
“always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act” in his 2004 address.  
While this is not an infallible28 teaching, the fact that he gave a public address and reaffirmed 
                                                          
28
 It is important to understand what constitutes an infallible statement by a pope.  First, the 
matter under discussion must pertain to faith and morals.  Second, a pope must declare that the 
statement he is making is infallible (that is, he must invoke the doctrine of infallibility).  Third, 
the pope must be speaking ex cathedra, that is, speaking physically from the Chair of St. Peter 
itself when issuing such a statement.  If these conditions are not met, then the statement is not 
infallible.  To date, only two infallible statements have been promulgated in the entire history of 
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what he wrote in an encyclical, a recognized medium of his teaching office, carries much weight.  
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), however, implies that ANH is a 
medical act when it uses the phrase “medically assisted nutrition and hydration” as a section 
heading in its “Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections.”   
 But the question remains: is ANH a medical act or ordinary care?  AHN requires a 
medical act to insert the feeding tube, but once it is in place, it delivers food and fluids, things 
that are typically considered ordinary.  ANH is not a “place-and-forget” procedure, nor are 
feeding tubes “place-and-forget” devices.  Insofar as ANH requires medical personnel to oversee 
the procedure and consult with families regarding the cleaning and maintenance of feeding tubes 
and associated equipment, the treating of complications as they arise, etc., I regard ANH as a 
medical act.  Families also sometimes provide care for patients on respirators with oversight 
from medical personnel, but that does not make the maintenance of respirator-dependent patients 
a nonmedical process.  In order for us to rethink the Catholic position on ANH, we must consider 
it to be a medical act. 
2.4  Redefining “Ordinary” and “Extraordinary” 
 Medical and technological advances can render terms such as “ordinary” and 
“extraordinary” obsolete when these terms do not take into consideration many of the factors in 
situations that modern families find themselves in when caring for ILTCs.  Therefore, definitions 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Roman Catholic Church: the Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (by Pope Pius IX in 
1854) and the Doctrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary (by Pope Pius XII in 
1950).  No infallible statements have ever been made about morals.  Many people—including 
lifelong, faithful Catholics—are surprised to learn that Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae 
(which condemned the practice of artificial contraception) is not an infallible teaching.  
Nevertheless, Catholics are encouraged to inform themselves to the point where they can 
understand the teaching and live in accordance with it.  Papal infallibility has nothing to do with 
a pope’s being unable to sin.  As Pope, Wojtyla was famously known for going to confession 
once a week. 
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for terms such as “ordinary” and “extraordinary” must be reviewed and refined.  While my 
comments surely will not put an end to the debate over ANH for ILTCs, they may at least keep 
the debate open and even be one step closer to resolving it.  
 In “A History of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means,” Donald E. Henke mentions that in 
1950, Gerald Kelly classified artificial means to help sustain life “as a remedy for a particular 
disease or illness.  The distinguishing characteristic of a remedy was that an individual might 
employ it as a useful means toward recovering from or halting a disease” (61).  Sometimes, 
however, an illness, condition, or injury so overwhelms a patient that no matter what remedy is 
attempted, it cannot stop the dying process.  It is upon this realization that we may call a remedy 
useless.  But we must be careful in how we label medicines, procedures, and so forth.  ANH is an 
artificial remedy for malnutrition or dehydration, but it by itself cannot cure an ILTC of the 
underlying condition(s) that will eventually cause his death.  Commenting on Kelly’s position, 
Henke says, “Simply because a means to preserve life was not completely natural did not mean 
that it automatically became extraordinary” (61).  Agreeing with Kelly, Daniel Cronin in 1958 
wrote, “ ‘[T]he terms artificial means and extraordinary means are not coextensive.  An artificial 
means can be an ordinary means of conserving life’ ” (61).  But when ANH does not seem to 
help an ILTC who is dying from one or more underlying conditions, it appears that ANH is an 
artificial means that becomes extraordinary. 
 Kelly’s contributions helped establish definitions based on 400 years of intense debate.  
Kelly’s definitions of ordinary and extraordinary means are as follows: 
Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without excessive 
expense, pain, or other inconvenience. 
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 Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations, which 
cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other 
inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit.  
(62)     
 Not everyone, however, was content with Kelly’s definitions.  Cronin, for example, 
believed that Kelly focused too exclusively on medical procedures.  Cronin thought other 
considerations were just as important: “physical condition, mental and emotional state, etc.” (62).  
Cronin’s definitions of ordinary and extraordinary are as follows: 
Ordinary means of conserving life are those means commonly used in given 
circumstances, which this individual in his present physical, psychological and 
economic condition can reasonably employ with definite hope of proportional 
benefit. 
 Extraordinary means of conserving life are those means not commonly used 
in given circumstances, or those means in common use which this individual in 
his present physical, psychological and economic condition cannot reasonably 
employ, or if he can, will not give him definite hope of proportionate benefit.  
(63) 
As we can see from Cronin’s definitions, the patient is given more latitude to decide for himself 
what he may or may not want.  As I have mentioned before, parents of ILTCs find themselves 
making these decisions as proxies.   
 Even after redefining “ordinary” and extraordinary,” there may still be confusion, since 
these terms can be used in both the medical and moral sense (Gomez 37).  “Proportionate” and 
“disproportionate,” therefore, may provide greater clarity.  Gomez says, “The terms ethically 
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ordinary and extraordinary are interchangeable with the terms ethically proportionate and 
disproportionate as they apply to life-sustaining methods” (37).  Defining “proportionate,” he 
refers to Directive 56 of The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
(ERDs): 
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of the patient offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit and do not entail an excessive burden or impose 
excessive expense on the family or the community.  (37) 
Defining “disproportionate,” Gomez refers to Directive 57 of the same document: 
 Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s judgment do not offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit or entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive 
expense on the family or community.  (37-38) 
 Having in mind the notions of “proportionate” and “disproportionate,” I believe that 
Cronin’s definitions can be refined even further to reflect Pacelli’s considerations of the family 
and the community at large.  I propose my definitions below.  For the sake of clarity, I provide 
separate definitions of these terms for patients themselves and for those deciding and acting on 
their behalf (e.g., parents of ILTCs).     
1a.  Ordinary (or proportionate) means of conserving life are those means 
commonly used in given circumstances, which this individual (i.e., this patient) in 
his present and future physical, psychological and economic condition can 
reasonably employ with definite hope of benefits that outweigh burdens for 
himself.   
1b.  Ordinary (or proportionate) means of conserving life are those means 
commonly used in given circumstances, which others deciding for and acting on 
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an individual’s behalf in their present and future physical, psychological and 
economic condition can reasonably employ with definite hope of benefits that 
outweigh burdens for the individual  and/or themselves.   
2a.  Extraordinary (or disproportionate) means of conserving life are those means 
not commonly used in given circumstances, or those means in common use which 
this individual (i.e., this patient) in his present and future physical, psychological 
and economic condition cannot reasonably employ, or if he can, will not give him 
definite hope of benefits that outweigh burdens.   
2b.  Extraordinary (or disproportionate) means of conserving life are those means 
not commonly used in given circumstances, or those means in common use which 
others deciding for and acting on an individual’s behalf in their present and future 
physical, psychological and economic condition cannot reasonably employ, or if 
they can, will not give them definite hope of benefits that outweigh burdens for 
the individual and/or themselves.   
While an ILTC is primarily affected by his condition(s) on the physical level, his family and 
others in the community suffer not only on the physical level, but also the psychological, 
economic, and other levels such as the social and spiritual.  Consideration of the present and the 
future is also important.  Successful or failed treatment results do not always present themselves 
immediately.  Doctors and families may have to wait to determine whether certain treatments 
deliver expected benefits.  Doctors may give a hopeful prognosis, only to find that the patient is 
not responding well to treatment.  Likewise, doctors may give a grim prognosis, only to discover 
the patient responding better than expected.  Also, regardless of how the ILTC responds to a 
treatment, the burdens and benefits to the family of extended NICU care will continue to unfold 
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far into the future.  As we can see from redefining “ordinary” and “extraordinary,” the debate 
over whether to administer, continue, withhold, or withdraw must take much more into account 
than the claim that ANH must be provided on the basis that it employs relatively simple 
equipment or does not cost very much.  
 Because we are dealing with human beings, there will always be difficulties when 
making choices based on estimates (e.g., time left to live, whether or not certain treatments will 
work, what side-effects a patient may encounter, etc.).  Even though two ILTCs may have the 
same condition, their families may arrive at completely different decisions based on their 
respective extenuating circumstances.  While no one wants to make mistakes—especially in 
matters where mistakes cost lives—they do happen.  But families cannot put off making these 
difficult decisions indefinitely for this reason.  Waiting until they are sure of their decisions is 
not really any different from deciding.  If families are this fearful of making mistakes, it is even 
more important for doctors, pastors, and chaplains to give them useful information and 
unwavering support. 
2.5  Conclusion 
 It is important to revisit the notion of why food and fluids are always considered ordinary 
and therefore obligatory, at least in Wojtyla’s opinion.  Recall that not all technically simple 
means of care are ordinary.  Conversely, not all technically complex means of care are 
extraordinary.  As medicine and technology have advanced, means that would have been 
extraordinary in the past are now considered ordinary.  That is why I believe it is especially 
important to redefine “ordinary” and “extraordinary.”  These definitions need to take into 
account circumstances that modern families find themselves in when caring for ILTCs.  Wojtyla 
does not provide an argument for the view that providing food and fluids is always ordinary; he 
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simply states that it is.  Since Pacelli does not address ANH in his speech, we must question 
whether Wojtyla has read too much into Pacelli’s responses about resuscitation and, as a result, 
placed an undue burden on ILTCs and their families.   
 Not all infants are born healthy.  Some may recover with a minimal amount of medical 
care.  Others may recover after undergoing much more aggressive treatment.  Still others may 
survive but may nevertheless be permanently affected by their conditions (e.g., trisomy 21, or 
Down syndrome) no matter what treatment is attempted.  The “culture of life”—coined by 
Wojtyla (whose name is synonymous with being pro-life)—calls for the protection of every 
human life, but we must accept the fact that some infants will die before the age of two, no 
matter what treatment doctors attempt.  The major concern with withholding or withdrawing 
ANH is that for Wojtyla and others within the Catholic tradition (including some bishops), it is a 
form of prolonged neglect.  The culture of life finds its roots in the sanctity-of-life ethic, which is 
often viewed as the antithesis of the quality-of-life ethic.  In chapter 3, I will discuss both of 
these ethics and propose a way to reconcile them using the principle of contentment. 
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Chapter 3: Reconciling the Sanctity- and Quality-of-Life Ethics 
within the Culture of Life 
 Even if we were to become what Wojtyla calls a “culture of life,” we would still have to 
face the reality that some infants are born with life-terminating conditions and will die before the 
age of two.  Wojtyla believes that every human life—including the life of every infant with life-
terminating conditions (ILTC)—is sacred and no one is permitted to violate it.  His notion of the 
culture of life promotes what many people understand to be the sanctity-of-life ethic.  But there 
is another ethic at work within Catholic teaching, the quality-of-life ethic, which can be used to 
determine what should be done in cases where there seems to be little to no quality left to a 
person’s life.  Wojtyla’s fear is that if judgments about life are based solely on quality, then those 
who do not “measure up” are in danger of being aborted, euthanized, or executed.  Wojtyla holds 
that artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) constitutes an ordinary form of care; therefore, it is 
wrong to withhold or withdraw ANH from ILTCs unless they are just about to die (i.e., in their 
final hours).  ANH, however, can cause harm.  So even if we hold life to be sacred (as the 
sanctity-of-life ethic does), we must make decisions based on the ILTC’s present and future 
quality of life if we are to avoid causing further harm by the use of ANH.  Wojtyla would object 
to my proposals about withholding and withdrawing ANH from an infant on the grounds that it 
violates the sanctity-of-life ethic.  He would claim that my proposals are based merely on a 
quality-of-life ethic.  But I believe that these two ethics can be reconciled using the principle of 
keeping an infant content.     
3.1  Revisiting the Culture of Life 
 I introduced what Wojtyla thinks the culture of life would look like in chapter 2.  
Probably the closest that Wojtyla comes to defining the “culture of life” is as follows: 
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In a word, we can say that the cultural change which we are calling for demands 
from everyone the courage to adopt a new life-style, consisting in making 
practical choices29—at the personal, family, social and international level—on the 
basis of a correct scale of values: the primacy of being over having, of the person 
over things.  This renewed life-style involves a passing from indifference to 
concern for others, from rejection to acceptance of them.  Other people are not 
rivals from whom we must defend ourselves, but brothers and sisters to be 
supported.  They are to be loved for their own sakes, and they enrich us by their 
very presence.  (Gospel 174 [98]) 
Individuals whom we consider “less than perfect” should not be judged to be worthless or 
expendable.  As I shall argue, making decisions based on an ILTC’s quality of life is not a 
judgment of worthlessness or expendability.  The sanctity of life permits natural death and thus 
does not require that we always prolong life.  But then the question arises as to when it is 
permissible to let natural death occur.   
 Deciding to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures (e.g., an artificial 
respirator) is a very delicate and complicated matter.  It is not always clear whether an infant will 
survive if he is taken off the respirator, and often, doctors can only give a best estimate as to his 
prognosis.  Death may occur if the infant is taken off the respirator, but it may still occur even if 
the infant is left on it.  When there is little to no hope of recovery (e.g., the infant has several life-
terminating conditions causing system failure), the Church permits the removal of life-
prolonging equipment.   
                                                          
29
 It is my hope that the Church can provide families with practical moral guidance to help them 
make practical choices.  To review what I mean by “practical moral guidance,” See footnote 10 
in section 2.1. 
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 ANH is a different matter, however.  It is a fact that the complete suspension of food and 
fluids will result in death, not only for terminal infants, but for anyone at all.  In the case of 
removing a terminal infant from the artificial respirator, the Church recognizes the act as one of 
allowing death versus euthanizing the infant.  But unless the infant is in the final stages of dying, 
or what the U.S. Bishops in “Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections” call 
“imminently dying” (119), complete suspension of food and fluids is viewed by the Church as an 
act of euthanasia and therefore prohibited.   
 Wojtyla’s words carry great weight because he speaks as Pope.  But other high-ranking 
Church officials have also commented on the sanctity of life.  Joseph Cardinal Bernardin (1928-
1996), Archbishop of Chicago, delivered one of the most influential statements to ever come out 
of the Catholic Church in the United States on the topic of the universality of the sanctity of life.  
I now turn to his address.     
3.2  Bernardin’s “Seamless Garment”: A Consistent Ethic of Life 
 In his 1983 address entitled “A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American-Catholic 
Dialogue,” 30 Bernardin notices that despite the efforts to incorporate teachings from the Catholic 
moral tradition (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae) into arguments as to why we 
should respect human life, the Church had not provided up to that point a framework to support a 
consistent ethic of life.  It would be an inconsistency to condemn abortion but support nuclear 
deterrence, or vice versa.    In his introduction, Bernardin says, “No other major institution 
presently holds these two positions [on abortion and nuclear deterrence] in the way the Catholic 
                                                          
30
 “A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American-Catholic Dialogue”, delivered at Fordham 
University, was a reflection on “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” the 
pastoral letter addressing war and peace.  The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), 
now the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), published the letter in May of 
1983. 
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bishops have joined them.”  He wants to show how these two issues are linked, and what the 
resulting ramifications would be when we consider other matters pertaining to human life.  His 
purpose for the address is to clarify “the Church’s role in helping to shape a public policy 
debate” (sec. 1). 
 In essence, we notice an inconsistency if, on one hand, we condemn abortion because 
“the fetus is judged to be both human and not an aggressor” but allow the presence of nuclear 
arms as a form of deterrence, even though the use of nuclear arms would be a “[direct] intended 
[attack] on civilian centers” (sec. 2).  Civilians not directly involved in the war cause are 
considered innocents.  So we see the inconsistency here: one group of innocent persons (unborn 
children) is granted protection, while another group is not.  And, of course, we can see the 
inconsistency in the other direction: we grant innocent civilians protection from being targeted 
during war, while at the same time, allow the abortion of unborn children (on the assumption, of 
course, that fetuses are indeed persons).  A consistent ethic of life, he argues, respects life—
regardless of its form or condition—from “womb to tomb,” that is, from the moment of 
conception to the moment of natural death.31 
 The purpose of Bernardin’s address is not to spell out in detail possible solutions to 
problems such as killing soldiers during war or executing condemned criminals.  He leaves that 
to the audience.  The solution, he says, lies in a change of attitude towards life itself.  In addition, 
he says that “an inner relationship does exist among several issues not only at the level of general 
                                                          
31
 The consistent ethic of life that Bernardin presents here is often referred to as the “seamless 
garment”—though he himself does not use this phrase in this address—referring to the seamless 
garment for which the Roman soldiers cast lots at Jesus’ crucifixion.  The soldiers recognized the 
value of such a garment and decided not to tear it (John 19.23-24).  Valuing life in the same 
regard, we should avoid doing anything that “tears” life’s fabric. 
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attitude but at the more specific level of moral principles” (sec. 2).  Consider what he says about 
how far this attitude should extend: 
 If one contends, as we do, that the right of every fetus to be born should be 
protected by civil law and supported by civil consensus, then our moral, political 
and economic responsibilities do not stop at the moment of birth.  Those who 
defend the right to life of the weakest among us must be equally visible in support 
of the quality of life of the powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry 
and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the unemployed worker.  
Such a quality of life posture translates into specific political and economic 
positions on tax policy, employment generation, welfare policy, nutrition and 
feeding programs, and health care.  Consistency means we cannot have it both 
ways.  We cannot urge a compassionate society and vigorous public policy to 
protect the rights of the unborn and then argue that compassion and significant 
public programs on behalf of the needy undermine the moral fiber of the society 
or are beyond the proper scope of governmental responsibility.  (sec. 2) 
Notice that in his discussion, Bernardin mentions the “quality of life.”  In the last several years, 
“quality of life,” when used as an ethic, has been taken to mean some kind of measuring stick 
against which to determine whether particular individuals’ lives should be prolonged or not.  But 
Bernardin talks here about this notion in terms of improving everyone’s living conditions.  A 
compassionate society, on his view, requires judgments about the quality of life.  Wojtyla does 
the same in The Gospel of Life: “Another welcome sign is the growing attention being paid to 
the quality of life and to ecology, especially in more developed societies, where people's 
expectations are no longer concentrated so much on problems of survival as on the search for an 
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overall improvement of living conditions” (50 [27]).  Our challenge here is to somehow 
incorporate the notion of the quality of life into Wojtyla’s culture of life, which is, in turn, based 
on the sanctity of life.  We must try to find practical solutions—as Bernardin suggests—to this 
very real problem. 
3.3  What Do We Mean by “Life?” 
      When we use phrases such as “culture of life,” “sanctity of life,” and “quality of life,” we 
must ask the critical question, what do we mean by “life?”  Christianity recognizes the 
distinction between earthly and heavenly existence.  At the same time, Christianity often uses the 
term “life” equivocally, especially when addressing pro-life issues such as abortion, euthanasia, 
and capital punishment.  We can talk about how certain actions can affect a person’s biological 
life, his family life, his social life, his religious life, his eternal life, etc.  I believe that it is on 
account of these several different meanings that there is some confusion as to what exactly the 
“culture of life” is.  Let us examine some of Wojtyla’s statements about “life”: 
- The life which God bestows upon man is much more than mere existence in 
time.  It is a drive towards fullness of life; it is the seed of an existence which 
transcends the very limits of time: “For God created man for incorruption, and 
made him in the image of his own eternity” (Wis 2:23).  (62 [34]) 
- The life which the Son of God came to give to human beings cannot be reduced 
to mere existence in time.  (66 [37]) 
- Sometimes Jesus refers to this life which he came to give simply as “life”, and 
he presents being born of God as a necessary condition if man is to attain the end 
for which God has created him: “Unless one is born anew, he cannot see the 
kingdom of God (Jn 3:3).  To give this life is the real object of Jesus’ mission: he 
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is the one who “comes down from heaven, and gives life to the world” (Jn 6:33).  
(66 [37]) 
- At other times, Jesus speaks of “eternal life”.  Here the adjective does more than 
merely evoke a perspective which is beyond time.  The life which Jesus promises 
and gives is “eternal” because it is a full participation in the life of the “Eternal 
One”.  (66 [37]) 
- Jesus himself, addressing the Father in the great priestly prayer, declares what 
eternal life consists in: “This is eternal life, that they may know you the only true 
God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent” (Jn 17:3).  (67 [37]) 
- Eternal life is therefore the life of God himself and at the same time the life of 
the children of God.  (67 [38]) 
As we would expect, Wojtyla’s aim is directed toward God.  This makes sense, as The Gospel of 
Life is first and foremost a theological document.  But this is not to say that Wojtyla discredits 
our existence in time as embodied creatures.  The problem is that if we do not completely 
understand what Wojtyla is calling for in The Gospel of Life, we may place ourselves in a 
position where we find ourselves providing ANH to infants who do not need it, or worse, 
creating unnecessary distress for them.   
 Eternal life is not the same as earthly life.  Many people believe that in order to attain 
eternal life, they must take care of earthly things—including their bodies—as a means of 
cooperating with God’s plan.  The problem with appealing to cooperating with God’s plan is that 
we can never truly be certain what that might be.  Since earthly life does have a temporal end, we 
have a duty to take care of it until it reaches its completion.  When or how this completion occurs 
is, in many instances, unfathomable.  That is why dealing with end-of-life issues—especially in 
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an age where modern medical technology can prolong biological life indefinitely—has become 
more difficult than it was in the past.  Now that we have access to much more advanced 
medicine and technology, we must ask, “Am I doing God’s will by prolonging my infant’s life 
until every medical procedure available is attempted but fails, or am I doing God’s will by 
allowing my infant to die without all the assistance of modern medicine?”  There is no way of 
knowing for sure, but we want to spare families from lifelong guilt and suffering, especially 
suffering that comes from second-guessing decisions made for their infants regarding end-of-life 
care.   
 Recall Pacelli’s admonition that temporal goods are always subordinate to eternal 
goods.32    No matter what route we take, we are still left with the question of how best to care 
for people who are, undeniably, bodily creatures and require care that they cannot provide for 
themselves.     
3.4  Inheriting Eternal Life: Lessons from the Gospels 
 For Wojtya, fullness of life is found in Jesus Christ.  Many people are familiar with 
Jesus’ miracles, many of which involved healing of the sick.  What was so significant about 
these kinds of miracles?  Certainly, when people were cured of their illnesses and conditions, 
they were better able to go about their daily lives.  Hearing about Jesus’ powers, people sought 
Him out so that He might cure them of their ailments.  From a socio-religious standpoint, many 
ailments rendered a person ritually unclean, resulting in his being treated as an outcast from 
                                                          
32
 We learn in chapters 23 through 25 in the first book of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of 
England that at the end of the sixth century, Pope Gregory I (Gregory the Great) sent St. 
Augustine of Canterbury and his missionaries to England. Gregory recognized the importance of 
providing temporal goods such as medical care and education, but of utmost importance to him 
was spreading the Gospel so that the English would be saved.  St. Augustine’s first act upon 
arriving in Kent was converting King Ethelbert.  Only after his conversion did the King allow St. 
Augustine and his missionaries to provide temporal goods to the English people.   
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society.  Even today, society tends to treat sick people as outcasts—not so much based on ritual 
uncleanness—but perhaps out of fear of being reminded that at some point in their lifetimes, they 
themselves may become sick and/or debilitated.   
 Jesus, however, was not intent upon healing just physical ailments, but, more important, 
healing souls from sin’s effects.  Sin is to the soul what sickness is to the body.  Just as sickness 
can isolate a person from the community in which he lives, sin separates a person from God.  
Catholics believe that if a person dies with venial sin on his soul, a process of purification (e.g., a 
“stay” in Purgatory) is necessary before entering heaven, since without holiness, “no one will see 
the Lord” (Heb. 12.14).   A person dying with mortal sin on his soul, however, suffers eternal 
damnation. 
 Jesus’ answer to the question of inheriting eternal life is the parable of the Good 
Samaritan, which is quoted again and again in the literature on ANH: 
 There was a scholar of the law who stood up to test [Jesus] and said, 
“Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?”  Jesus said to him, “What is 
written in the law?  How do you read it?”  He said in reply, “You shall love the 
Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your being, with all your strength, 
and with all your mind, and your neighbor as yourself.”  He replied to him, “You 
have answered correctly; do this and you will live.”  
 But because he wished to justify himself, he said to Jesus, “And who is my 
neighbor?”  Jesus replied, “A man fell victim to robbers as he went down from 
Jerusalem to Jericho.  They stripped and beat him and went off leaving him half-
dead. A priest happened to be going down that road, but when he saw him, he 
passed by on the opposite side.  Likewise a Levite came to the place, and when he 
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saw him, he passed by on the opposite side.  But a Samaritan traveler who came 
upon him was moved with compassion at the sight.  He approached the victim, 
poured oil and wine over his wounds and bandaged them.  Then he lifted him up 
on his own animal, took him to an inn and cared for him.  The next day he took 
out two silver coins and gave them to the innkeeper with the instruction, ‘Take 
care of him.  If you spend more than what I have given you, I shall repay you on 
my way back.’  Which of these three, in your opinion, was neighbor to the 
robbers’ victim?”  He answered, “The one who treated him with mercy.”  Jesus 
said to him, “Go and do likewise.”  (Luke 10.25-37) 
The kind of life Jesus promises in the Gospels is everlasting life with God in heaven.  Even 
though eternal life is a gift from God, Catholics believe that we must cooperate with God’s will 
in order to share in this gift.33  We cannot do anything we please and hope to inherit eternal life 
just because we presume that God is loving and forgiving.  Notice that the young man asks Jesus 
what he must do to inherit eternal life.  Obeying the two greatest commandments (love of God 
and love of neighbor) is essential.  But also notice that when the young man asks Jesus for 
clarification, Jesus responds with a story about one person helping another in need.  At the very 
end, Jesus says that we must do likewise.  So actions of some type are necessary. 
 Let us look more closely at the Good Samaritan’s actions.  Jesus says that the Good 
Samaritan poured oil and wine over the victim’s wounds, and bandaged them.  In The Cultural 
Dictionary of the Bible, John J. Pilch says that oil—most likely olive oil—could be used “as a 
                                                          
33
 To cooperate with God’s will in His plan of salvation runs counter to the fifth-century heresy 
known as Pelagianism, which [denied] . . . our need for divine help in avoiding sin and . . . 
[insisted] that we could earn our salvation by our own efforts” (Thomas Bokenkotter, A Concise 
History of the Catholic Church 68). 
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salve for wounds” (55).  The New World Dictionary Concordance to the New American Bible 
states that “[w]ine was also noted for some of its therapeutic qualities” (“Wine”).  The Samaritan 
performed what we today would probably call “first aid.”  The Samaritan’s main intent—or so it 
seems—was to get the victim off the road and to a place where he might recuperate.  It appears 
that he kept watch over the victim through the night.  Though he had no obligation to do so, he 
paid for the victim’s stay at the inn and even promised to pay any additional fees that the victim 
might have incurred. 
 Without further details, we are left asking further questions.  Did the victim live, or did 
he die from his wounds?  Was there a doctor available who could have done more than the 
Samaritan or the innkeeper?  If the victim lived, what was his quality of life afterwards?  If 
Jesus’ main intent was to show how far our love should extend (e.g., even to our enemies, as 
there was at that time great enmity between Jews and Samaritans), then these other details might 
not have been so important for Him to address.  But especially today, when we have access to 
modern medicine, equipment, and technology, we must ask, what is the extent to which we 
should care for a sick person?  If the Samaritan was traveling with silver, he was probably 
wealthy.  What happens today if a sick person or his family does not have the means to pay for 
medical care?  If the victim was half-dead, he might not have been able to eat for quite some 
time.  Feeding him while unconscious would have proven fatal.  At the same time, he could have 
died from his injuries without ever regaining consciousness or the ability to eat.  If a person is 
dying, it may be in his best interests not to eat or drink.   
 Another passage from the Gospels often appears in the literature on ANH, especially in 
the mandates to Catholic healthcare workers “ ‘to cure if possible, always to care’ ” (Wojtyla, 
“Care” 207).  Jesus speaks about the rewards we will receive if we feed the hungry: “ ‘Amen, I 
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say to you, whatever you did for one of these least brothers of mine, you did for me’ ” (Matt. 
25.40).  But what if we decide not to?  Jesus also warns of punishments to come:  
“Then [the Son of Man] will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you 
accursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels.  For I was 
hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink, a 
stranger and you gave me no welcome, naked and you gave me no clothing, ill 
and in prison, and you did not care for me.’  Then they will answer and say, 
‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or ill or in 
prison, and not minister to your needs?’  He will answer them, ‘Amen, I say to 
you, what you did not do for one of these least ones, you did not do for me.’  And 
these will go off to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life.”  (Matt. 
25.41-46) 
Again, the fact that Wojtyla speaks as head of the Catholic Church and quotes Jesus Himself on 
what we may expect at our judgment carries great weight for anyone encountering others who 
need care, and not just those whose profession it is to provide care.   It is understandable, then, 
that families agonize over end-of-life decisions, especially if they take seriously Jesus’ words 
about heaven and hell. 
 A very subtle point to consider—but one which I think has significant ramifications—is 
Jesus’ statements about being hungry, thirsty, and sick.  Notice that the requirement to give food 
or drink to someone is a response to the person’s being hungry or thirsty.  Recall from chapter 1 
that modern clinical evidence suggests that when a person is ill or dying, he may not actually be 
hungry or thirsty.  “Tube feedings [and] IVs . . . are obviously not the same thing as eating [and] 
drinking.  Not only are they mechanical and not responsive to our feelings of hunger [and] thirst  
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. . . but they also are troubling, uncomfortable, and efficient—just what human contact is not” 
(Lynn and Harrold 130).  Notice, finally, that Jesus expects us to care for or visit the ill.  There 
are many ways to care for a sick or dying person that do not necessarily involve feeding or 
hydrating him.  We must be careful to distinguish what a person needs from what we think he 
wants. 
 In The Gospel of Life, Wojtyla twice mentions the parable of the Good Samaritan.  In the 
first instance, Wojtyla praises those people within the Church who have followed “the example 
of Jesus the ‘Good Samaritan’ . . . freely giving of themselves out of love for their neighbour, 
especially for the weak and needy” (49 [27]).  Citing Matthew 6.6, Wojtyla refers to rewards 
bestowed by God that these people will enjoy both in this life and in the next (48-50 [27]). 
 In the second instance of referring to the Good Samaritan, Wojtyla says the following: 
 By his words and actions Jesus further unveils the positive requirements of the 
commandment regarding the inviolability of life [i.e., “You shall not kill”].  These 
requirements were already present in the Old Testament, where legislation dealt 
with protecting and defending life when it was weak and threatened: in the case of 
foreigners, widows, orphans, the sick and poor in general, including children in 
the womb (cf. Ex 21:22; 22:20-26).  With Jesus these positive requirements 
assume new force and urgency, and are revealed in all their breadth and depth: 
they range from caring for the life of one’s brother (whether a blood brother, 
someone belonging to the same people, or a foreigner living in the land of Israel) 
to showing concern for the stranger, even to the point of loving one’s enemy.  
(71-72 [41]) 
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Wojtyla does not go into detail here as to what care should be provided.  What we must then ask 
is how we will accomplish this care, for medical care may involve a complicated web of many 
types of simple actions, administration of various medications, complicated and/or invasive 
procedures, and people (e.g., family members, nurses, physicians, specialists, etc.).  Wojtyla 
arrives at the conclusion that “the deepest element of God’s commandment to protect human life 
is the requirement to show reverence and love for every person and the life of every person” (72 
[41]).  Wojtyla cites Paul’s letter to the Romans: “Love does no evil34 to the neighbor; hence, 
love is the fulfillment of the law” (Rom. 13:10). 
 We must be very careful not to harm an ILTC in providing medical care.  We may have 
no intention of doing so, but if we are not aware of the unintentional harm we may cause, we 
may nevertheless subject the infant to unnecessary pain and distress.  Even if one medical 
treatment is deemed a success, it may create a complication that in itself is not life-terminating, 
but may still cause the infant pain and/or distress.  Also, doctors should not assume that just 
because a treatment has proven successful in the past, the ILTC undergoing treatment here and 
now will respond well to it.   
3.5  The Sanctity-of-Life Ethic 
 Doing no harm to a person is at the heart of the sanctity-of-life ethic.  Let us now turn our 
attention to the sanctity-of-life ethic, and especially to the concerns that it raises.  Consider first 
the propositions that it defends.  In “Who Shall Live?” Leonard Weber defines them as follows: 
1.  That human life is sacred by the very fact of its existence; its value does not 
depend upon a certain condition or perfection of that life. 
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 In quoting this verse from Romans, Wojtyla’s text states, “Love does no wrong to a  
neighbour. . .” (emphasis added).  We can also safely substitute “harm” here as well.  The point 
we should take away from this verse is that we should not do violence to anyone against his will.    
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2.  That, therefore, all human lives are of equal value; all have the same right to 
life.  (111) 
 Where does the first proposition come from?  Why is human life sacred?  Catholics (and 
some non-Catholics, too) look to the first story of creation in Genesis.  On the sixth day, God 
created the beasts, creeping things, and finally man.  But something peculiar happened when 
God created man: 
Then God said: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.35   Let them 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over 
all the wild animals and all the creatures that crawl on the ground.”  God created 
man in his image, in the divine image he created him; male and female he created 
them.  (Gen. 3.26-27) 
God did not utter words about imparting His image and likeness to anything else He created, not 
even the more intelligent animals such as the higher primates and dolphins.  For our purposes 
here, I leave it as a given that we are created in God’s image and likeness.  But a reasonable 
question to ask is, why do human beings exclusively have this special status?  There seems to be 
no clear answer to this question.    In Feeding the Dying: Religion and End-of-Life Decisions, 
Patricia Talone states that many people accept the teachings of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas 
Aquinas as to how we are created in the image and likeness of God: it is because of our rational 
intellect (51-52).   
 This threshold appears at first to be a possible solution, but Talone highlights a very 
serious consideration: 
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 Many people wonder to whom God is speaking when He says: “Let us make man in our 
image, after our likeness” (emphasis added).  A possible interpretation is that this was a 
conversation among the Three Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). 
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. . . [W]hen we wrongly locate the essence of the human in functional rationality 
(alone) we automatically assume a hierarchical structuring that relegates those 
who do not possess the acceptable reasoning skills to the lower strata of being.  
Obviously this is prejudicial to those who may not “measure up” to the highest 
standards of what it means to be rational.  Children, the mentally handicapped and 
the illiterate, not to mention women, are frequently treated as if they are not truly 
human, an abuse with striking ethical overtones for the treatment of the sick and 
dying.  (52)    
So if we accept the two sanctity-of-life propositions, we find ourselves bound to care for all 
human life from womb to tomb.  Imperfections (i.e., physical or mental handicaps, or 
combinations of both) do not absolve us from this responsibility.  ILTCs who do not live past the 
age of two will never meet standards based on reasoning skills.   
 But when human life is unable to sustain itself (as in the case of ILTCs), and the means 
of caring for it seem to cause more problems than they solve, we must reexamine what it is that 
the sanctity-of-life ethic demands.  The problem that ILTCs face is that their conditions 
jeopardize their very survival.  It is one thing if an infant is truly dying and no matter what is 
done, death is imminent.  It is another thing entirely, though, if an infant may be kept alive but 
only with medical treatments and procedures, or if the infant is not yet dying but is also not 
expected to live beyond the age of two.  Especially if an infant is severely handicapped—both 
mentally and physically—there is really no opportunity for him to develop to a point where he 
can experience what life has to offer or appreciate it.  According to the sanctity-of-life ethic, 
decisions to terminate life cannot be made for this reason.  But Weber also says, “It should be 
noted very carefully, though, that the sanctity of life ethic does not insist that everything possible 
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must be done to prolong life in all cases; it is not opposed to the practice of withholding or 
ceasing treatment at times.  That does not directly attack the goodness of life; it recognizes that 
death is natural and that life is not the only good to be concerned with” (113). 
 What are other goods to consider?  Recalling Pacelli’s speech, we are reminded that 
eternal goods (e.g., truth, virtue, eternal life, etc.) are superior to temporal goods (e.g., health, 
beauty, money, etc.).  In the case of ILTCs, however, none of these goods are things that they 
themselves can appreciate.  If a baptized infant dies, Catholics believe that his soul will go 
straight to heaven, since the stain of Original Sin is removed, and the infant is incapable of 
committing any other sins.36  But an infant does not know this.  Likewise, an infant neither 
knows what virtue or eternal life is, nor does he know what health, beauty, or money is.  But an 
infant benefits from the virtuous acts of people acting on his behalf.  Similarly, an infant benefits 
from being healthy, beautiful, or born into a wealthy family.  Good health means an infant will 
have to undergo few, if any, medical procedures.  A beautiful baby—versus one who is deformed 
in some regard—is more likely to be given attention, even by strangers.  And being born into a 
wealthy family means that the infant may benefit from not only having the necessities of life 
provided, but also luxuries.  We must be careful to note, however, that temporal goods such as 
health, beauty, and wealth can disappear instantly.  These goods are transitory; they are 
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 The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that “[s]in is an offense against reason, truth, 
and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and neighbor caused by a perverse 
attachment to certain goods.  It wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity.  It has 
been defined as ‘an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law’ ” (n. 1849).  
“Mortal sin destroys charity in the heart of man by a grave violation of God’s law; it turns man 
away from God, who is his ultimate end and his beatitude, by preferring an inferior good to him” 
(n. 1854).  “For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: ‘Mortal sin is sin 
whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate 
consent’ ” (n. 1857).  “One commits venial sin when, in a less serious matter, he does not 
observe the standard prescribed by the moral law, or when he disobeys the moral law in a grave 
matter, but without full knowledge or without complete consent” (n. 1862).   
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subordinate to eternal goods, which do not change.  But eternal goods such as truth, virtue, 
eternal life, etc. do not in and of themselves provide what an infant needs to sustain physical life. 
 Having said this, we must ask, when is it permissible to allow a person to die, if we are 
operating from a sanctity-of-life ethic?  If we say that we should allow a person to die because he 
is no longer healthy, beautiful, or wealthy, we appear to be making a choice based on his quality 
of life.  Simply stated, if life does not provide a person with all these goods, perhaps it is better 
that he should die.  Rather than simply saying that these are poor reasons from the start, they are 
worth considering.   
 Consider, for example, Wojtyla’s own decline in health over the years before he died in 
2005.  When Wojtyla was dying in late March and early April of 2005, there had already been 
speculation for years over whether he would or should retire.  In the last week of his life, Wojtyla 
appeared at his apartment window on Easter Sunday to give the crowds his blessing, but he was 
completely unable to speak because of a recent tracheotomy.  During an interview with EWTN’s 
Raymond Arroyo on the weekend of Wojtyla’s beatification,37 Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz, 
Wojtyla’s  personal secretary and friend, recounted the incident: 
 It was a difficult time, because every shepherd needs his voice.  Especially for 
this Pope, who was an actor in a certain sense, which means he worked with his 
voice.  That was a great sacrifice on his part, just to lose his great predilection, his 
great ability to use the voice.   
 I remember the last blessing at St. Peter’s Square.  He really wanted to speak 
before, and he even made a serious attempt before to speak, but when he went to 
the window, he could not speak a word.  He came back very sad.  Then he said to 
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 Wojtyla’s beatification occurred on 1 May 2011. 
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us, “If I cannot celebrate in public—that was Easter—if I cannot speak to the 
people, it might be better for me to die.”  But then immediately he added, “May 
God’s will be done.”  (Dsiwisz) 
We can see here at play a mixture of both the sanctity- and quality-of-life ethics.  Wojtyla judges 
himself incompetent to carry out his duties and laments—wondering aloud—whether death is a 
better alternative to his current condition.  That is his human side speaking.  But notice 
immediately after this statement, he places his trust in God.  Wojtyla died six days later, after 
having said goodbye to close friends and associates. 
 Being sick often involves pain, and prolonged pain can drive people to the point where 
they wish nothing else but to die.  Being deformed because of illness or injury can make people 
feel isolated, even when others are committed to caring for them.  ILTCs, too, are aware of pain 
and discomfort, and they are capable of suffering from isolation.  Determining appropriate 
courses of action based on considerations such as these involve quality-of-life judgments.  
Sometimes the decision to provide care—even costly care—seems obvious, so much so that we 
do not even realize that we are making quality-of-life judgments.  For example, when doctors 
determined that both our son and our daughter (nine and six at the time, respectively, and in good 
health except for periodic bouts of strep throat) needed tonsillectomies, it was not so much a 
question of whether to perform the procedures, but when.  Quality-of-life judgments become 
more recognizable as such when decisions to treat or not to treat are not as easy to make.  But a 
sanctity-of-life ethic cannot avoid judgments about the quality of life without lapsing into 
medical vitalism or denying that there is no obligation to subject oneself or others to heroic 
suffering, which I address in section 3.7. 
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3.6  The Quality-of-Life Ethic 
 Often contrasted with the sanctity-of-life ethic is the quality-of-life ethic.  Basic questions 
to ask are 1) what the quality of an ILTC’s life is; and 2) whether, given the infant’s condition 
(by “condition” I mean here “well-being,” or lack thereof), attempts at sustaining life are worth 
the effort.  Just as “life” can take on different means, so can “quality.”   
 We can use “quality” to refer to an infant’s physical condition.  Is his current health 
improving, stabilized, or declining?  We can also use “quality” to refer to the kind of medical 
care he is receiving.  Are particular treatments helping him or not?  The quality of care depends 
on the competence of the doctors, availability of resources, etc.  “Quality” can refer to his 
family’s home situation.  If he goes home, will it be to a home that is clean and a family who is 
committed to providing him good, loving care, etc.?  Or will his living conditions be unfit, 
especially for a sick infant?   
 Then there is, of course, “quality” as it refers to his future human development (i.e., 
intellectual, psychological, emotional, social, and/or religious life).  Healthier infants progress 
through successive stages of development and benefit from interpersonal relationships with 
others.  How they interact and what they appreciate depend on their current level of maturity.  
Especially in the case of ILTCs, though, we do not expect them to 1) live long enough to reach 
adolescence or adulthood; and/or 2) have the mental capability to respond deliberately to stimuli.  
We must also realize that although an ILTC seems to be comfortable now and may not be dying 
yet, he may live to the point where his condition worsens and makes his life not much more than 
a struggle for mere survival. 
 Consider a newborn infant who is not expected to survive.  No newborn infant—healthy 
or imperiled—has any duties or responsibilities to anyone, including himself.  At the same time, 
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unlike Wojtyla, a newborn cannot think, “If I cannot do certain things, it might be better for me 
to die.”  When infants have life-threatening conditions but are expected to mature to normal, 
responsible adulthood, we subject them to considerable physical pain and suffering (e.g., from 
the isolation of an incubator in a neonatal intensive care unit [NICU]) if that is needed to get 
them through a medical crisis.  But an ILTC will not survive to reach adulthood, so the 
perspective of a future, competent adult is not relevant to his care.  So why is it that some people 
are adamant about preserving imperiled newborns’ lives?  Their lives are sacred, and, within the 
sanctity-of-life ethic, they have no less value than the rest of us.  But what do these affirmations 
commit us to?  And what does preserving an ILTC’s quality of life consist of? 
 Again, we must remember that we can only approach problems like these from the 
perspective of a healthy, competent adult.  If an infant, then, lives with serious disabilities and 
will die before the age of two, we may not be able to say with certainty that there is little to no 
quality of life.  I propose the idea of keeping him content as the appropriate concept of an 
adequate quality of life for an ILTC who will die before ever maturing. 
3.7  Contentment: A Guiding Principle 
 I believe that we may already be operating from both the sanctity- and quality-of-life 
ethics without recognizing that we are.  Just because we may believe that life is sacred does not 
mean that we believe it is of infinite value, at least in its earthly form.  We ought to care for 
human life in its earthly form as long as it lasts, but at the same time, we must accept and 
become knowledgeable about the dying process, especially when an infant enters it.  With all 
ILTCs, but especially as an infant approaches death, we should begin a constant state of 
watchfulness in order to know what comforts the infant, as well as what does not.  We can then 
add knowledge gleaned in one case to an ever-increasing body of knowledge about the dying 
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process.  When we cannot or ought not to sustain the infant’s life any longer, we must make the 
difficult decision to let go.  So our question now becomes, how do we reconcile these two ethics 
so that we can respect life while simultaneously making the right decisions (e.g., appropriate 
time, method, etc.) to let go?   
 The sanctity-of-life ethic does not espouse medical vitalism, that is, the belief that 
biological life is so sacred that it must always be preserved at any cost.  The sanctity-of-life ethic 
admits death and allows for individuals to die, while at the same time aims at protecting human 
life from being wasted, especially at the hands of others and without the individual’s consent.  
The sanctity-of-life ethic itself requires judgments of the quality of life, as both Bernardin and 
Wojtyla acknowledge.  We often speak of a person’s potential, and the decision to put off 
difficult decisions about end-of-life care—especially the one to provide nothing more than 
palliative care—is perhaps the result of not knowing what a person’s potential is or whether it 
will be realized.  But notice that if we are always looking (far) into the future, we run the risk of 
bringing a person to the threshold of death numerous times in the hope that he will survive.  An 
ILTC may survive the present crisis, but there will be no growth into adulthood or even into 
childhood.  Prolonging the life of an ILTC (who is very unlikely to survive to age two) often 
imposes considerable pain and suffering on an infant who may already be suffering, both from 
the underlying condition and/or from the treatments that extend life.  It is not a far stretch to say 
that such treatment and care borders on experimentation, as we are not sure whether this infant 
will survive to face yet another crisis.  At what point do we say that we have done what we 
should (not just what we can) and let the individual die in peace? 
 We must be careful not to go to the other extreme and say that anyone who embraces the 
quality-of-life ethic is looking to exterminate an infant at the first sign of illness.  The quality-of-
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life ethic looks not only in its present condition, but also its future condition.  Wojtyla warns us 
against becoming too focused on efficiency: if others cannot measure up or produce enough, they 
are somehow not worthy of living (Gospel 22 [12]).   
 This notion of measuring up or producing enough raises the question, from whose point 
of view is this judgment being made?  An infant does not technically have a point of view, but 
placing ourselves in his position, we can ask, “If prolonging my life means that I will experience 
pain and/or isolation more often than not, would I want to continue living?”  We allow older 
patients to make the choice to forgo medical treatment and die sooner rather than later when they 
believe that their continued existence produces more burdens than benefits for themselves and/or 
others.  Why, then, can we not make this decision for an ILTC out of concern for his best 
interests, especially if his continued existence consists mostly of one medical treatment after 
another?  
 It does happen, however, that decisions to end an ILTC’s life earlier are based on 
society’s expectations for its members to contribute something.  Even healthy infants cannot 
produce something as can older people, but as infants mature, our expectations for them to 
produce something increase. 
 What, exactly, do we expect people to produce or contribute to society?  It often happens 
that even the healthiest, most productive people fail to meet our expectations on a variety of 
levels.  For example, a person may fail to produce a good product.  Perhaps he produces a good 
product, but fails to deliver it on time.  Or perhaps he may produce a good product and deliver it 
on time, but he is not particularly pleasant to deal with.  While we may be frustrated with this 
person for reasons such as these, it would be morally wrong to eliminate him for these reasons.  
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 It is very often the case that people with various disabilities (e.g., trisomy 21) bring great 
joy to others not so much based on what they accomplish, but because of their happy, infectious 
dispositions.  When people hold happy or sleeping infants, they often remark about how good it 
makes them feel.  We often do not consider infants’ smiles, hugs, peaceful sighs, etc. to be 
products or contributions, but that is in fact what they are.  We cannot put a price tag on things 
such as smiles, laughter, affectionate gestures, etc.  It goes without saying that life would be 
much less pleasant without them. 
   Let us again examine the two propositions given by Weber earlier in this chapter: 
1.  That human life is sacred by the very fact of its existence; its value does not 
depend upon a certain condition or perfection of that life. 
2.  That, therefore, all human lives are of equal value; all have the same right to 
life.  (111) 
I propose that if we hold the sanctity-of-life ethic, we should act in such a way so as to bring 
contentment to the infant in need of medical attention.  What all people strive to avoid is distress 
of one sort or another.  No one wants to be in distress.  By removing sources of distress, we can 
keep people content.  To be clear, by “contentment” I mean a state of total comfort, not 
necessarily the emotion we often call “happiness.”  We can provide comfort to an ILTC by 
holding him, talking and singing to him, rocking him, patting him on the back, keeping him 
warm, etc.  (in other words, “high touch”).  These are very simple actions not requiring great 
expense.  All that is truly required is time, attention, and love.  And we should provide these 
things precisely because we hold human life to be sacred. 
 This is not to say, however, that pain and/or distress will be completely avoidable during 
treatment or care.  Let us consider cases in which parents allow doctors to initiate ANH for their 
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infants.  One common complication of ANH is aspiration of the lungs, which can easily lead to 
aspiration pneumonia, a life-threatening condition.  According to Wojtyla, both ANH and 
treatment of pneumonia are ordinary and therefore obligatory.  Let us suppose there is an infant 
who is otherwise healthy, expected to mature to adulthood, but suffers a bout of aspiration 
pneumonia.  He experiences distress in a number of ways.  First, the infant is in distress from 
pneumonia itself.  Second, he is in distress from medical personnel’s attempts to suction fluid out 
of his lungs.  This is by no means a comfortable procedure.  And of course, he is in distress at 
this moment by being restrained by medical personnel rather than cuddled in the arms of a family 
member.  But once the treatment is over, he will soon be content once again.  If we know that 
this procedure will save his life, we will agree to it, without a lengthy weighing of benefits and 
burdens. 
 Consider next, however, a case in which ANH has become more than a bridge treatment 
for an ILTC.  For him, aspiration pneumonia is not a one-time occurrence, but a routine 
complication.  If we hold Wojtyla’s position, we must not only provide ANH, but also treat the 
ILTC for aspiration pneumonia each time he suffers it.  Consider all the ways the ILTC will be in 
distress each and every time he is treated for pneumonia.  Moreover, an ILTC will not survive 
beyond two years.  We must begin to question, is there not something we can do to prevent this 
vicious cycle from repeating itself, or even beginning in the first place?   
 It is this vicious cycle that leads to heroic suffering, about which Wojtyla himself says 
“cannot be considered the duty of everyone” (Gospel 118 [65]).  Here he is talking about patients 
who choose to forgo palliative care so as to share more deeply in the suffering of Christ (what is 
commonly called “redemptive suffering,” which I shall address in chapter 5).  If infants—healthy 
or imperiled—have neither duties nor choice, then they certainly cannot be expected to undergo 
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heroic suffering.  An infant also cannot participate in redemptive suffering, for that requires 
knowledge and spiritual awareness beyond the capabilities of an infant.  In my opinion, ILTCs 
especially should be spared from any unnecessary suffering if possible.  Complete relief from 
suffering keeps an ILTC content.  And it may be that only withholding or withdrawing ANH 
offers complete relief.  If so, withholding or withdrawing ANH is what respectful, loving care for 
an ILTC would be.  
 If we make contentment a priority, we should think twice about invasive procedures such 
as surgery, if surgery will not truly be of benefit to the infant.  Likewise, if an infant seems 
perfectly content sucking on a pacifier or having just a taste of food, forcing food and fluids 
through ANH may do nothing more than cause the infant distress.  Medical personnel can deliver 
enough food and fluids to keep an ILTC comforted without necessarily providing enough for 
growth (Ellis38).  Ultimately we must ask ourselves, is it better for an ILTC to die content, or in 
distress due to the employment of various life-prolonging measures including ANH?  For an 
ILTC will soon die39 regardless of what treatment measures we employ. 
 Giving food and fluids for comfort rather than growth raises the question of what the 
proper amount to deliver to an ILTC is.  The Church does not address this question in her 
literature.  I believe that were the Church to do so, she would be overstepping her bounds 
                                                          
38
 Wendy Ellis is a registered nurse with further certification in neonatal resuscitation.  She has 
more than twenty years of experience working with babies, including premature infants and 
those with illnesses.  For the last eight years, she has worked with families whose newborn 
infants have conditions that are incompatible with life. 
39
 For dying patients, being in a hospice is preferable to being in a hospital, since a hospice is 
designed to meet dying patients’ basic needs for warmth, cleanliness, and human presence 
without the discomfort of aggressive medical treatments designed to reverse or cure illnesses or 
conditions.  Dying ILTCs may benefit more from being in an infant hospice instead of an NICU, 
where the emphasis is placed on saving at-risk infants’ lives, often through aggressive medical 
treatment.  I thank Glenn Graber for his thoughts on the matter. 
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(reminiscent of Pacelli’s remarks about the Church’s declaring a person dead from a clinical 
point of view).  Based on what we have learned from chapter 1, I believe that once an ILTC has 
entered the dying phase or suffers more harms than benefits from ANH, ANH should be 
withheld or withdrawn.  This, I submit, would be “the deepest element of God’s commandment 
to protect human life” that the sanctity-of-life ethic requires: “to show reverence and love for 
every person and the life of every person” (Wojtyla, Gospel 72 [41]).  But if a very small amount 
of something in the mouth (e.g., tastes of food, a few drops of water, or even just a moist swab) 
comforts the ILTC to the point of contentment, then families or medical personnel should by all 
means provide it. 
3.8  Conclusion 
 It is because of the Church’s insistence on the sanctity of life that Catholic parents find 
themselves facing ethical dilemmas when medical treatments seem to be the only thing keeping 
their infants alive.  Lessons from the Gospels (e.g., the parable of the Good Samaritan and Jesus’ 
words about heaven and hell) play a major role in the Church’s attitude toward the provision of 
ANH for the sick and/or dying.  But modern medicine provides evidence that underlying 
conditions themselves or other forms of medical treatment can affect an infant’s hunger or 
interfere with his digestive process.  Seemingly, there is a conflict to resolve between the 
sanctity- and the quality-of-life ethics.  Doing harm by neglecting the needs of an ILTC violates 
the sanctity-of-life ethic.  But causing an infant harm in the process of providing forms of care 
we think he needs violates the quality-of-life ethic.  We may already be operating from some 
combination of both ethics when we provide basic care to ILTCs but make decisions based on 
both their current and future quality of life.  If we discover that certain forms of ordinary care or 
medical treatment other than ANH are enough to keep an infant who has entered the dying 
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process or suffers more harms than benefits because of ANH content, then it is in the infant’s 
best interests for us to withhold or withdraw ANH—and we should do so.  This is a departure 
from Wojtyla’s position, but as we shall see in the next chapter, Ratzinger’s answer to the 
AIDS40 problem in Africa may be a step in a direction that would enable the Church to move 
toward adopting my proposal as a practical choice for parents of ILTCs.   
  
                                                          
40
 “AIDS” is the acronym for “acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.” 
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Chapter 4: Rethinking the Catholic Position on ANH for ILTCs 
 End-of-life decisions we make for others are difficult, especially when these individuals 
cannot speak for themselves.  Based on our decisions to provide or withhold treatment, a patient 
can 1) die sooner and in peace; 2) die sooner but in pain and/or distress; 3) die later but in peace; 
or 4) die later and in pain and/or distress.  We can assume that no one desires to die in pain 
and/or distress, no matter when death occurs.  One benefit to dying sooner and in peace is that 
the patient is more quickly released from his condition, illness, pain, and/or distress.  One benefit 
to dying later and in peace is that the family may be able to spend more time with and care for 
the patient.  But since it is the patient (for our purposes, an infant with life-terminating conditions 
[ILTC]) who is dying, his needs should come first, even if that means that his family has less 
time to spend with and care for him.  But as we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, the Catholic 
Church teaches that not every possible way to help a patient die free of pain and/or distress is 
morally permissible (e.g., euthanasia).  So the Church finds herself having to speak on medical 
matters, such as the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) for sick and/or dying 
patients.     
 When ILTCs are in pain and/or distress for an indefinite period of time, all kinds of 
questions arise regarding what forms of care should be provided and to what extent.  In Caring 
for Each Other, Even Unto Death, a pamphlet designed to instruct families about various end-of-
life issues, including ANH, Marie Hilliard states, 
 Many families are unsure about moral options for the care of their loved ones.  
Fortunately, the popes and bishops of the Catholic Church have provided 
invaluable guidance concerning end-of-life decisions, including issues of pain 
control and consciousness, the provision of food and water to dying or 
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unconscious patients, the right to refuse certain treatments, and the duty to care, 
even when a cure is no longer possible.  (3) 
I agree with some of Hilliard’s statements, but not all of them.  It is because families are unsure 
of Catholic teaching that they ask for guidance in the first place.  The fact that most, if not all, 
contemporary Catholic commentators quote Pacelli’s ”The Prolongation of Life” is a testament 
to both his grasp of a very complex issue and his foresight.   
 As I argued in chapters 2 and 3, however, Wojtyla’s position is inconsistent.  His 2004 
address, “Care for Patients in a ‘Permanent’ Vegetative State,” contains the following 
statements: 
- The person in a vegetative state [PVS], in fact, shows no evident sign of self-
awareness or of awareness of the environment and seems unable to interact with 
others or to react to specific stimuli.  (203) 
- . . . [T]he administration of water and food, even when provided by artificial 
means, always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act.  Its 
use, furthermore, should be considered in principle ordinary and proportionate, 
and as such morally obligatory insofar as and until it is seen to have attained its 
proper finality, which in the present case consists in providing nourishment to the 
patient and alleviation of his suffering.  (205) 
So a PVS patient cannot suffer since he cannot react to stimuli.  But Wojtyla states that 
administering ANH is a way to alleviate a PVS patient’s suffering.  This makes Wojtyla’s 
position inconsistent with itself.  In addition, from chapters 1 and 2, his position seems to be 
inconsistent with the findings of medical experts who advocate the withholding or withdrawing 
of all food and fluids in order for the patient’s body to alleviate suffering by producing its own 
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analgesics.  Moreover, as I showed in section 2.2, by Pacelli’s understanding of ordinary and 
extraordinary means, ANH is by no means always ordinary treatment.  Thus Wojtyla’s 
statements are also inconsistent with Pacelli’s.  As I argued in section 3.2, a culture of life and 
any sanctity-of-life position need to include judgments about the quality of life if they are not to 
risk lapsing into medical vitalism.  At the same time, a culture of life and any sanctity-of-life 
position need quality-of-life judgments to support their quite appropriate denunciation of 
degrading practices (e.g., slavery, prostitution, poor working conditions, etc.) that are not in and 
of themselves life-shortening.  And we have just seen Wojtyla appealing to “the alleviation of 
suffering” in one of his statements about ANH.  Given these inconsistencies and tensions, there 
is no way for anyone to be faithful to the whole of Church teaching on the issue of ANH for 
ILTCs. 
 It is important to note that several recent Church documents addressing the care of the 
sick and/or dying either refer to or directly quote Wojtyla’s statement about the status of ANH 
(i.e., ordinary and therefore obligatory).  Such documents include the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith’s (CDF’s) “Responses to Certain Questions of the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB] Concerning Artificial Nutrition and Hydration” and 
its subsequent Commentary on “Responses,” both published in 2007.  After hearing from the 
CDF, the USCCB subsequently published its own comments in its 2007 “Q&A from the USCCB 
Committee on Doctrine and Committee on Pro-Life Activities regarding The Holy See’s 
Responses on Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a ‘Vegetative State.’ ”  Directive 58 of the 
USCCB’s 2009 version of Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
(ERDs) also refers to Wojtyla’s statement.  Two recent resources designed to help families make 
end-of-life decisions for their loved ones, Gomez’s A Will to Live: Clear Answers on End of Life 
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Issues (2006) and Hilliard’s Caring (2010),41 both directly quote the statement in question.  
 But none of the documents listed above address the inconsistency of Wojtyla’s statement 
with itself in his 2004 address or with Pacelli’s position; the authors use Wojtyla’s statement as 
the final authority for their position on providing ANH to anyone who appears in need of it.  To 
remain faithful to at least part of Catholic teaching, then, we should consider withholding or 
withdrawing ANH from ILTCs in light of Pacelli’s position instead.  As I shall show in section 
4.4, using Pope Benedict XVI’s42 (Ratzinger’s) position on condoms to help stop the spread of 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Africa, identifying a situation as hopeless from 
the outset may pave the way for allowing the Church to approve of withholding or withdrawing 
ANH under certain circumstances. 
4.1  Building a New Framework from “The Prolongation of Life” 
 There are advantages to considering my proposal in light of Pacelli’s position.  While he 
does not address ANH specifically as Wojtyla does, his position is not inconsistent with itself.  
Despite the inconsistencies in Wojtyla’s position, though, there are benefits to comparing it with 
Pacelli’s.  Remember Wojtyla’s call to respect, protect, love, and serve each and every single 
human life.  The sanctity-of-life ethic demands it.  But Wojtyla’s intense focus on every 
individual human life seems at times to eclipse the family’s concerns.  Individuals do not live in 
                                                          
41
 While all of these references can be found in print, the reader may prefer to read Wojtyla’s 
“Care for Patients in a ‘Permanent’ Vegetative State,” the CDF’s “Responses to Certain 
Questions of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition 
and Hydration” and  Commentary, the USCCB’s “Q&A from the USCCB Committee on 
Doctrine and Committee on Pro-Life Activities regarding The Holy See’s Responses on 
Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a ‘Vegetative State’ ” and Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (5th ed.), and Hilliard’s Caring for Each Other, 
Even Unto Death on the Internet. 
42
 From now on, I shall refer to Pope Benedict XVI as “Ratzinger.”  Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger 
became Pope Benedict XVI upon his election to the papacy in 2005.  His pontificate continues to 
the present. 
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complete isolation; what happens to one person also affects others.  So in this regard, Pacelli’s 
consideration of the family and the community at large is also important.  Tempering Pacelli’s 
position with Wojtyla’s concerns, we are reminded that even though it is the family who decides 
what treatments an ILTC does or does not receive, it is the ILTC who should remain the focus of 
medical care, as he is the one most directly affected by it.  But all throughout the ILTC’s life, 
dying process, death, and the period following his death, the family’s needs must also be 
considered, and they also need care.  And spiritual care is also the central mission of the Church.  
I discuss the provision of spiritual care to families of ILTCs in chapter 5.  The tension remains, 
then, between the burdens of treatment that the ILTC bears in certain ways and burdens of 
providing treatment that the family bears in others.  Withholding or withdrawing ANH from 
ILTCs should be done with the ILTC’s best interests in mind. 
4.1.1  Burdens of Treatment for Families of ILTCs 
 So that we may narrow our focus on ILTCs in the next section, let us first consider the 
burdens of treatment for an ILTC’s family.  Financial costs of medical treatment are often what 
first come to mind.  Determining whether a medical treatment is ordinary or extraordinary is a 
relatively simple task where finances are concerned: either the family has the money or the 
medical insurance to cover the treatment or not.  But we cannot think only in terms of the 
treatment itself; we must take into account the overall cost of providing medical care.  Other 
financial costs to consider include hospital stays, medications, follow-up visits with the doctor, 
travel expenses (especially extensive travel), home medical equipment, in-home nursing care, 
etc.  Financial costs of medical care can overwhelm a family’s financial well-being very quickly. 
 We cannot underestimate the physical toll that caring for an ILTC takes on a family, 
either.  Even if the parents are young and healthy, their health can deteriorate if they fail to keep 
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themselves healthy with proper rest, diet, and exercise.  Family members may unwittingly 
sacrifice their own health by focusing too exclusively on that of the ILTC’s.  But if they 
themselves become sick, it becomes that much harder to care for the infant and other family 
members. 
 The emotional burdens of caring for an ILTC are overwhelming.  The joy of childbirth 
immediately turns to sorrow when the parents realize that their child will not live very long.  Not 
knowing when the child will die creates all kinds of anxiety.  Parents may routinely forgo sleep if 
they think there is a chance that the infant might die during the night.  A working parent may feel 
torn about going to work if the parents have made it a priority for both of them to be present 
when the infant dies.  But the obligation to support the family still remains.  Parents may feel 
guilt no matter what they decide—either to have their infant undergo any number of treatments 
or to let him die.  For example, a family will always wonder whether it would have been better to 
let their infant die if the decision to treat prolongs the ILTC’s dying process and/or adds to his 
pain and/or distress.  On the other hand, a family will always wonder what could have been had 
they decided to treat their infant rather than let him die.  Other children and relatives living in the 
home (e.g., grandparents) have emotional needs that need to be met as well.  Everyone in the 
household will be affected in some way by the situation, and it usually falls to the parents to 
ensure each and every family member receives the love and attention he deserves. 
 The burdens on the family’s social well-being are also important to consider.  It is 
through friends, organizations, activities, hobbies, etc. that family members connect with other 
people outside the home, develop their own talents, and relieve stress.  Families may find 
themselves torn over what to do once the ILTC is born and/or comes home from the hospital.  
Should all social events be put on hold so that the family can give their full attention to the 
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infant?  Without taking care of their own needs, however, family members may become irritable, 
resentful, etc.  And rather than support one another through this tragic situation, they may find 
themselves taking out their anger and frustration on one another, or, worst of all, on the ILTC 
himself. 
 When any of these kinds of burdens become overwhelming for an ILTC’s family, it can 
change any treatment from ordinary to extraordinary, at least on Pacelli’s position.  Pacelli says, 
“The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the presumed will of the 
unconscious patient if he is of age and “sui juris” [‘one’s own master’].  Where the proper and 
independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually bound only to the use of ordinary 
means” (96).  Since no infant is of age or his own master, treatment decisions in cases where an 
ILTC is not expected to survive or where he undergoes substantial pain and/or distress become 
even more complicated and agonizing.  Once again, if we make the ILTC’s comfort a top 
priority, the decision to forgo extraordinary means may make the decision less complicated, but 
not necessarily less agonizing for the family.  Especially if a family is religious or spiritual, these 
decisions will impact their spiritual lives.  
 Serious illness can place tremendous burdens on a family’s spiritual life, especially if 
they take seriously Jesus’ command to love: “As I have loved you, so you also should love one 
another” (John 14.34).  Even families who are spiritually strong may find themselves asking, 
“Why did this happen to us?” or “If God is so good and loving, why would He permit something 
like this to happen?”  As a result, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to strive for what Pacelli 
calls “the higher, more important good” or “spiritual ends” (94).   
 It is important to note the distinction between the spiritual goods of the family and those 
of the ILTC.  It may be a family’s highest priority to have their ILTC baptized.  For example, 
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Catholic couples who have their infant baptized fulfill their marriage vow to raise their children 
in the faith.  Even though all the family members receive spiritual benefits when they pray 
together, participate at Mass, receive various sacraments, etc., parents and older siblings 
participate in spiritual matters in ways that infants cannot.  And especially since we are talking 
about ILTCs who will die before the age of two, they will never have any concept of spiritual 
goods. 
 But just because an infant has neither the concept of spiritual goods nor the ability to 
appreciate them does not mean he does not benefit from them.  At the same time, the fact that an 
infant does not have a concept of spiritual goods also means that he does not have a concept of 
things such as sin, doubt, fear, etc.  He cannot even attempt to find meaning in his circumstances.  
In this way, then, an infant does not bear spiritual burdens.  An infant, however, can neither have 
his suffering alleviated by spiritual means (e.g., finding meaning in it) nor participate in 
redemptive suffering, which I briefly mentioned in section 3.6 but shall address in more detail in 
chapter 5.   
 The most important of any ILTC’s spiritual needs—eternal salvation—is obtained 
through the sacrament of Baptism, which anyone—not just a priest—can perform in an 
emergency.43  If a family is unsure as to whether their infant will live even for a few minutes, 
someone—even a non-Catholic—can perform Baptism moments after birth.  In cases where an 
infant dies before Baptism, ecclesiastical funeral rites are allowed if it was the parents’ intention 
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 The Catholic Church’s Code of Canon Law addresses infant Baptism in cases of emergency in 
Canons 867-868.   
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to have him baptized.44  Granting, then, that Baptism places the ILTC in a state of grace and 
assures his salvation (especially because he will die well before the age of reason [approximately 
seven years of age] and is therefore incapable of committing subsequent sins needing 
forgiveness), we can set this concern aside and focus primarily on the “earthly care”45 that ILTCs 
need.  
4.1.2  Burdens of Treatment for ILTCs Themselves 
4.1.2.1  Considering Reasonable Hope of Success 
 Before proceeding to discuss my recommendations for the earthly care of various ILTCs, 
I believe it is necessary to consider the burdens of treatment for ILTCs themselves in light of 
Pacelli’s remarks, especially since ILTCs are not the focus of “The Prolongation of Life.”  First 
is the notion of “reasonable hope of success”46 (Pacelli 92).  Recall that in developing my own 
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 The commentary for Canon 1183 (Rites for Catechumens, Non-Baptized Children, Non-
Catholics) states, “The Sacramentary contains a Mass for a child who dies before baptism. . . . 
The unbaptized child may receive these rites if the parents intended to have the child baptized.”  
45
 By “earthly care” I mean any basic care (physical, medical, emotional, etc.) that affects the 
ILTC in his earthly existence.  I distinguish earthly care from spiritual care, as spiritual care does 
not usually result in physical benefits (e.g., miraculous healing) for ILTCs.  While I personally 
believe that miraculous healing is possible, for the purposes of this dissertation (and realistically 
speaking), I assume that if an infant is born with life-terminating conditions, they will remain 
with him as long as he lives. 
46
 In “The Prolongation of Life,” Pacelli, addressing older patients who somehow suffer some 
kind of trauma to the brain that leaves them in a state of deep unconsciousness, says, “It happens 
at times—as in the aforementioned cases of accidents and illnesses, the treatment of which offers 
reasonable hope of success—that the anesthesiologist can improve the general condition of 
patients who suffer from a serious lesion of the brain and whose situation at first might seem 
desperate” (92).    There is an important distinction to make here, that is, between the reasonable 
hope of success that a particular medical treatment provides the intended medical benefit and the 
reasonable hope of success that a patient will recover from his condition.  In the case of older 
patients in a state of deep unconsciousness, the hope is that the treatment is successful so that 
they will once again regain consciousness.  In the case of ILTCs, however, they may recover 
from something like aspiration pneumonia, but they will never be cured of their underlying 
condition (e.g., trisomy 13, duplication 3q syndrome, etc.).  I thank John Hardwig for drawing 
my attention to this distinction. 
106 
definitions for “ordinary” and “extraordinary” in section 2.4, I used the phrases “present and 
future” and “definite hope of benefits that outweigh burdens.”  Hope is future-looking; it does 
not focus on the past or even strictly on the present.  For example, suppose doctors take an ILTC 
to the operating room to insert a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube, and the 
operation is successful.  Right now, “successful” means that the ILTC survives the procedure, 
the PEG tube is in place, and there do not appear to be any complications.  But looking into the 
future, there is no way of knowing whether providing food and fluids through the PEG tube will 
continue to deliver benefits that outweigh burdens.  Perhaps the ILTC will develop an infection 
or aspiration of the lungs.  And if he does develop an infection or aspiration of the lungs, there is 
no telling whether this is a one-time occurrence or just one of many episodes requiring treatment.  
This is where the vicious cycle of feeding, complications, and treatment begins, and parents must 
ask themselves whether they want this cycle to continue or not.   
4.1.2.2  Considering Circumstances of Persons, Places, Times, and Culture 
 The second point to consider is the circumstances which make various forms of treatment 
ordinary or extraordinary: “persons, places, times, and culture” (94).  A treatment becomes 
extraordinary and therefore optional if these circumstances present even one grave burden.  
Recall that Pacelli says, “A more strict obligation [i.e., to use extraordinary means] would be too 
burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more important good 
too difficult” (94).  Because we are dealing with ILTCs, his “higher, more important good” (i.e., 
his eternal salvation, the greatest “spiritual end”) is attained through Baptism.  But his Baptism 
must be arranged by someone else, since he cannot request it for himself.  That being said, 
ILTCs have no duties, responsibilities, or obligations.  They cannot seek higher, more important 
goods as can older children and adults.  And we should not expect them to. 
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 So what is it about circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture as they relate to 
ILTCs that would make medical treatments extraordinary?  We must ask the question, what is 
the difference between an ILTC and an older child or an adult?  I believe the key difference—
and the consideration that determines treatments to be ordinary or extraordinary—has to do with 
a person’s ability to understand what is happening to him, the reason why it is happening, and for 
what purpose. 
 For example, I was involved in a serious car accident when I was nine years old.  
Because of internal bleeding, the doctors inserted a Foley catheter.  Before proceeding, though, 
they first explained to me in terms I could understand what a catheter is, what insertion would 
involve, and why they needed to insert it.  Needless to say, I found it very uncomfortable, and I 
wanted it removed as soon as possible.  When it came time for the nurses to remove the catheter, 
they told me what I needed to do to prepare myself for some brief but intense pain.  In addition, 
they told me that by the end of the afternoon, I would need to urinate at least once to avoid 
developing an infection and the need to have another catheter inserted.  The nurses warned me 
that because of irritation to the urethra, urinating for the first time would create pain similar to 
that which I experienced when the nurses withdrew the catheter.  They were correct about the 
pain, but because I did not want to have another catheter inserted, I was willing to endure another 
episode of intense pain. 
 One key difference between my situation and that of an ILTC needing some kind of 
treatment is that he cannot understand what doctors are doing or why they are doing it.  All he 
knows is that he is in pain, but he has no idea why or how long it will last.  I at least was given 
some choice in the matter: either urinate or have another catheter inserted.  The nurses also told 
me that after urinating the first time, voiding my bladder would not be painful.  So I knew what 
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to expect.  Weighing my options, I chose what would cause me the least amount of pain and 
discomfort, even though I knew that some would be involved. An ILTC has no choice in what 
happens to him.  He can resist or “fight off” doctors and nurses trying to help him, but this may 
be more from instinct than choice.  I do have to say, though, that had the doctors and nurses not 
explained to me everything I needed to know and proceeded with the treatment, I certainly would 
have been less willing to cooperate with their efforts, especially if it meant additional insertions 
of a catheter.  But this is what happens to every infant—regardless of health—when doctors and 
nurses provide treatments that cause pain and/or discomfort. 
 Another key difference between my situation and that of an ILTC is that I was expected 
to make a full recovery.  In addition to the Foley catheter, I had to undergo exploratory surgery 
to ensure that I did not have more substantial internal injuries.  So the burdens of having a 
catheter inserted and undergoing exploratory surgery did not outweigh the benefits of a full 
recovery.  But an ILTC will not make a full recovery; he will probably die before he reaches the 
age of two.  So here is an important consideration: if a healthy person were to be placed in the 
ILTC’s situation and be given the choice of undergoing medical treatments to prolong his life 
that may or may not induce pain and/or distress but at the same time will not give him hope of a 
full recovery, would the healthy person agree to it? 
 The third and final key difference is that an ILTC cannot see the greater purpose beyond 
what is happening to him now.  At the time of my accident, I did not know about redemptive 
suffering.  Had someone explained to me that I could help other people spiritually by offering 
my pain and distress for their benefit, I probably would have done so.  Having experienced 
intense pain myself, though, I can understand how difficult it may be to see past one’s own 
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situation and offer up one’s own pain and distress for the benefit of others.  But no infant—either 
a healthy one or an ILTC—can offer anything of himself, including redemptive suffering. 
 That an infant has one or more life-terminating conditions but lacks the ability to choose 
for himself what treatments he does or does not receive makes his circumstances extraordinary as 
far as his own person is concerned.  From my discussion, we can see why many ordinary medical 
treatments for older patients may be extraordinary for ILTCs.  If there is no hope of recovery or 
purpose that holds any relevance, would anyone be willing to undergo treatment?  And since an 
ILTC attains the highest spiritual end (i.e., salvation) through others’ efforts, what more should 
he be expected to do?  Once again, we see the need for addressing ILTCs as a unique category in 
debates over providing medical care, to include ANH.  Considerations that apply to many other 
groups do not address ILTCs’ particular needs. 
 The fact that there is no hope of recovery for an ILTC can make treatments extraordinary 
based on circumstances of place.  Granted, a patient receives better medical care in a hospital 
than he does at home.  A hospital is designed, equipped, and staffed to meet a wide range of 
medical needs all hours of the day.  Despite attempts to make hospital rooms more inviting, an 
ILTC would probably be most comfortable at home, away from all the noise and activity that 
occur in a hospital or, more specifically, the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).  An ILTC 
needs quiet and comfort from his family.  An NICU also tends to interfere with human contact 
(e.g., holding, cuddling, talking, etc.) that all infants need.  Think of how many older patients 
want to die at home rather than in a hospital.  An ILTC should be afforded that same option. 
 Time is one thing that an ILTC does not have much of, so for the time he does spend on 
earth, he should be free of pain and/or distress as much as possible.  If an ILTC’s situation is 
hopeless, the parents must ask, how long will certain procedures take, how long will it take the 
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ILTC to recover from them, how long will the ILTC need to remain in the hospital before being 
able to go home, etc.?  Older patients would much rather spend time out in the world, especially 
if they know they do not have much time left to live.  Of course, some older patients’ conditions 
prevent them from doing everything they want to.  But the desire to stay out of the hospital is 
still there.  Suppose that inserting a PEG tube gives an ILTC a few more weeks to live.  If his 
spiritual needs have already been met, and he does not have much time left to live, is it worth an 
extra few weeks of life for the ILTC to have a PEG tube inserted?  The family may argue that 
inserting the PEG tube gives them more time with the infant.  But once again, we must ask, what 
is in the ILTC’s best interests?  Perhaps the decision to do everything possible to save the 
ILTC’s life is based on the family’s fear of being left behind.  But death is inevitable, and 
families need to learn to let their infants go as peacefully as possible, even if it means that the 
end comes sooner than they would like. 
 Circumstances of culture can have an impact on how families care for their ILTCs, but 
culture, like spiritual goods, holds no relevance for ILTCs.  Doctors should be mindful of 
families’ cultures when they treat their infants, but from the perspective of medical science, 
certain conditions call for certain treatments.  And it ultimately does not matter to what culture 
an ILTC belongs.  If the ILTC gains no benefits from certain treatments, he should be spared 
from anything that causes him undue discomfort.   
4.1.2.3  Considering Doctors’ Responsibilities            
 Third and finally is the notion of doctors’ responsibilities.  Pacelli says, “In general, [the 
doctor] can take action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, gives him 
permission” (96).  Since ILTCs cannot speak for themselves, their parents are responsible for 
speaking for them.  Pacelli also says, “Where the proper and independent duty of the family is 
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concerned, they are usually bound only to the use of ordinary means” (96).  But as I have argued 
in section 4.1.2.2, the fact that an ILTC’s condition(s) will cause his death before the age of two 
makes some of the most ordinary treatments for an older child or adult extraordinary for him.  
Once again, the ILTC’s needs must come first, since he is the one most directly affected by the 
medical treatment he receives. If the ILTC’s health deteriorates to the point where it appears that 
he has entered or will very shortly enter the dying process, the family should request the doctor 
to discontinue treatment.  I go so far as to say that if the family is unrealistic about their infant’s 
situation and prognosis, doctors should encourage the family to make the decision to discontinue 
treatment.  Because these decisions involve the most untimely death we can imagine—that of an 
infant—doctors must exercise great compassion when counseling families about treatment 
options.   
4.2  Considering My Proposal in Light of Pacelli’s Position 
 I now consider my proposal to withhold or withdraw ANH from ILTCs under various 
circumstances.  Recall that in chapter 1, I listed four categories of ILTCs based on their 
situations: 
1.  Infants who receive prognoses of two weeks or less 
2.  Infants who will live longer than two weeks but no more than two years and 
who are not yet suffering or in distress.  (An infant presently in distress falls 
within one of the next two categories.)     
  3.  Infants who are not dying, but are in distress from the use of ANH 
  4.  Infants who are not dying, but are in distress from their conditions and/or ANH 
There are countless infants born with all types of life-terminating conditions.  Especially when 
ILTCs are born with syndromes, not all ILTCs will have the same anomalies, and even if they 
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do, the same anomalies may affect these infants differently.  In section 1.4, I briefly discussed 
some of the most common life-terminating conditions that tend to claim the lives of infants 
within the first two years.  In what follows, I shall propose under what conditions it is in ILTCs’ 
best interests not to be provided with ANH. 
4.2.1  Infants Who Receive Prognoses of Two Weeks or Less 
 Recall from section 1.4.1 that ILTCs with trisomy 18, trisomy 13, and trisomy 9 are 
expected to die within the first two weeks of life.  There will be instances where ILTCs live 
longer than doctors’ prognoses.  In cases where there is a high degree of certainty that an ILTC 
will die within two weeks, however, doctors should not initiate ANH so that 1) possible 
complications may be avoided; and 2) the ILTC’s body will be allowed to produce its own 
analgesics.  Feeding such an infant via ANH would produce only burdens with no hope of 
benefit.  To proceed and cause the infant pain and/or distress (in other words, harm) would be 
morally impermissible.  This recommendation may be difficult to accept, especially since many 
parents view feeding their infants as an act of love. 
 Why would we not want to feed these infants?  First of all, these infants’ life-terminating 
conditions make practically every medical procedure extraordinary.  Not even the most 
advanced, aggressive medical procedure will cure conditions such as trisomy 18, trisomy 13, and 
trisomy 9.  In other words, there is no reasonable hope of success for their recovery.   
 Physiological complications alone may make ANH extraordinary.  Severe facial 
deformities prevent many of these infants from being able to breastfeed, bottle-feed or be fed 
with a nasogastric (NG) tube.  The insertion of either a PEG tube or jejunostomy PEG (JPEG) 
tube requires surgery.  Complications can arise either during surgery or afterwards, possibly even 
resulting in death.  Many parents want to be present when their infants die, but surgery would 
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preclude this.  And even if an infant survives surgery, he can still suffer from a compromised 
gastrointestinal system or an inability to assimilate food and fluids through a tube for various 
other reasons.  If parents decide to provide food and fluids by total parenteral feeding, there is 
still the issue that after a few months, complications will begin to present themselves.  While 
doctors can attempt to provide various forms of ANH, it is not as if ANH can be used on a 
rotating schedule.  And regardless of the form of ANH doctors may consider, no form of it will 
cure these—or any—infants of their conditions.  And as I discussed in section 1.2, withholding 
food and fluids provides several benefits and avoids several complications.  
 Parents must ask themselves the following question.  Thinking strictly in terms of the 
infant’s best interests, is it better for him to die comfortably within a two-week time frame, or 
prolong his life to the point where he begins to suffer from his underlying condition(s) and/or 
complications resulting from the use of ANH?  We may lean towards what we consider to be the 
best interests of the family, since they are the ones who are making decisions about the infant’s 
medical care.  But the infant’s circumstances are such that he will be subjected to one medical 
procedure after another just to keep him alive.  There is no reasonable hope that these infants will 
be able to overcome both the physical and mental difficulties lying ahead of them.  We must 
realize that there are conditions that preclude some infants from ever maturing to childhood or 
adulthood.   
 Some people may wonder, why not see how long an ILTC may live, even if we provide 
ANH but no other medical treatment other than palliative care?  After all, if a family can provide 
loving care for perhaps several months or even up to a year, is that not a sign that they love their 
infant more than if they let him die after only two weeks?   
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 At issue is the ILTC’s body’s ability (or lack thereof) to sustain life.  Because of modern 
medicine and technology, we sometimes find ourselves at the crossroads of life and death.  As I 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the culture of life and the sanctity-of-life ethic allow for natural 
death to occur.  But modern medicine and technology can make it very difficult to determine 
whether or not it is artificial life support that is keeping an ILTC alive.  Modern medicine and 
technology have given us the capability of sustaining ILTC’s lives much longer than in the past.  
But at the same time, modern medicine and technology can keep an ILTC alive too long, thus 
forcing him to suffer heroically, something that is never morally required of anyone and that 
most, if not all, of us hope to avoid ourselves. 
 So when we say that an ILTC’s situation is hopeless, we need to focus on his body’s 
inability to sustain life rather than what we hope he might be able to do in the future.  Having 
neither a sense of time (especially the long-term future) nor expectations, an ILTC will not be 
disappointed that he is not able to live longer.  But he will be content by having his other basic 
needs (e.g., warmth, cleanliness, and human presence) satisfied.  As a result, we arrive at the 
conclusion that it is in the ILTC’s best interests to withhold ANH from him and allow him to die 
within the first two weeks of life.   
4.2.2  Infants Who Will Live Longer than Two Weeks but No More than Two Years and Who Are 
Not Yet Suffering or in Distress (An infant presently in distress falls within one of the next two 
categories.)     
 ILTCs in this category can suffer from various conditions such as triploidy syndrome, 
duplication 3q syndrome, deletion 4q syndrome, duplication 10q syndrome, and Wiedemann-
Rautenstrauch syndrome.  Infants with these conditions often have the following health 
problems: congenital heart defects, brain anomalies, renal anomalies, asphyxia, apnea, 
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gastrointestinal defects, feeding problems, and respiratory infections.  Some of these problems 
will, of course, cause immediate distress, but some will not.  We expect these infants to die 
before they reach the age of two, but we do not know exactly when their conditions will cause 
them to die.  If it appears that these infants have not entered the dying phase within the first two 
weeks (as ILTCs in the first category have), we must treat them as we would any other person—
healthy or sick—who derives more benefits than burdens from eating and drinking.  
 The fact that doctors should feed and hydrate ILTCs in this category raises the following 
question: how will they provide food and fluids?  Remember that food and fluids taken orally are 
not automatically ordinary means of care and ANH as a medical treatment is not automatically 
an extraordinary form of care.  ILTCs’ circumstances are what determine what forms of 
treatment are ordinary or extraordinary.  Remember also that our goal is to keep ILTCs content 
as much as possible.  It is preferable, then, to feed and hydrate without ANH if possible.  If ANH 
becomes necessary, however, then doctors should initiate the form of ANH that 1) is least 
invasive; and 2) provides and allows for the most benefits; and 3) minimizes burdens.    
  What makes the decision to provide ANH to ILTCs in this category difficult is that they 
may not be in pain and/or distress right now, but we can expect them to be at some point in the 
future (in which case they fall into one of the next two categories I shall discuss shortly).  Based 
on doctors’ experiences and case histories, doctors can provide families with some kind of 
estimated life expectancy, but an ILTC may die earlier than expected or outlive doctors’ 
prognoses. 
 Recall that in section 3.7, Ellis states that it is possible for doctors and nurses to provide 
enough food for comfort but not growth.  Doctors and nurses must be watchful for the first signs 
of complications, whether they be from an ILTC’s underlying condition(s) or from the use of 
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ANH.  But because of the ILTC’s condition(s), we know that at some point the ILTC will 
develop complications as one or more of his conditions progress or ANH becomes a medical 
treatment that delivers more harms that benefits.  At this point, then, the ILTC no longer falls 
under this category but must be placed in one of the next two. 
 Before moving on to the next two categories, however, it is worth mentioning again that 
modern forms of ANH have only been around since 1979.  Before then, infants who were not 
able to assimilate food and fluids orally simply died.  When there are advances in medicine and 
technology, we typically welcome them because they improve the quality of life for those who 
benefit from them.  But once again, we must remember that ILTCs in this category are not going 
to recover from their conditions; they will still die before they reach their second birthday.  If it 
is possible to keep ILTCs comfortable with ANH until doctors and nurses can determine that 
these infants have entered the dying process and no longer need food and fluids, there is a case 
for both administering ANH and then withdrawing it at the appropriate time.  We are not 
starving or dehydrating these patients; we are allowing nature to take its course, as well as 
allowing the ILTCs’ bodies to cooperate in the dying process.  In this way we accept natural 
death as part of the human condition while at the same time avoid medical vitalism. 
4.2.3  Infants Who Are Not Dying, but Are in Distress from the Use of ANH 
 An ILTC becomes a member of this category if he experiences pain and/or distress from 
the use of ANH (e.g., an infant with deletion 3p syndrome).  An ILTC can suffer pain and/or 
distress related to the placement of the various devices for supplying ANH, to complications 
resulting from ANH, or to an inability to assimilate food and fluids supplied by ANH on the 
physiological level.  Recall from section 1.1.3 that there are burdens that a patient himself may 
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suffer regardless of the type of ANH that doctors employ; there is not one form of ANH that is 
completely trouble-free.   
 In terms of the placement of ANH, an ILTC may experience pain and/or distress from an 
NG tube if it causes ulceration or a sinus blockage, which could also lead to an infection.  And 
any patient, not just an ILTC, may have to be restrained if he attempts to remove the NG tube out 
of discomfort.  And of course, restraint is another source of discomfort for not only an ILTC, but 
anyone else in this situation.  Infants with deletion 3p syndrome are often fed with an NG tube, 
but pneumonia is a frequent result.  The insertion of either a PEG tube or a JPEG tube could 
cause perforation of the gastrointestinal tract, bleeding, and/or infection at the placement site.  
Placing a line for total parenteral feeding can lead to thrombosis, vascular perforation, and/or 
bacterial and/or fungal infection.   
 Not only can the placement of a feeding tube or line cause an ILTC pain and/or distress, 
but also the body’s inability to assimilate food and fluids administered by ANH.  Aspiration of 
the lungs—which can lead to aspiration pneumonia—is common when ILTCs are fed by NG 
tubes or PEG/JPEG bolus feedings.  Feeding by JPEG tube can lead to diarrhea, which can be 
life-threatening for any infant, but especially an ILTC.  Total parenteral feeding can lead to 
cholestasis with possible resulting sepsis, liver disease, and hepatic failure, especially when used 
for several months.   
 We must remember also that we are dealing with ILTCs who need ANH to keep them 
alive indefinitely, not otherwise healthy patients who may need ANH only as a bridge treatment.  
While a healthy person may recover from an infection rather easily, an infection could become 
life-threatening for an ILTC.  Recall also that the Church considers injections and antibiotics 
ordinary care.  So according to Church teaching, doctors must treat infections (provided, of 
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course, that the treatment is available and can be administered by a competent medical 
professional with reasonable hope of success).  It is not morally permissible to administer ANH 
to a patient to the point where he develops an infection, refuse to treat the infection, and allow 
the patient to die from it.  But again, if we view this situation from the ILTC’s point of view, we 
must ask whether we would want to undergo the vicious cycle of feeding, infection, and 
treatment indefinitely.  While a treatment may not in and of itself cause that much pain and/or 
distress, we must look at the overall situation and consider the pain and/or distress of an ILTC 
who experiences one complication after another.  Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether 
a complication is a one-time event, the first of many, or the last one before the ILTC dies.  If it 
appears, then, that the use of ANH produces more burdens than benefits, doctors should 
discontinue it and allow the ILTC to die comfortably. 
4.2.4  Infants Who Are Not Dying, but Are in Distress from Their Conditions and/or ANH 
 Recall from section 1.4.4 some of the infants who fall within this category: those 
suffering from Smith-Lemli-Opitz syndrome, Noonan syndrome, Costello syndrome, Opitz 
G/BBB syndrome, and Marshall-Smith syndrome.  Infants with these syndromes suffer from 
cardiac defects, renal abnormalities, gastroesophageal reflux, milk or soy allergies, etc.  Their 
physiological conditions alone can make feeding burdensome.  The question for this group of 
ILTCs is, if it appears that they will survive the first two weeks of life, when must we consider 
withdrawing ANH if it is ever implemented? 
 Diagnosing an ILTC’s source of pain and/or distress is easier if doctors know whether it 
stems from an underlying condition or the use of ANH.  It is much more difficult when doctors 
cannot determine whether an ILTC’s condition stems from one or more underlying conditions, 
the use of ANH, or the combination of both.  Many of the same considerations from the third 
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category of ILTCs apply here.  Doctors should avoid prolonging life through ANH if it means 
the infant must endure the vicious cycle of feeding, complications, and treatment.  Likewise, if 
an ILTC is in pain and/or distress that cannot be relieved, doctors should withdraw ANH as a 
means of comfort.  To prolong an ILTC’s life under either circumstance subjects him to heroic 
suffering, something which the infant cannot understand, appreciate, or utilize for his own or 
others’ benefit.   
 Once again, some people may claim that I am suggesting starving or dehydrating ILTCs 
to death.  I respond by stating that if our intention is to provide ILTCs comfort, then we should 
avoid anything that produces suffering.  If the continued provision of ANH prolongs ILTCs’ 
lives to the point where they suffer harm for any reason, ANH should be withdrawn.  Recall once 
again my definitions of “ordinary” and “extraordinary” from section 2.4.  While a treatment may 
provide some benefit in the short term, we must also consider what benefit—if any—ILTCs will 
derive in the long term.  We cannot focus so intently on an ILTC’s present status that we lose 
sight of what harms he is likely to suffer in the future.  
 The most important consideration is determining what will keep the infant content from 
day to day.  That is why doctors and nurses need to be watchful for progression of life-
terminating conditions or complications resulting from the use of ANH.  This is assuming, of 
course, that the ILTC is in the hospital.  If the family is able to take the infant home, then it is 
even more important for doctors and nurses to maintain contact with the family and give them 
information that is easy for them to understand.  Such information should include how to care for 
the infant, what complications are minor and whether/how they can be treated at home, and what 
complications are life-threatening.   
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 Life-threatening complications can be difficult for the family.  On one hand, an untreated 
life-threatening complication will result in the infant’s death.  But if they rush a dying ILTC to 
the hospital, doctors and nurses will do what they are trained to do: save the ILTC’s life.  As a 
culture, we are unfamiliar with the dying process and with death, and when confronted by death, 
we panic, especially if the patient seems to be in pain and/or distress.  We rush healthy people to 
the hospital in emergencies with the hope that they will recover because we sought medical 
treatment for them in time.  But here we are dealing with ILTCs who are expected to die.     
 So the real question is this: if an ILTC seems to be dying but is in pain and/or distress, 
what can the family do at home to keep him comfortable?  As the infant’s condition or 
conditions progress, doctors should explain to the family what to expect, and what can be done to 
keep their infant comfortable.  And as difficult as it may be, doctors should discuss end-of-life 
care, to include palliative medicine and the withdrawal of ANH at the appropriate time.  If the 
family wants and expects the infant to die at home, doctors should help them prepare for that and 
explain to them that the infant’s body will shut itself down in various ways that can be unsettling 
to family members who are unfamiliar with dying and death.  Of course, there may be instances 
where families do not believe they may be able to hold their infants while they die.  For the sake 
of everyone’s comfort, families should discuss this issue with their doctors to determine the 
circumstances under which the ILTC may die in peace.  In some situations, it may be better for 
ILTCs to die in the arms of a nurse in the NICU.      
 Before proceeding any further, I summarize my proposal for the withholding or 
withdrawing of ANH from ILTCs within each of the four categories.  For infants who receive 
prognoses of two weeks or less, I propose that doctors should not initiate ANH.  For infants who 
will live longer than two weeks but no more than two years and who are not yet suffering or in 
121 
distress, I propose that doctors should provide food and fluids by the form of ANH best suited 
for their situations, and only to the point where these infants are satisfied and do not suffer 
complications resulting from ANH.  For infants who are not dying, but are in distress from the 
use of ANH, doctors should determine what the source of distress is.  If these ILTCs are in 
distress from complications that produce more burdens than benefits that ANH provides, I 
propose that doctors withdraw ANH, administer palliative care as needed, and allow these 
infants to die comfortably.  For infants who are not dying, but are in distress from their 
conditions and/or ANH, doctors again need to determine what the source or sources of pain 
and/or distress are.  If the burdens associated with either the condition(s) or the use of ANH are 
greater than the benefits ANH provides, doctors should withdraw ANH, administer palliative 
care as needed, and allow these infants to die comfortably.  What distinguishes these last two 
categories is the difficulties doctors may have in trying to determine whether the source of pain 
and/or distress is ILTCs’ conditions, complications from the use of ANH, or a combination of 
both.     
4.3  Difficulties in Assigning ILTCs to Categories 
 There is no distinguishing feature that allows doctors to determine infallibly how long an 
ILTC will live, what his quality of life will be, or how much pain and/or distress he will 
experience from medical treatments, including ANH.  Some ILTCs who appear as though they 
might die within a few days outlive doctors’ prognoses, while others who appear to be stronger 
die much sooner than anticipated.  As we have seen throughout my dissertation, decisions to 
provide, continue, withhold, or withdraw ANH have an impact on not only how long an ILTC 
may live, but also on his quality of life.  We want to provide ANH to ILTCs as a means of loving 
comfort, but we must also realize that ANH can harm ILTCs. 
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 Consider the case of a trisomy 18 infant named “JR” who was treated by Dr. Benson 
Shih-Han Hsu, author of “Cost of a Life” (Pharos 32-33).  “JR was born with significant 
congenital heart disease” (32).  In addition, “he developed severe pulmonary hypertension” (32).  
He was given a grim prognosis, but “his parents were clear that there be no limitations on care” 
(32).  One wonders what kind of information Hsu gave the parents on which to base their 
decision.  Hsu relates, “Knowing the overall poor prognosis of this condition, I wondered if his 
continued medical care was appropriate—not from a perspective of futility but from one of 
resource allocation” (32).   
 The parents waited until JR was four months old—the age at which trisomy 18 infants are 
able safely to undergo cardiac surgery—before having him undergo the procedure.  Dr. Hsu lists 
the complications resulting from surgery: 
Unfortunately, given his heart failure and feeding difficulties, he suffered multiple 
medical setbacks over the following eighteen months, undergoing several 
operations including gastric and duodenal tube placements, central lines 
placements, and pulmonary artery banding.  His postoperative recovery was 
constantly fraught with complications as he developed multiple infections and 
respiratory failure.  Despite the repeated setbacks, his parents maintained their 
resolve to not limit his care.  (32) 
 JR underwent another round of surgery to fix other heart defects at eighteen months.  
“But after over four weeks in pediatric intensive care with multiple failed extubations, his 
parents decided to withdraw care, convinced that he had endured more than enough suffering” 
(32).  Summarizing all the care JR received, Hsu says, 
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 JR had been admitted over fifteen times to the wards as well as the neonatal 
and pediatric intensive care units.  He underwent numerous operations and 
procedures.  He received consultations from more than eight separate pediatric 
services.  He suffered countless infections and was mechanically ventilated on 
several occasions.  He spent most of his life in the hospital and the cost of his care 
exceeded that of most hospitalized patients.  (32) 
Hsu says that JR “was aware of his environment, withdrawing from pain, having vital sign 
changes with stress, and even occasionally smiling” (32).  Dr. Hsu estimates that “[m]illions of 
dollars were spent on his care” (32).  Hsu writes, “After JR died, I felt comfortable in saying that 
his care was necessary” (33).  His conclusion is that “limiting care on arguments of allocation 
makes no sense, ethically or economically” (33).   
 Hsu’s article focuses more on resource allocation than on futility as a deciding factor in 
providing medical treatments to someone like JR.  Considering the family’s circumstances is 
important, but the problem in JR’s case seems to be that there was no limit to all the resources 
that were utilized.  Between the parents’ desire to save their child and the team’s efforts to 
accommodate them, JR’s best interests were ignored.  Two important questions arise: to which 
category did JR belong first, and what decisions should have been made in his best interests? 
 Considering the fact that JR was born with trisomy 18 with “significant congenital heart 
disease” and multiple anomalies, I would have considered him to be an ILTC in the first category 
(32).  Therefore, my recommendation would have been to refrain from initiating ANH.  Certain 
symptoms such as a dry mouth could have been alleviated by keeping his mouth moist.  And 
there would have been nothing wrong with providing him tastes of formula to keep him content. 
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 It was JR’s heart disease that would have ultimately caused his death.  JR’s parents 
decided to have him undergo corrective surgery, but he needed to be at least four months old 
before he could undergo that surgical procedure.  ANH was necessary, then, to keep him alive 
that long.  I am sure that when JR’s parents made the decision to have the doctors initiate ANH, 
they hoped he would not suffer complications as a result.  If JR had not been in pain and/or 
distress, we could have considered him to belong to the second category of ILTCs.  But because 
he suffered from both his heart condition and complications resulting from different forms of 
ANH, he belonged to the fourth category of ILTCs.  As we can see from this case, ILTCs do not 
progress sequentially from one category to another.  It is their particular circumstances that 
determine to which category they belong. 
 Since financial burdens were not a factor in JR’s case, and JR’s parents were willing to 
give him every chance at life, I set these and other concerns of the family aside to consider JR’s 
best interests.  Recall from the case history that he spent more time in the hospital than at home, 
underwent numerous operations and procedures (including mechanical ventilation), and suffered 
multiple complications.  The fact that he lived approximately eighteen months indicates that he 
outlived the vast majority of infants with trisomy 18.  The question is, should he have been 
allowed to live that long, considering what he endured?     
 Given the original diagnosis and prognosis, I would have withheld ANH from JR and 
allowed him to die within the first two weeks of his life.  Numerous operations and procedures, 
multiple setbacks, and countless infections indicated that he had been in a vicious cycle his entire 
life.  There is no doubt that JR’s parents loved him, but it appears that they made one loving 
decision far too late: the decision to let him go.  All the money in the world and the 
determination to “help” JR live as long as possible did not change the fact that his situation was 
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hopeless from the outset.  Recalling my discussion throughout chapter 3, the judgment that an 
ILTC’s quality of life is virtually or totally nonexistent does not mean that we value his life any 
less.  It simply means that the ILTC’s body is unable to function properly on its own to sustain 
life.  Dying after having been kept as content as possible through a short struggle for life is 
preferable to dying after a long, painful struggle that could have been avoided in the first place, 
especially when we consider that ILTCs cannot grasp why it is they are suffering or for what 
purpose. 
4.4  Ratzinger: A Model for Rethinking the Catholic Position on ANH for ILTCs 
 There is still the issue of embracing my proposal within the whole of Catholic teaching of 
caring for the sick and/or dying.  From a philosophical standpoint, it is easier to adopt Pacelli’s 
position over Wojtyla’s on the grounds that Wojtyla’s position is inconsistent with itself and with 
Pacelli’s position.  But we cannot forget the fact that these two positions come from two Popes 
who were and still are regarded as staunch pro-life advocates.  The issue of ANH for ILTCs is 
difficult because we must figure out for ourselves how Pacelli might have specifically addressed 
the topic, as well as figure out a way of following Wojtyla’s command despite the 
inconsistencies of his position.     
 Recall Bernardin’s claim that a consistent ethic of life calls for a change of attitude 
toward life.  But if we cling too tightly to the sanctity-of-life ethic without acknowledging the 
benefits of the quality-of-life ethic, we are in danger of embracing medical vitalism, which 
ultimately does the infant no good and sometimes even harms him.  If the sanctity-of-life ethic 
prohibits us from either withholding or withdrawing ANH from ILTCs, we are left only with the 
option of watching helplessly as an infant endures what we consider to be heroic suffering.  In 
situations such as the birth of an ILTC, the Church needs to offer parents not only spiritual 
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support, but also practical options.  I believe that Ratzinger’s answer to the AIDS problem in 
Africa can serve as a model for establishing conditions in which it can be morally acceptable to 
the Catholic Church to withhold or withdraw ANH from ILTCs who are in a constant state of 
pain and/or distress or have entered the dying process.   
 Aboard a flight to Cameroon on 17 March 2009, when questioned about the AIDS 
epidemic in Africa, Ratzinger said, “I would say that this problem . . . cannot be overcome 
merely with money, necessary though it is.  If there is no human dimension, if Africans do not 
help [by responsible behavior], the problem cannot be overcome by the distribution of 
prophylactics: on the contrary, they increase it” (Light of the World 193).  Many people 
worldwide claimed that the Pope had basically issued the people of Africa a death sentence.   
 Many people throughout the world have objected to the Church’s longstanding position 
against artificial birth control, including condoms.  In 1968, Pope Paul VI47 (whom I shall refer 
to as “Montini”) issued his last encyclical, Humanae Vitae [Of Human Life], in which he 
condemned the use of artificial birth control on the grounds that it rendered the conjugal act 
incapable of fulfilling both its unitive and procreative functions (10 [12]).48  Catholic couples 
worldwide were outraged over his position, and many people—both within and outside the 
Church—questioned what business the Church had in matters occurring in couples’ bedrooms.  
Quite often, whenever the Church pronounces a statement that runs counter to popular opinion, 
people dismiss the Church on the grounds that she is antiquated and/or irrelevant.  Papal 
                                                          
47
 Giovanni Cardinal Montini became Pope Paul VI upon his election to the papacy in 1963.  His 
pontificate lasted until 1978. 
48
 The Church teaches that in order for the conjugal act to remain consistent with the will of God 
(as He is the Creator and we imitate Him as ministers of creation), it must be both unitive 
(loving) and procreative (life-giving).  In vitro fertilization (IVF) can be procreative but not 
unitive, while intercourse using artificial contraception can be unitive, but is not life-giving.  The 
reader may access Humanae Vitae on the Internet here.  
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statements issued in encyclicals tend to give the impression that once a pope speaks his mind, the 
question is closed to debate. 
 Following Ratzinger’s comments, there was massive confusion as to whether Ratzinger 
had lifted the Church’s ban on the use of artificial contraception, most notably condoms.  Did 
Ratzinger give everyone permission to use them?  Or did Ratzinger give permission to use them 
only to people in Africa, or only to people with AIDS regardless of location, etc.?  Let us first 
look at the clarification Ratzinger provides to his interviewer, Peter Seewald: 
The Church does more than anyone else, because she does not speak from the 
tribunal of the newspapers, but helps her brothers and sisters where they are 
actually suffering.  In my remarks I was not making a general statement about the 
condom issue, but merely said, and this is what caused such great offense, that we 
cannot solve the problem by distributing condoms.  Much more needs to be done.  
We must stand close to the people, we must guide and help them; and we must do 
this both before and after they contract the disease. . . . 
 There may be a basis in the case of some individuals, as perhaps when a male 
prostitute uses a condom, where this can be a first step in the direction of a 
moralization, a first assumption of responsibility, on the way toward recovering 
an awareness that not everything is allowed and that one cannot do whatever one 
wants.  But it is not really the way to deal with the evil of HIV infection.  That 
can really lie only in a humanization of sexuality. . . . 
 She [the Catholic Church] of course does not regard [the use of condoms] as a 
real or moral solution, but, in this or that case, there can be nonetheless, in the 
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intention of reducing the risk of infection, a first step in a movement toward a 
different way, a more human way, of living sexuality.  (Light 118-119) 
If we pay very close attention to Ratzinger’s rationale for his initial comments, we see emerge a 
method of reexamining a moral dilemma in light of a situation that Montini could not have 
possibly imagined (i.e., AIDS) when he penned Humanae Vitae.   
 An important phrase to consider is “solve the problem.”  Before providing a solution, we 
must first correctly identify the problem.  What is the problem in Africa?  It is the spreading of 
AIDS.  The ANH-for-ILTCs issue presents a different kind of problem.  What is the problem 
with ANH for ILTCs?  They have life-terminating conditions that will cause them to die before 
the age of two, and providing ANH can cause additional harms and prolong the dying process.   
 Now we ask, why do we want to solve the problem?  We want to solve the AIDS 
problem so that Africans can live without the devastating consequences of AIDS.  Here is the 
fundamental difference between the AIDS problem and ILTCs.  We want to solve the ANH-for-
ILTCs problem not so that they can live long, healthy lives, but so that they can avoid 
unnecessary pain and/or distress and die comfortably. 
 Having identified the problems and the reasons for solving them, let us turn to the 
solutions.  First, if all we do to solve the AIDS problem is tell people that they cannot engage in 
sexual intercourse but they do so anyway, AIDS will continue to spread.  Science has shown that 
people can limit the spread of AIDS when they use condoms properly and the condoms do not 
fail.  While the use of condoms may help stop the spread of AIDS, their use does not cure it.    
Ratzinger hopes that there will one day be a cure for AIDS, but there is none right now.  In the 
meantime, we cannot abandon AIDS victims, regardless of the way they may have contracted it 
(either through lifestyle choices or through unknowingly coming in contact with contaminated 
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blood).  In particular, infected infants certainly have done nothing to warrant being abandoned; 
they are truly victims of their circumstances.  The ideal situation would be the elimination of 
AIDS and monogamous sex within marriage.  But since that is not the real situation, we must 
provide solutions that help people in their present circumstances.  
 What would be the ideal solution for ILTCs?  It would, of course, be a cure for their 
conditions.  But that is not the real situation.  Just as the Church thinks it is wrong to abandon 
AIDS victims, it would be equally wrong to abandon ILTCs and their families.  The real 
situation is that ILTCs will die before the age of two, and their families must struggle in 
numerous ways to care both for their infants and themselves.  The next best solution—which is 
available right now—is to provide comfort to ILTCs through palliative care and the form of 
ANH that is least invasive and delivers the most benefits while producing the fewest harms.  And 
if ANH becomes such that it produces more harms than benefits, withholding or withdrawing 
ANH is in itself another form of palliative care.   
 Second—and this is where we see the new model emerge—Ratzinger commends those 
who make a conscious decision to protect their partners.  Those engaging in sex outside of 
marriage or using a condom within marriage to avoid pregnancy are not living up to the Church’s 
ideal regarding human sexuality.  Ratzinger hopes these that people will eventually adopt the 
Church’s teaching on human sexuality,49 but in the meantime, the effort to protect others is better 
than simply seeking sexual pleasure and jeopardizing their partners’ health. 
                                                          
49
 Ratzinger did not reverse the Church’s position against the use of condoms as a means of 
artificial birth control for married couples.  The Church still encourages couples to practice 
natural family planning (NFP)—not to be confused with the rhythm method—as a practical 
option of regulating birth.  In Humanae Vitae, Montini states, “If, then, there are serious motives 
to space out births, which derive from the physical or psychological conditions of husband and 
wife, or from external conditions, the Church teaches that it is then licit to take into account the 
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 So how does this different approach apply to the debate over ANH for ILTCs?  Like 
infants born with HIV (who may live for several years; in this way they are different from 
ILTCs), ILTCs are not responsible for their conditions.  Families of ILTCs find themselves in a 
less-than-ideal situation from the very beginning of their children’s lives.  We should commend 
them for providing loving care to their infants rather than abandoning them.  Providing ANH to 
dying ILTCs does nothing to cure their life-terminating conditions.  Especially since curing the 
condition is not an option, comfort should be the top priority.  If medical science has 
demonstrated that the complete withholding or withdrawing of ANH—along with palliative care, 
if necessary—keeps these infants content, doctors should explain to families that withholding or 
withdrawing ANH will keep their ILTCs content and reassure them that making that decision is 
ultimately in their infants’ best interests.  Again I emphasize that we should not consider 
withholding or withdrawing ANH an automatic response in providing care—especially since 
some ILTCs may not enter the dying process or be in a constant state of pain and/or distress 
according to doctors’ original prognoses—but it should be made available as the situation calls 
for it.  In this way, we can make a quality-of-life judgment about an ILTC’s present and future 
life while still respecting the sanctity of his life.  Withholding or withdrawing ANH during the 
dying process or in a constant state of pain and/or distress would “[express]”, as Wojtyla says, 
“acceptance of the human condition in the face of death” (Gospel 118 [65]). 
 If we look at Pacelli’s speech, Wojtyla’s encyclical and his 2004 address, and Ratzinger’s 
response to the AIDS problem in Africa, we can see where Pacelli and Ratzinger have left 
dilemmas involving medical ethics open to debate, while Wojtyla appears to have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
natural rhythms immanent in the generative functions, for the use of marriage in the infecund 
periods only, and in this way to regulate birth without offending . . . moral principles. . .” (13 
[16]).    
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singlehandedly settled the ANH debate once and for all.  Pacelli recognized that artificial 
respiration was only one newly developed medical procedure.  He probably could not have 
imagined the kinds of medicines and new technology we now enjoy.  Had he lived (he died in 
1958, the year after he delivered “The Prolongation of Life”), he probably would have found it 
necessary to discuss the moral concerns regarding other new forms of medical technology.  
Likewise, Ratzinger knows that AIDS will continue to be a problem throughout the world for 
many years to come.  While condoms alone will not eradicate the problem, admitting that their 
use may be a first step towards adopting more responsible behavior keeps the debate alive.  But 
declaring the withholding or withdrawing of ANH to be morally impermissible and closing the 
ANH issue to debate (as Wojtyla and other bishops have done) while clinical evidence appears to 
offer a possible, practical solution may be another source of distress for families already dealing 
with a devastating situation.  And not allowing the withholding or withdrawing of ANH can 
create further pain and/or distress for ILTCs, whose basic needs should be at the center of the 
debate.   
 Worth noting is the fact that forty-one years passed between the time Montini published 
Humanae Vitae and Ratzinger offered his comments about condoms being a possible first step 
toward solving the AIDS crisis.  It has been fifty-four years since Pacelli delivered “The 
Prolongation of Life.”  The Church embraces ILTCs in its arguments for the sanctity of life, but 
she has not addressed in any great detail the special circumstances surrounding ILTCs and their 
families in her arguments.  It is time for the Church to engage in the debate over ANH for 
ILTCs. 
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 4.5  Conclusion 
 When it comes to end-of-life decisions, deciding to allow ILTCs to die is perhaps the 
hardest decision of all.  We are still getting to know them, and they leave this earth much sooner 
than we would like.  But in some circumstances, it is more in an ILTC’s best interests to die 
sooner and in peace rather than linger and suffer heroically.  In this chapter, I considered four 
categories of ILTCs: those who appear to be already dying from birth, those who will die 
anywhere between two weeks and two years, those who are not yet dying but suffer 
complications from ANH, and those who are not yet dying but suffer from both their conditions 
and the use of ANH.  In cases where ILTCs are already dying or demonstrating that they cannot 
assimilate food and fluids through ANH, withholding or withdrawing ANH is a loving form of 
care designed to ease the ILTC’s pain and/or distress.  Decisions regarding infants who are not 
yet dying from their conditions but seem to be able to tolerate ANH are more difficult.  If parents 
can determine that lifesaving treatments are extraordinary, they are morally permitted to allow 
their infants to die.  To ensure that the decision to withhold or withdraw ANH is not made too 
early, doctors should be watchful for signs that the dying process has begun.  It is understandable 
that parents want to provide every form of treatment so that their children might live.  Since it is 
clear that an ILTC will not survive, doctors should brief the family on the benefits of 
withholding or withdrawing ANH.  It is in the ILTC’s best interests, even though his death will 
create tremendous pain and suffering for the family.  Because this decision cannot be taken 
lightly, doctors must be as compassionate as possible when counseling families about end-of-life 
decisions for their infants.   
 Regardless of the position we take—Wojtyla’s or Pacelli’s—families must still deal with 
the death of their infants.  Serious illness, dying, and death can make families question, “Why 
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did this happen to us?”  Especially from a religious perspective, families often ask, “Why did 
God allow this to happen to us?”  At times like these, families are under considerable stress.  
People often turn to their faith for guidance and comfort.  But as I have argued, Wojtyla’s 
position places ILTCs and their families in situations amounting to heroic suffering, something 
Wojtyla himself says not everyone is obligated to undergo.  Regarding tensions between 
different Church teachings on the same issue, Ratzinger’s approach to solving the AIDS problem 
in Africa can serve as a model for debating the issue of ANH for ILTCs from a new perspective 
(i.e., an ILTC’s situation is hopeless from the outset, and most treatments are extraordinary for 
him).  Families need to make the correct ethical decisions about the care of their infants, but as I 
have argued, circumstances make it impossible to follow hard-and-fast rules, especially when 
there is no way of being completely certain about the future.  More than at any other time, 
families of ILTCs need compassionate spiritual care.  My aim in chapter 5 is to offer possible 
options for the Church to help in this regard. 
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Chapter 5: Providing Spiritual Care to Families of ILTCs 
 In the first four chapters of this dissertation, I focused primarily on comforting dying 
infants with life-terminating conditions (ILTCs) or trying to ensure that they are content.  I now 
wish to focus my attention on their families who must bear the burden of caring for them up to 
and including the moment of their death.  Recall Wojtyla’s admonition from The Gospel of Life: 
actions that cause human suffering “poison human society, and they do more harm to those who 
practice them than to those who suffer from the injury” (7 [3]; Wojtyla quoting Gaudium et 
Spes).  Loving families do not intentionally cause their ILTCs harm, but they may unknowingly 
do so when they permit doctors to perform medical procedures aimed at saving or prolonging 
these infants’ lives.  In such cases, these families may feel guilt and remorse if they think that 
their infants have suffered or died as the direct result of a particular decision they made (e.g., 
attempting, continuing, withholding, or withdrawing a treatment).  There is no immunity from 
pain and suffering resulting from the death of a loved one.  But no one needs to bear pain and 
suffering alone.  The Church is not presently in a position to provide guidance for parents of 
ILTCs because the Church’s teaching on artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) is not 
consistent.  But the aim of this chapter is to show that by rethinking its position on ANH, the 
Church can provide spiritual care by easing grieving families’ suffering and allowing them to 
experience the benefits of redemptive suffering. 
5.1  Distress versus Suffering 
 People often make statements such as, “This infant is suffering from heart disease” or 
“That infant suffered horribly before dying.”  But infants do not suffer in the true sense of the 
term.  They do, however, experience various types of distress.  What is distress?  Distress is the 
state of needing relief from some type of pain and/or discomfort.  Older children and adults can 
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sometimes manage to alleviate their own distress by themselves or by asking others to help them.  
For example, an adult can flee a burning building, and a student struggling with a particular 
subject can ask a teacher for help.  Infants, however, need help in obtaining relief.  Infants can 
experience life-threatening distress when they are choking or are drowning in the bathtub.  
Infants can also experience mild distress when they are cold, hungry, or in some type of physical 
pain (e.g., when they receive an injection).  Chronic distress can last indefinitely, while other 
forms of distress (e.g., an injection) can be momentary.  Crying and thrashing are often signs that 
an infant is in distress.  An infant can also be in danger of death without alerting anyone (e.g., 
sudden infant death syndrome, or SIDS50).  At the end of chapter 3, I proposed that our goal 
should be to keep a dying ILTC content.  While keeping an ILTC content may do nothing to 
prevent him from dying, keeping him content will prevent him from being in distress (i.e., 
feeling pain, crying, and/or thrashing). 
 About ILTCs, people often say, “It is better for an infant to die than to suffer 
indefinitely.”  We understand what they mean, but to say that an infant suffers is actually 
incorrect.  Therefore, we need to define exactly what we mean by “suffering.”  As we shall see, it 
is not necessarily the ILTC who needs relief from his suffering, but the family who needs relief 
from theirs.  Once we understand the difference, we can begin to help families heal. 
 Except for those patients who cannot feel pain (e.g., anencephalic infants, patients in a 
permanent vegetative state [PVS], and patients who are sedated), physical pain is often, but not 
always, the initial event that causes people to suffer.  But not all physical pain leads to suffering.  
                                                          
50
 I do not consider infants who die from SIDS to be ILTCs.  Families of infants who die from 
SIDS do not have to make decisions about end-of-life care as do families of ILTCs.  But the 
sudden death of an infant from SIDS can cause parents to second-guess everything they did 
before laying their infant down to sleep.  For this reason, we can expect these families to feel 
guilt, even if they have done nothing wrong.  
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For example, a marathon runner completing the last mile and in position to win is no doubt 
experiencing great physical pain.  But anticipating his first-place finish, he experiences 
jubilation, not suffering.  Likewise, a mother delivering her child naturally experiences 
excruciating pain, but once her child is born, she is overcome with joy as she holds her baby in 
her arms.   
 Sometimes it happens, though, that someone else is in terrible pain or experiencing an 
unfortunate turn of events, but I still experience suffering.  For example, one of my children may 
be involved in a serious accident or I may learn that another family member has been evicted 
from his house or been arrested for some violation of the law.  My child’s accident involves 
physical pain for him, but not for me.  My other family member’s arrest may not involve any 
physical pain whatsoever.  But I still suffer nonetheless.  How is this possible? 
  In “The Meanings of Suffering,” Stan van Hooft says, “The very word suffering has a 
resonance that relates to our sense of life’s meaning and the threat suffering poses to our hopes 
of happiness. . . .  Suffering is a spiritual phenomenon, an event that strikes at the faith we can 
have in life” (13).  Quoting Stanley Hauerwas, van Hooft writes, “ ‘Suffering is not morally 
significant only because things happen to us that we cannot avoid . . . but because the demand of 
morality cannot be satisfied without asking the self to submit to limits imposed by morality 
itself” (15).  In “Diagnosing Suffering: A Perspective,” Eric J. Cassell writes, “Suffering 
involves some symptom or process that threatens the patient because of fear, the meaning of the 
symptom, and concerns about the future” (531).  
 From these reflections, we begin to see why infants are incapable of suffering.  They 
have not matured to a stage at which they find meaning in anything.  Although they can be made 
comfortable, infants are incapable of happiness in the Aristotelian sense because they cannot 
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willfully choose to pursue activities leading to a higher end.  Infants do not engage in spiritual 
matters, although they can receive benefits from the spiritual activities of others.  Infants cannot 
comprehend morality, limitations, fear, or the future.  But others who care for these infants can 
and do comprehend these things.  This is why families often suffer when their infants experience 
pain and/or distress. 
 ILTCs experience pain and/or distress primarily on the physical level, and, to some 
extent, on the emotional level (e.g., being isolated in an incubator in the neonatal intensive care 
unit [NICU]).  Family members do not feel the physical pain that the ILTC does, but they 
experience anguish on the physical level in a different way, and on several other levels as well.  
For instance, providing round-the-clock care can take a physical toll on family members.  Worry 
and fear can cause emotional pain, which in turn can manifest itself in physical ways as well.  
Family members may feel socially isolated from others.  There is a moral dimension to decisions 
we make about medical care for ourselves and others.  And because it is possible to make both 
ethical and unethical choices when it comes to providing care, families of ILTCs suffer from the 
weight of the decisions they must make and then, often, also from guilt or remorse about the 
decisions they did make.  And the illness and death of an infant can be spiritually devastating for 
families.  The Church must provide spiritual care to her members, and this is something different 
from her teaching or guidance function. 
5.2  Heroic Suffering 
 In chapters 3 and 4, I mentioned the notion of heroic suffering.  What is heroic suffering?  
Heroic suffering does not mean acting like a hero in the face of suffering.  Heroic suffering is 
suffering which goes beyond what can be expected or asked of a person.  Wojtyla himself says 
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that not everyone is obligated to endure it.  But the history of the Catholic Church is full of saints 
who suffered heroically. 
 Both the Old and New Testaments recount stories of the epitome of heroic suffering: 
being martyred for the faith.  Chapters 6 and 7 of 2 Maccabees51 in the Old Testament give 
accounts of the martyrdom of Eleazar and the martyrdom of a mother and her seven sons.52  
Chapter 7 of the Acts of the Apostles in the New Testament provides the details of Stephen’s53 
martyrdom. 
 All Christians are called to be Christ’s witnesses to the world, and some may experience 
great suffering as a result, including a martyr’s death.  But there have been many good Christians 
who, instead of suffering a martyr’s death, endured what we would consider to be heroic 
suffering on various levels.  Countless saints have suffered horrible afflictions or been persecuted 
without having been put to death.  The reason saints are recognized as such is that they willfully 
chose to forgo much of what this life has to offer in exchange for the glory of God, no matter the 
cost.  It was this willingness to suffer that they earned the Church’s highest distinction. 
 In section 5.1 above, I argued that, strictly speaking, infants do not suffer.  But when 
Wojtyla speaks of “heroic suffering,” he is using a broader sense of the term, that is, suffering 
involving extreme pain or discomfort, which ILTCs can in fact experience.  In The Gospel of 
Life, Wojtyla himself says that heroic suffering “cannot be considered the duty of everyone” 
                                                          
51
 Many people may not be familiar with 1 and 2 Maccabees in the Catholic Bible.  According to 
the introduction of 1 Maccabees, “The Books of Maccabees, though regarded by Jews and 
Protestants as apocryphal, i.e., not inspired Scripture, because not contained in the Palestinian 
Canon or list of books drawn up at the end of the first century A.D., have nevertheless always 
been accepted by the Catholic Church as inspired, on the basic of apostolic tradition” (New 
American Bible 468). 
52
 The mother and her seven sons were all martyred on the same day. 
53
 As the early Church continued to grow, the Twelve Apostles called seven men to assist them 
in spreading the Gospel.  Stephen was one of the first seven assistants.  See Acts 6.1-7. 
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(118 [65]).  But infants—healthy or imperiled—have neither duties nor choice, so they certainly 
cannot be expected to undergo heroic suffering.  It is not hard to imagine that an ILTC’s heroic 
suffering leads to his family’s heroic suffering.  If we can keep an ILTC from suffering 
heroically, we may alleviate—but not totally eliminate—his family’s suffering.  Recall from 
section 4.4 Ratzinger’s challenge for us to relieve suffering where we can.  Why should we not 
try at the very least, then, to prevent ILTCs and their families from suffering heroically? 
5.3  Redemptive Suffering 
 There is a belief within the Catholic Church that we can participate in Christ’s 
redemptive work by suffering.  Such suffering is called “redemptive suffering.”  To be clear, 
redemptive suffering does not mean that Christ’s sacrifice on the cross was in any way 
inadequate in procuring salvation for all humanity, and we somehow add what is missing.  Since 
suffering is part of the human condition, the question then becomes, what do we do about 
suffering when we experience it?   
 To gain a better understanding of redemptive suffering for families of ILTCs, it is best to 
consider briefly the redemptive suffering of Christ.  Paul says in his letter to the Philippians: “. . . 
[T]hough he was in the form of God, [Christ Jesus] did not regard equality with God something 
to be grasped.  Rather, he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, coming in human likeness; 
and found human in appearance, he humbled himself, becoming obedient to death, even death on 
a cross” (2.6-8).  Christ Himself sets the grounds for being one of His disciples: “ ‘Whoever 
wishes to come after me must deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me’ ” (Mark 8.34).  
Out of appreciation for the ransom He paid, we need to offer something of ourselves.  The 
willful gesture of offering ourselves out of appreciation is obedience on our part.  There is no 
complete escape from suffering, but the Church teaches that our suffering can somehow be 
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united to that of Christ’s.  We learn from the Catechism of the Catholic Church that by uniting 
one’s own suffering to Christ’s, “[s]uffering, a consequence of original sin, acquires a new 
meaning; it becomes a participation in the saving work of Jesus” (n. 1521). 
 St. Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897), who nicknamed herself the “Little Flower,” was a 
Carmelite nun who developed what she called the “Little Way.”54  The Little Way is really 
nothing more than performing the most ordinary acts or embracing whatever suffering we 
encounter out of love for Jesus and for the sake of others’ spiritual benefit.  St. Therese’s sister, 
Céline (who was also a Carmelite nun and took the name Sister Geneviève), says the following 
about Thérèse: 
The saint’s voluntary participation in the Passion of Christ (a participation 
foreseen, to be sure, in her Act of Oblation according to the degree willed by Our 
Lord) is the reason for her extraordinary sufferings, especially during those last 
years of her life.  The two burning ideals of Thérèse’s vocation . . . might be 
expressed in this way: 
a) . . . when she was fourteen years old, she voiced the desire to suffer and to 
help save souls by the Cross; 
b) . . . at the summit of her spiritual ascent, she offered herself as a victim to 
the merciful love of God, to make amends to this love which is ignored on all 
sides.  (Clarke 15; Clarke quoting A Memoir of My Sister) 
                                                          
54
 Because of the Little Way’s simplicity and popularity among Catholics worldwide, St. Therese 
was the latest saint to be declared a doctor of the Church by none other than Pope John Paul II 
(Wojtyla) himself in 1997.  This honor has been given to only thirty-three individuals (only three 
of whom are women) in the entire history of the Catholic Church. 
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St. Thérèse died a most painful death from tuberculosis, and thus her suffering was clearly 
heroic.  But even according to her, that does not mean that we must also undergo heroic suffering 
to participate in redemptive suffering.  We can take even the slightest suffering we encounter and 
offer it on behalf of others.  For example, we can offer a prayer to God in the midst of our 
suffering, even if that prayer is short or expresses anger.  Or we can perform some very simple 
act out of love for others (e.g., holding open a door).  Recall from section 3.4 Jesus’ words:  
“ ‘Amen, I say to you, whatever you did for one of these least brothers of mine, you did for me’ ” 
(Matt. 25.40).  From the parable of the talents,55 we hear the words we hope to have spoken to us 
at our own judgment: “ ‘Well done, my good and faithful servant. . . .  Come, share your 
master’s joy’ ” (Matt. 25.21).   
 In the process of praying and doing works for others, then, a person also obtains spiritual 
benefits for himself.  This appears to be somewhat ironic and raises a very important question: 
can the willingness to participate in redemptive suffering drive families too far in providing care, 
especially in cases involving ILTCs?  In other words, can the family of an ILTC use his pain 
and/or distress for their own spiritual benefit while the prolongation of life does not benefit him 
at all?  I believe the answer to this question is yes.  As I explained in section 4.3, a family may 
believe that they are doing what is in their infant’s best interests by giving him every chance to 
survive (e.g., ANH, heart surgery, etc.).  From Hsu’s “Cost of a Life,” we do not know anything 
about JR’s family’s spiritual life, that is, if they have one at all.  But let us suppose for a moment 
that they believe that they derive spiritual benefits by providing JR with whatever care is 
necessary to prolong his life.  In doing so, however, they are in fact practicing medical vitalism 
and subjecting JR to heroic suffering, neither of which the Church demands, especially in cases 
                                                          
55
 See Matthew 25.14-30. 
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where the patient has no say about his own medical care.  This issue arises not only with ILTCs, 
but with older, chronically ill patients, whose families sometimes prolong their lives because 
caring for them is the only source of meaning in families’ lives.  In any case, it is morally wrong 
to cause or prolong the suffering of others in order to try to derive spiritual benefits for oneself 
from their suffering.  
 So how can the family of an ILTC participate in redemptive suffering without its 
becoming heroic suffering, especially for the ILTC?  The family of an ILTC can participate in 
redemptive suffering from the moment they discover their infant has life-terminating conditions 
(even if he is in utero), throughout his lifetime (no matter how long or short it is), and 
indefinitely after he has died.  Participating in redemptive suffering can involve praying for the 
infant and/or any other families undergoing similar situations, donating to foundations aimed at 
helping families of ILTCs, offering support to other families of ILTCs, etc.  These are all ways 
of helping others without increasing or prolonging an ILTC’s pain and/or distress.  I believe we 
reap the most spiritual benefits when we are focused on others’ spiritual welfare to the point 
where we completely forget about our own.          
 Is it possible for families to participate in redemptive suffering if they do not know what 
it is?  I believe the answer to this question is yes.  When Jesus explains what will happen to 
people based on what they have done or have failed to do in Matthew 25.31-46, notice that both 
groups of people ask the king when it was that they did or did not do something for him.  So 
people who are unfamiliar with redemptive suffering may provide all kinds of spiritual benefits 
for themselves and for others without realizing it.   
 Some people may ask, can only Christians participate in redemptive suffering?  What 
about those who do not belong to any particular denomination or those do not profess belief in 
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God?  Cassell discusses transcendence, which appears to be quite similar to redemptive 
suffering.  Cassell writes, “When experienced, transcendence locates the person in a far larger 
landscape.  The sufferer is not isolated by pain but is brought closer to a transpersonal source of 
meaning and to the human community that shares that meaning.  Such an experience need not 
involve religion in any formal sense; however, in its transpersonal dimension it is deeply 
spiritual” (Nature of Suffering 45).  It is quite probable that families of ILTCs will find 
themselves interacting with many people who do not share the same faith.  Families may find 
that some of the people giving them the most comfort are spiritual, but not necessarily religious.   
 I believe that if people learn about the benefits they can provide to others through 
redemptive suffering (or transcendence, in Cassell’s terms), they will try to see past their own 
suffering and try to help others whenever and however they can.  St. Thérèse is the perfect 
example of someone who embraced redemptive suffering after learning about it; it became her 
life’s mission, long before she succumbed to tuberculosis.   
 But there is an underlying question we need to answer as well: when does the family’s 
suffering become heroic?  Wojtyla says that not everyone is obligated to undergo heroic 
suffering.  But from Wojtyla’s claim that ANH constitutes ordinary and therefore obligatory 
care, families find themselves obligated to provide ANH to their ILTCs.  But complications 
resulting from the use of ANH and/or the progression of an ILTC’s condition(s) can cause him to 
suffer heroically, as well as his family.  But recall Pacelli’s remarks about duties of families: 
-  But normally one is held to use only ordinary means—according to 
circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture—that is to say, means that do 
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another.  A more strict obligation 
would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the 
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higher, more important good too difficult.  Life, health, all temporal activities are 
in fact subordinated to spiritual ends.  (94) 
-  The rights and duties of the family depend in general upon the presumed will 
of the unconscious patient if he is of age and “sui juris.”  Where the proper and 
independent duty of the family is concerned, they are usually bound only to the 
use of ordinary means. 
 Consequently, if it appears that the attempt at resuscitation constitutes in 
reality such a burden for the family that one cannot in all conscience impose it 
upon them, they can lawfully insist that the doctor should discontinue these 
attempts, and the doctor can lawfully comply.  (96) 
Distilling the following arguments from both Wojtyla’s and Pacelli’s comments above, we notice 
a real dilemma for families of ILTCs.  The first argument is as follows: 
1.  Wojtyla says not everyone is obligated to undergo heroic suffering. 
2.  The Church teaches that the provision of ANH is obligatory. 
3.  The provision of ANH can force an ILTC and/or his family to suffer 
heroically. 
4.  But (1) contradicts (3). 
We now proceed to the second argument: 
5.  The Church teaches that we are supposed to respect life from its very 
beginning to the moment of natural death. 
6.  Medical science maintains that withholding or withdrawing ANH can be a 
means of facilitating natural death. 
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7.  But the Church teaches that withholding or withdrawing ANH to facilitate 
death is euthanasia and makes us unable to participate in the sacramental life of 
the Church. 
8.  So it appears that in order to be able to participate in the sacramental life of the 
Church, we must continue to provide ANH. 
But (8) can lead us to (3), which contradicts (1).  A real dilemma for families of ILTCs develops 
when, on one hand, they find themselves in most need of spiritual care, while on the other, they 
may choose an action that is not morally permitted by the Church and so make certain forms of 
spiritual care such as the sacraments unavailable to them.  The ramifications can be quite 
substantial.  They may subject their infants to heroic suffering that is truly unnecessary, and they 
may become so bitter with the Church that they decide to leave it. 
 There is no predicting how individuals or their families will suffer during their lifetimes.  
Some families seem to endure heroic suffering interminably, while other families seem to avoid 
it by and large.  It seems ironic that the full range of spiritual care that the Church provides to its 
members is available when they are not suffering (provided, of course, that they remain in a state 
of grace), but not when they believe they have no option but to choose an action that is morally 
prohibited by the Church.  
5.4  How the Church Can Provide Spiritual Care to Families of ILTCs 
 There is one major obstacle to overcome before the Church can provide adequate 
spiritual care to the parents of ILTCs, and that is the Church’s present teaching that a family 
cannot withhold or withdraw ANH from an ILTC unless it is clear that ANH produces more 
harms than benefits or the ILTC is in his final hours.   
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 My son Zachary was born less than three weeks after my wife and I discovered that he 
had trisomy 13.  Not knowing what we would be facing in terms of taking care of him, we told 
our family, close friends, doctors, and our pastors that we would provide whatever care was 
necessary to keep him comfortable and remain with him until the time he died.  There was 
nothing that we said or planned to do that conflicted with Church teaching, and since Zachary 
only lived six hours, providing long-term care was not an issue for us.  We received all kinds of 
support and spiritual care from people within our parish, and we continued to enjoy fully 
participating in the sacramental life of the Church.  Zachary’s death was tremendously painful 
for us, but it did not create moral dilemmas for us or cause us spiritual suffering to the point 
where we felt that the Church could not help us, or worse, to the point where we felt that leaving 
the Church might have been a better option for us. 
 But there are families whose ILTCs live longer than six hours, and providing care for 
more than a day raises various concerns.  Suppose a family tells their pastor, “The doctors and 
nurses have suggested withholding or withdrawing ANH as a form of palliative care.”  If the 
pastor upholds Church teaching on the matter (which he should if he wants to remain faithful to 
it), his response will probably be, “This is something that the Church does not permit.  You must 
provide ANH to your infant until it is clear that there is no way he can assimilate food and fluids 
or he is in his final hours.  But I will pray for you.”  This is something no family wants to hear, 
and we see where this response leaves the family.  First, the family is considering an option (i.e., 
euthanasia, at least from the Church’s point of view) that will prevent them from fully 
participating in the sacramental life of the Church.  Second, the family is left without a practical 
option of providing comfort care for their infant and must resign themselves to heroic suffering.  
Third, they come away with a feeling that “I will pray for you” really means, “I will pray that 
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you see the error of your ways and will instead do the right thing.”  Rather than feel that they are 
being provided spiritual care, the family may reasonably feel as though they are being judged by 
someone who probably cannot completely comprehend how agonizing their situation is.  If the 
parents decide to withhold or withdraw ANH  from their infant to relieve pain and/or distress, 
they are cut off from what they probably need most of all—participating in the sacramental life 
of the Church—since, as Pacelli says, spiritual goods are superior to temporal goods.   
 So how can the Church provide spiritual care to families of ILTCs, especially if they 
decide to withhold or withdraw ANH as a form of palliative care?  This is where my discussion 
of Ratzinger comes into play.  If the Church makes the effort to revisit the debate over ANH for 
ILTCs and consults with experts in palliative care, she may come to the same conclusion that I 
have: withholding or withdrawing ANH from an ILTC may provide comfort to the ILTC for as 
long as he continues to live, while at the same time taking both his sanctity of life and quality of 
life into account.  We provide as much earthly care as possible and avoid medical vitalism, 
which only prolongs the ILTC’s pain and/or distress.  We accept natural death.  We allow nature 
to take its course while at the same entrust the ILTC’s soul to God’s care. 
 Suppose that the Church agrees with my proposal and encourages pastors to provide care 
to families of ILTCs based on it.  What steps would she need to take?  
 First, the Church needs to rethink her position on ANH in general.  As it stands right 
now, there is a real gap between medical science and religion, or between earthly and spiritual 
care.  Medical science continues to develop all sorts of treatments to prolong a patient’s life, but 
this does not mean that the Church approves of every treatment.  In addition, because medical 
science can create moral dilemmas, the Church finds herself having to address the morality of 
science, when her primary expertise and mission involve the spiritual welfare of her members.  
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Pacelli admits that there are some instances where the Church cannot address scientific matters 
because she does not have the expertise.  When the growing body of medical knowledge seems 
to indicate that it is in a patient’s best interests to stop being fed and hydrated for one or more 
reasons, the Church should be open to such discussions and rethink her position on the issue. 
 Second, if the Church does indeed approve of withholding or withdrawing ANH as a 
form of palliative care, she should inform families that such a decision is permissible and offer 
whatever spiritual care she can.  Recall from section 4.4 that Ratzinger says that the Church 
“must stand close to the people, we must guide and help them. . . ” (118).  If families know they 
have the Church’s support, they will be more inclined to ask for help and to continue 
participating in the life of the Church, especially during a most difficult time like this. 
 Of course, a family of an ILTC may refuse spiritual care for one or more reasons.  
Perhaps they are overwhelmed by the situation.  Perhaps they are in denial that their infant will 
die from his condition.  Or perhaps they are so angry with God for allowing their child to be born 
with life-terminating conditions.  The Church (by “Church” I mean the local parish) should make 
herself available to the family with the understanding that the family may refuse help.  This does 
not mean, however, that the Church should abandon the family.  It may take some time for the 
family to accept the situation and realize that they do need help.  It is hard to offer help and be 
rejected, but we must remember that not all families will accept their situation in the same 
manner or according to an established time frame. 
 Third and finally, the Church must work with medical science to help her members learn 
how to deal with dying and death.  Illness, dying, and death do not involve just our bodies.  
Illness, dying, and death involve our souls as well.  When faced with issues of mortality, many 
people turn to the Church for spiritual care.  On one hand, the Church teaches that we are to care 
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for earthly life as long as it shall last, but on the other, the Church also teaches us that at some 
point we must all die and return to our Creator.  Most people look forward to being in heaven, 
but they fear the process of getting there.  We are constantly told that heaven is a place of bliss.  
But dying and death create all kinds of turmoil for us: worry, fear, anger, bitterness, depression, 
etc.  So there is a tug of war between our bodies and souls.  People need help making the 
transition between life and death 
 It is not enough for the Church to preach about heaven on Sundays.  She needs to engage 
the medical community, particularly in the area of palliative care for the dying.  This is where the 
Church can help effect a change of attitude towards life that Bernardin calls for in “A Consistent 
Ethic of Life.”  In conjunction with the medical community, the Church can better serve her 
members by addressing what happens to the body during the dying process, what concerns and 
emotions may arise as a result, and what palliative options can be chosen to keep dying patients 
and their families comfortable.  If care is provided on all levels, dying patients and families may 
feel assured that they are choosing Church-approved palliative methods, and they have the full 
support of the Church.  
5.5  Conclusion       
 Not all suffering can be avoided or eliminated, but the Church has the tremendous task of 
helping to alleviate it where possible.  In providing spiritual care, the Church can help her 
members participate in redemptive suffering while helping them avoid heroic suffering, 
especially if it is not their choice.  It is easy to provide spiritual care to an ILTC.  But as we have 
seen throughout this dissertation, ILTCs primarily need physical comfort, while families need 
comfort on several different levels.  The Church needs to undertake a number of tasks.  First, she 
needs to consult palliative care specialists to rethink the debate over ANH for ILTCs.  Second, 
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she needs to offer practical moral guidance for families (i.e., giving families moral permission to 
withhold or withdraw ANH when it is in ILTCs’ best interests).  Third, she needs to educate all 
her members about the benefits of withholding or withdrawing ANH towards the end of life.  
Knowing what a dying patient’s own body can do to facilitate natural death will relieve families 
of having to make some very difficult end-of-life decisions, especially when the continued use of 
various forms of artificial life support borders on medical vitalism.  The Church should respect 
the wisdom of the medical community and keep her focus where it belongs: on the spiritual care 
of her members.  In this way she can best fulfill her primary mission: the salvation of her 
members. 
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Checklist for Determining Necessity of ANH for ILTCs 
 
Families, doctors, and chaplains should consult this checklist during the decision-making 
process.  All parties must answer the following questions honestly and in order, beginning with 
the first question.  Especially if there is a change in the infant’s status, it is imperative to start 
with the first question every time, no matter how many times this checklist has been 
implemented in the past. 
 
1.  Is the infant healthy? 
Yes.  Food and fluids (OFF)56 obligatory. 
No.  Diagnosis of ailment obligatory.   
 
2.  Is the illness/condition at this moment life-threatening? 
Yes.  Proceed to next question. 
No.  Treat the illness, and give OFF as prescribed. 
 
3.  Is there hope of recovery from illness/condition? 
Yes.  Treat illness/condition.  Provide OFF, unless infant is unable. 
No.  Administer palliative care, and provide OFF if infant seems hungry or thirsty. 
 
4.  Will the infant survive more than two years? 
Yes.  Not included in this dissertation. 
No.  Dissertation restricted to these cases. 
 
5.  Is the condition itself gravely burdensome for the infant?  
Yes.  Allow condition to progress and give palliative care as needed.  Provide OFF, unless infant 
is unable. 
No.  Continue to provide OFF, and provide simple care to alleviate pain/distress. 
 
6.  Is the treatment for the condition in (5) gravely burdensome for the infant? 
Yes.  Treatment optional.  Allow condition to progress and give palliative care as needed.  
Provide OFF, unless infant is unable. 
No.  Provide treatment and OFF, unless infant is unable. 
 
7.  Will treatment(s) involve extraordinary means?  That is, will the family (including infant) face 
grave burdens in treating infant? 
Yes.  Treatment(s) optional.  Administer palliative care to keep infant comfortable.  Provide OFF 
unless futile. 
No.  Treatment(s) obligatory.  Use sedatives to keep infant comfortable.  Provide OFF. 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
 For clarification, I shall use the abbreviation “OFF” for food and fluids a person can ingest 
orally, and “ANH” for food and fluids delivered by any artificial means. 
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8.  Will grave burdens fall only on infant? 
Yes.  Consider physical pain/distress as part of treatment/non-treatment decision.  This could 
happen only if parents were uncaring, uninvolved, and medically indigent. 
No.  In addition to physical burdens on infant, consider burdens on family such as physical, 
financial, psychological, social, and/or spiritual. 
 
9.  Can infant ingest OFF? 
Yes.  OFF mandatory.   
No.  Consider alternative method of feeding and hydrating (i.e., some form of ANH).  Prioritize 
methods according to what is easiest to employ/least invasive and delivers most benefit. 
 
10.  Is infant taking enough OFF to sustain life? 
Yes.  OFF still mandatory. 
No.  Provide ice chips, tastes of food, but do not begin ANH unless as a “bridge” treatment.  
Infant may be dying from condition, complication due to condition, or complication due to 
treatment.  Consult doctor immediately for diagnosis. 
 
11.  Is ANH not a “bridge” treatment but expected to be permanent? 
Yes.  ANH is a permanent treatment.  Do not begin ANH. 
No.  Administer ANH until infant can ingest OFF. 
 
12.  Have complications occurred? 
Yes.  Determine what complication has occurred (e.g., fluid in lungs, edema, infection) and treat 
accordingly. 
No.  Continue ANH. 
 
13.  Have complications reoccurred? 
Yes.  Determine whether this is beginning of complication-treatment cycle. 
No.  Continue ANH. 
 
14.  Do the treatments for complications constitute grave burdens in themselves to the infant? 
Yes.  Obligatory discontinuation of treatment. 
No.  Continue ANH.  Treatment for many complications resulting from treatments will be 
burdensome, but not necessarily gravely burdensome. 
 
15.  Is the complication-treatment cycle gravely burdensome to the rest of the family? 
Yes.  Consider discontinuation of treatment. 
No.  Continue treatment.  Some burdens are not grave and should be borne by family due to the 
infant’s vulnerability. 
 
16.  Is infant now dying from illness/condition? 
Yes.  Use palliative care.  Determine whether OFF are no longer necessary.  If ANH in use, 
discontinue.   
No.  Continue ANH. 
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17.  Is ANH itself now (at this moment) life-threatening? 
Yes.  Discontinue ANH. 
No.  Continue ANH. 
 
18.  Does infant now require extraordinary means of care? 
Yes.  Treatment optional.  Continue ANH unless treatment itself is gravely burdensome for 
infant. 
No.  Treatment obligatory.  Continue ANH. 
 
19.  Is ANH futile? 
Yes.  Obligation to discontinue ANH. 
No.  Continue ANH unless one of previous conditions is met. 
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